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Introduction

A

number of prominent

legal scholars

have proposed

European thinking and "colonial experiences" was
review. Such a doctrine

and

is

American system of

over executive actions and legislative

why

doctrine has an actual basis in fact, however,

America, for instance,

did

we

same

not see the

statutes.' If the

"logical" result

Mexico, where the colonizer was also a European

in

country and the nation also endured the "colonial experience"? The reasons are

the

most important depend on

relevance

is

judicial

based upon the existence of a higher law over other lower laws

in the judicial control practiced

in Latin

the

that a "logical" product ol

and philosophical motivations.

historic

A

philosophical thoughts prevailing in Europe

at that

Roman

but

matter of great

the distinct character of the legal traditions of each country, the

influence from the British and the civil law experience from

many

Law.""

common

law

The opposing

time were also significant.

Several factors caused the United States and Mexico to have different legal

frameworks.

'

Mauro

On

the one hand,

the

power of

Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the

the

Supreme Court of

Contemporary World

25

(

1

the United States

is

a

97 )[hereinafter Cappelletti,
Law 89-90 (1989
1

Judicial Review]. See also Allan R. Brewer-Cari'as, Judicial Review in Comparative

Cambridge) [hereinafter Brewer-Cari'as]. See A. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall 142 (1919).
Certainly, the maxim of judicial review itself is "wholly and exclusively American."
"
John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western
Europe and Latin America 34-38 (2"'' ed. 1985) [hereinafter The Civil Law Tradition]. See also Robert S'.
Barker, Constitutionalism in the Americas:

A

Bicentennial Perspective (A Bicentennial Celebration of the

Constitution: The Third Circuit Judicial Conference in Philadelphia

(1988) [hereinafter Barker, Constitutionalism in the Americas].

Essax), 49 U.

Pitt.

L. Rev.

891; 900

On

very active one within the decision-making sphere.

duties

judges

ol"

undependable

Mexico have labeled

in

one.'*

The

the

analyze

procedure, and

its

The most

are

branch

be reviewed

in

and discuss the judicial review doctrine,

as

institutions-from their

this

its

paper,

different

which

significant political principles

more

all

facilitate the

government,

will

it

facets,

States with a federal

linked to Federalism."

likely than others to

the

need

establishment of judicial control.

its

to

It

The second

is

form of

have an equal distribution of powers

maintain

satisfactory

a

balance

in

an

In states with a

has

led

to

the

has been asseverated that the construction of judicial

review has had two principal expectations. The

rights.

but

establishment of the

attempt to prevent usurpation of authority by any branch over the other.

federal

and

passive

a

effects.

judicial review doctrine are

government

judicial

significant differences of both judicial

functions, competence, and organization-will

primarily

the other hand, the nieclianical

judicial protection of individual

first is

ample protection of the Constitution, which

is

an organic

instrument to control the diverse powers of a government.

To
herein

ensure that the concept under examination

is

clear, judicial

review as used

"any judicial action that involves the review of an inferior legal norm for

is

conformity with a higher one, with the implicit possibility that the reviewing court

Robert

F.

Utter and David C. Lundsgaard. Judicial Review in the

Some Thoughts from

a

Comparative Perspective, 54 Ohio

New

St.

may

Nations of Central and Eastern Europe:
559, at 560 [hereinafter Utter and

L.J.

Lundsgaard].

1

'
''

James F. Smith, Confronting Differences in the United States and Mexican Legal System in the Era of NAFTA,
U.S.-Mex. L.J. 85, 88-89 (1993) [hereinafter Smith, Confronting Differences].
See Brewer-Cari'as, supra note 1 at 11 7- 124.
The principle of Separation of Powers contemplates three "autonomous entities" with their own independence

perform their functions (Legislative, Executive and Judicial) Geoffrey Stone et al. Constitutional
385-392 (3''' ed. 1996) [hereinafter Stone].

to

Law

invalidate

or suspend the

norm

inlerior

attempts to define judicial review

in

all

it

its

necessary or desirable."

possible versions. For

different manifestations of judicial action have been

The doctrine of

similar.

judicial.

in its effects, but the

Characteristically, judicial

Constitution, which regularly

is

the

review

power

scholars, the

ends procured are very

is

organ of control

practiced

supreme law over

those systems have searched for effective

constitutions by giving a

the

some

deiinilion

review can also vary according to the means of

judicial

procedures employed and even

many, but

This

mechanisms

to ordinary

judges

is

always purely

by systems with a written

the other ordinary laws.

to guarantee the

(in the

Hence,

defense of their

American model) or

special

Constitutional Courts (European model) to declare the unconstitutionality of state laws

enacted in violation of the Constitution.'" Although there could be as

many forms

to

warrant the constitutionality of laws and regulations as there are countries with a written

Constitution, the scope of this study

models, the American system

The

in the

final analysis includes the

of both models and

is

is

limited to analyzing the

two most important

United States and the European model

form of judicial review

characterized as a

in

Mexico, which

is

in

Germany.

a combination

mixed form.

41 //;
See Brewer-Carias, supra note
at 117; see also Louis Favoreu, Constitutional Review in Europe.
Constitutionalism and rights: The Influence of the United States Constitutionalism abroad (Louis
Henkin & Albert Rosenthal eds., 1990)[hereinafter Favoreu, Constitutional Review in Europe].
See Utter & Lundsgaard, supra note 3, at 559-561. The authors make clear that the definition of judicial review
1

includes the review of statutes legislatively enacted and of administrative and executive decrees to be in

accordance to the Constitution.
'^

See Brewer-CarIas, supra note

the

1

at

1

12.

124. Professor Brewer-Carias associates the concept of judicial review with the rule of law, stating that

Id., at

powers of the public bodies forming the

state

emanate from the law, and this precise law which created and
is, countries which follow the rule of law have limited

established the powers also limits that power. That

governmental powers and excersise a form of judicial control.
Id. at

1

12-124. Accordingly, these two types of judicial control over the constitutionality of legislation are the

broadest division.

Chapter

The American Model

a) Origin

Review

of Judicial

and Scope

The Constitution of the United
in

I.

one Supreme Court and

mentioned before,

in

States vests the judicial

such inferior Courts as Congress

system of control empowers

this

power of the United

Any

all

may

States

As

create.''

judges and courts of a given

controversy brought to the court, no matter

its

may appear

in

any case, and judges will give them regular treatment. The American or diffuse model

is

country to act as constitutional judges.

nature,

is

resolved by the same court. That

considered to have

is to

say, Constitutional issues

origin in the United States of

its

Supreme Court decision of Marbury

v.

America and

Madison, 5 U.S.

(1

particularly in the

Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60

(1803;, by Chief Justice John Marshall.'-^

Marbury

v.

Madison

review. However, there

is

art.

in. §

As

From time

l.

as noted, the

landmark case

for the

concept of judicial

an argument that long before, the courts had already practiced

this peculiar jurisdiction.'^

' U.S. Const,

is,

a matter of fact, historical legal literature attributes the

to time, the

term "Supreme Court" will be used to refer

that judicial

power.

Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law I ( 12"' ed. 1991)[hereinafter Gunther]. See also
Clinton, Marburyv. Mad/son and Judicial Review 125-127 (1989) [hereinafter R. Clinton].

Robert

''^

'"

See

Gunther supra

note

1

3 at 1-71. See also

THOMAS

J.

HiGGINS, JUDICIAL Review

Unmasked

1

1

-26

( 1

L.

98 1 ).

See generally William Castro, James Iredell and the American Origins of Judicial Review, 27 Conn. L. Rev. 329
(1995), which supports the early conceptions of judicial review made by Justice Iredell in the 1780s. Sixteen

review to Ihe American colonial experience,

origin of judicial

government conducted

in

which

a systematic review of colonial legislation so that the

new

laws would not be contrary to the laws of England. This control was exercised

and

royal governors

finally

through the Privy Council

Supreme Court and

eighteenth century, the

several

in

British

the

colonial

initially

London.'^ Analogously,

other Federal

by

in the

and State Courts

considered that the legislative branch had a "delegated and limited" power under the
Constitution and that in order to be effective, such limits should be observed by law.

When

law

is

applied,

it

must be interpreted and applied by the

courts.'^

Accordingly, Alexander Hamilton, through his papers in the Federalist,
readily accepted the concept of judicial review.'^

Almost

all

had

North American judges of

the late eighteenth century maintained the doctrine of judicial review without a stipulated

legal

body endorsing

this

power. The practice of judicial review brings to the surface the

controversial issue of constitutional justification to interpret the political document. For

many,

this

power

power of

the

found "nowhere"

is

the judiciary

is

Marhuiy was decided,

the

not

in the Constitution.

legitimate

because

Therefore,

it

is

not

it

is

assumed

that

supported by the

Constitution.''^

years before

Supreme Court of North Carohna suggested the supremacy of the
Supreme Court and other State Courts before
Hawkins. Va. Cas. 20 (1793), Vanhore's Lesse v. Dorrence, 2 Dall. 304

Constitution over legislative acts. Other cases resolved by the U.S.

1803

are, for instance,

Kemper

v.

(1795).
'^

Charles Grove Haines, The Conflict OVER Judicial Powers

""

See R. Clinton, supra note

'^

Id. at

65. See also

The

13, at

In

THE United States TO 1870

Federalist No. 78, at 9 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ronald

Hamilton saw particular limitations

1-35 (1970).

125-127.

Rotunda

ed., 1997). Certainly,

to the legislative authority contained in a "limited Constitution"

which

requires an independent judiciary. Thus, the maintenance of those limitations are to be guarded exclusively by
the "Courts of Justice."

"The

interpretation of the laws," he adds, "is the proper and peculiar province of the

Courts."
"*

Alexander M. Bickel, The Last Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics

1(1986) [hereinafter BiCKEL].

The legitimacy of this doctrine has been subject to many debates not only by judges and academics but also by
The legitimacy of this power has raised two questions. 1. Did the Constitution grant this power. If

politicians.
not,

why

is

the Court exercising it? 2. If granted,

what

is

the lawful scope to interpret

and even

nullify acts of an

The

trainers of the Constitution did not set Ibrlh a provision for the exercise

judicial review, not

if

they did

even by "implication."

intend

not

for

it

foundations of judicial control

Article

VI paragraph

2,

which

to

in

that account, their silence is interpreted as

be assumed."

Nevertheless,

Marshall

found the

Constitution on the basis of the Supremacy clause:

in the

reads:

This Constitution, and the

made

On

of"

Laws of

Pursuance thereof; and

which

shall

be

made, or which

shall

be

the United states

all treaties

made, under the Authority of the United

States,

shall

be the

supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the

Contrary notwithstanding ..."

Marshall asserted that

when

the framers were writing the Constitution, they were

building the "fundamental and paramount" law of the nation, and that

it

were void.

In addition,

are construed to be the

acts contrary to

he supported his theory with the fact that written Constitutions

fundamental

when

rules. Finally,

Constitution and an inferior law, he stated, "this

interpret

all

is

there

is

a disparity between the

the judicial department's task to

and resolve which law should prevail."

However,

elected legislature?
judicial control

and

its

this

on the most considerable

section will focus only

historical precedent of

ordinary competence for comparative purposes. See detailed discussion infra Chapter FV

§ c) & d). For a broader discussion of the legitimacy of judicial review see, for example, Eugene V. RosTOW,
The Sovereign Prerogative (1962); Bounding, Government by Judiciary (1932); J. Ely, Democracy
AND Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1980); Alexander M. Bickel, The Last Dangerous
Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 1(1986); Christopher Wolfe, The Rise of Modern
Judicial Review (1986); Mauro Cappelletti. Repudiating Montesquieu? The Expansion and Legitimacy of
Constitutional Justice. 35 Cath. U.L Rev.
(1985); Johnny C. Burris, Some Preliminary Thoughts on a
1

Contextual Historical Theory for the Legitimacy of Judicial Review, 12 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 585 (1987).
See Charles A. Beard, The Supreme Court-Usurper or Grantee? 27 Political Science Quarterly 1, in ESSAYS IN

Constitutional

Law

24-58, (Robert McCloskey ed., 1957).

speeches, papers and recorded activities of the
that "the

purpose and

spirit

members of

A

the

of the federal Constitution and of

recompilation of strategic documents, writings,

Convention of 1787 by Beard was the evidence

all

those Fathers"

over the other two powers of government; See also BiCKEL, supra note 18
"'

Marbury

v.

Madison 5 U.S.

(1

Cranch) 137, 2

L. Ed.

was

to exercise judicial control

at 15, 16.

60 (1803). This notion was emphatically stressed in
v. Aaron 358 U.S. 1, 78 Ct. 1401, 3 L. Ed. 2d 5

another Supreme Court decision years later in the case Cooper
(1958). Suggesting that in
federal judiciary

is

supreme

Marbury

v.

Madison, Chief Justice Marshall "declared the basic principle
of the law of the Constitution."

in the exposition

that the

order to approach fully the scope

In

of the facts of Marbury

new

v.

Madison

is

Adams

as

administration of

was leaving

he

Thomas

American

judicial review, a brief synopsis

necessary. William

justices of peace for the District of

John

ot"

Marhury was one of

Columbia appointed by

March

office

3,

the four

the Federalist President

1801.""

The

new Republican

The

Jefferson succeeded on the following day.

Federalists did

not deliver the appointments of formal commissions that had not been delivered before

the end of the

the

Adams

administration.

Supreme Court seeking a

Madison
relied

to

compel him

The appointees brought

writ of

to deliver the

mandamus

Court to hear their demand.
controlled Congress a

plaintiff's right to the

a

Marbury and

in

James

the other plaintiffs

to support jurisdiction in the

Supreme

This Judiciary Act had been enacted by a Federalist-

month before Adams

The court faced

an original action

directed to Secretary of State

commissions."

on Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789

suit in

number of

left office."'*

issues.

commission and

The

first

part of the decision deals with the

the appropriate legal

remedy

to obtain that right."

Subsequently, the court resolved that such a remedy for the violation of the right was a
writ of

mandamus. Thereupon,

exercising

its

original jurisdiction.

original jurisdiction

" See

the court

was

examined

its

power

However, Marshall concluded

in conflict

with Article

III

to

issue the

writ

that the exercise of

by

such

of the Constitution,"^ and that in

R. Clinton, supra note 13 at 82-101.

Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789

among

other things provided that the

Supreme Court may have

appellate jurisdiction from the Circuit Courts and the Courts of the States and to issue writs of prohibition to the
District Courts

and issue writs of mandamus

in cases

warranted by principles of usage of law,

to

any courts

RONALD

D.

Rotunda,

appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United

Modern Constitutional Law: Cases and Notes
--'

See Marbury; 5 U.S.

at

1

States.

See

(5*ed. 1997) [hereinafter R. Rotunda].

154-73.

U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 2 grants the Supreme Court limited original jurisdiction: "In all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers an Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court
shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate

giving the Supreme Court original

Judiciary Act conflicted with Article

The decision

jurisdiction

III

issue

to

the

writ.

points out that Article

of the Constitution."''

Supremacy Clause

TIT,

§ 2 clearly delimits the jurisdiction

The Act was found

of the

of the

transgressing the

it,

unconstitutional on the basis of the

Marshall's opinion erected what

(Article IV)."'

13

and was. therefore, unconstitutional.

Supreme Court and under no circumstances could Congress modify
spirit

Section

it

is

now

the accepted

foundation that legitimizes judicial review as a power of the Court.

The Court touched
ordinary laws.

answer was an
department

final

"Were

a very consequential point

courts

bound by those laws notwithstanding

incisive one: "It

to say

when considering

what the law

is

its

the invalidity of

emphatically the province and duty of the judicial

is.""

The Supreme Court assumed

responsibility as the

authority to interpret the Constitution, and in giving this answer, the

created the theory of judicial review. ^'^ Judicial authority

Constitutional system by the

The

justification to determine

among

why

this type

legislative

Law

was

is

enactments or executive

that

In spite of the fact that all officials of

of oath, Marshall argued,

Jurisdiction, both as to

from the whole

the judicial branch and not another branch of

other considerations already mentioned,

uphold the Constitution.

was deduced

judgment

Supreme Court.

government should decide the constitutionality of
actions,

The

invalidity?"

judges take an oath to

government take an

oath,

a fundamental element to the official character of a

and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress

shall

make"
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act conflicted with the provisions quoted previously (note 24). The Act gave the

Supreme Court

original jurisdiction in an area where, arguably, the Constitution conferred only appellate

jurisdiction.
-'

See Marbun; 5 U.S.

at

177-78

judge.

Moreover, a judge would not promise

'

Constitution

b) The

if

the Constitution

would not form

Supreme Court Approach

The American system of
Constitution.^^

In order to

amend

to

to

perform his obligations

part of the rules of the judiciary.

to

the

32

Applying Judicial Review

judicial

review

is

categorized as having a "rigid"

the Constitution, the ordinary legislative processes are

not sufficient, and special procedures are necessary. Hence, another characteristic of

American

judicial review

inferiori to

The

is

the applicability of the principle of lex superior derogat legi

determine the constitutionality of laws.
practice

of controlling the constitutionality of acts and legislation has

produced two different methods

to construe the Constitution

and the non-interpretative methods. ''^ The

norms included

those

meaning of language

^"

first

form

in a written Constitution.

in the Constitution,

See R. Clinton, supra note 13

at 98,

by judges: the interpretative

limits judges to

Courts consult the

make
literal

use of only

and

historic

support their opinions in the structure of the

stating that this part of the opinion

is

the cause

why Marbury

is

celebrated.

^ SeeMarbiin\5\i.S.ii\.
See
180.
" Id.
Note that this type of judicial control is also established principally in onetime British colonies, such us, India.
Canada and Australia. Curiously, the decentralized system of review has been also adapted in Japan and
Switzerland, Norway and Sweden. See Cappelleti, JUDICIAL Review, supra note
at 47-49.
The opposite of this classification is the "flexible" Constitution which is part of the legal systems in England,
New Zealand and Israel, countries with unwritten and therefore flexible Constitutions. Brewer-Cari'as, supra
1

note
"

1

at 103.

Id. at

104;

making

allusion to Chief Justice Marshall

who

applied this principle

when

resolving

Marbury

v.

Madison.
'^
John H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A theory of Judicial Review 1-2 (1980)[hereinafter Ely].
Michael Perry, The Constitution, the Courts and Human Rights (1982). See also Thomas Grey, Do we

have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 Stan. L.Rev. 703 (1975)[hereinafter Unwritten Constitution?].

10

Then, the judges

Constitution as a whole, and try to follow the intention of the drafters.

are able to perform judicial review of legislation.

Nonetheless, the progressive transformation of the country has facilitated the

development of the non-interpretive method of judicial review. This means
judging an act or legislation for

literal

rely

constitutionality, judges are not restrained

its

meaning of the written Constitution

to

judge those laws or

on fundamental principles of the society and the

interpretive system has

been widely used

Supreme Court over

the years.

Education of Topeka,

Roe

v.

justice are the parameter of this

that

by the

acts, but they also

system.

political

may

This non-

most of the major cases resolved by the U.S.

in

Such cases include, among
Wade,

when

and Furman

v.

others,

Brown

v.

Board of

Principles of natural

Georgia.

form of judicial control, sometimes even without regard

to the content of the Constitution.'^"

This

is

due

to the

ambiguity or open-endedness of

provisions in the Constitution to determine particular constitutional questions.

The reasons underlying which form of

interpretation the courts apply

the significance of the Constitution and the period of time in

court are living. For many,

it

is

fortunate to

make use of this

which the members of

type of interpretation

to the easy adaptation of the Constitution to the current values of society

Historically,

it

was

the

depends on

form of interpretation when pursuing judicial review

in

the

owing

and of the

Marhitry and

many

other

following cases.
**

Id.

It

is

well

known

that the

Warren Court followed

principles of liberty and justice.
41)

347 U.S. 483 (1954); segregation issue.
410 U.S. 13 (973); abortion issue.
408 U.S. 238 (1972); death penalty issue.
See Brewer-Carias, supra note at 106.
1

^'

*^

1

this

form of interpretation

in its

decisions guided by

n

political

system

Therefore, the non-interpretative

maintain a "Constitution alive."

to

method has been "crucial"

Supreme Court.

as confirmed by the U.S.

Judicial review of legislation and executive acts

which

the United States' courts have broad standing rules

There are

to the courts."^^

restraints

can only adjudicate when there

act until

its

jurisdiction

is litigation;

To cover

it

it

or controversy" requirement by

who

all

courts

but

can bring an action

deals with a particular case, and

is

me

which cases does

to seek judicial rehef

the first point,

limit

These particulars lead

essential aspects of the judicial process: In

and secondly, who has the right

practiced by

on the courts when adjudicating. "An American court

invoked.""*^

is

is

to

the court have jurisdiction,

necessary to consider the Article

is

cannot

comment about two

and have access

which a concrete dispute

it

to federal courts?

m.

Section 2 "case

Courts are not

necessary.

allowed to issue opinions on "abstract" or "hypothetical" questions; consequently,
advisory opinions

the absence of

"

Id. at

1

10.

"^

are

two

banned within the United

prerequisites: a party

See also Unwritten

An example

Topeka, where Chief Justice Warren said

1868 when the amendment
the light of
"^

Both

its full

when
in

[the Fourteenth

development and

State Courts

In light of the

supra note 36

Constitution'.',

of this approach occurred

its

who

the

States' judicial jurisdiction because of

has suffered an injury and a real and

at

703.

Supreme Court was deciding Brown

1954: "In approaching this problem

Amendment] was adopted

present place in

American

life

....

We

v.

we cannot

Board of Education of
turn the clock back to

must consider public education

in

throughout the Nation."

and Federal Courts have jurisdiction over constitutional matters.

number of courts which have

constitutional adjudication, judicial review permits not only public

authorities to bring constitutional issues to the court (like in the

Utter and Lundsgaard, supra note

3, at

European Model) but individuals

as well. See

591-596.

See Favoreu, Constitutional Review in Europe, supra note 7, at 56., citing Alexis de Tocqueville. De la
Democracie en Amerique, 1835, collectium 10/18 ( Paris: 1863).
Article III, § 2 provides that "Judicial Power shall be extend to specified 'cases' and 'controversies.'" To this
restrain there is added another one called "prudential." Only if a case completes those requirements will the case
be considered to be heard or "justiciable." See Stone, supra note 6, at 88.
The U.S. judicial body has declined to issue advisory opinion since as early as 1793, when President
Washington wrote to the Supreme Court asking informal advice on several legal topics and with national
relevance, however, the Supreme Court refused to give its advice in view of the Separation of Powers principle.
For a complete view of exchanges of letters, see Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay, vol 3.
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50

immediate

it

was

contliet.

stated in Flasi

That

limitatiiMi

Colien,^^

v.

complies with the Separation

which

Warren wrote

Justice

Powers principle

ol

as

as follows:

[T]he Cases and Controversies requirement limits the business of
federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a

form

historically

process.

And

viewed

in that part

as capable of resolution

though the judicial

those words define the role assigned to the

judiciary in a tripartite allocation o(

power

to assure that the federal

courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of

government. Justiciability

is

the

term of

employed

art

to

give

expression to this dual limitation placed upon federal courts by the
case and controversy doctrine.

Hence, constitutional questions need not be brought

in a specific

court nor do they

require a special procedure. Constitutional questions can arise incidentally during a

regular proceeding," as long as the case and controversy requirements are met.

Secondly,

who

is

able to be heard in the courts to claim the enforcement of a legal

obligation? Contrary to the foregoing, wherein the focus

the focus

in

is

is

on the nature of the

the party and his or her position in the controversy.

1992 when delivering the opinion of the court

have access to federal courts, the

litigant

must

in

fulfill

Lujan

v.

As

issue, here

Justice Scalia affirmed

Defenders of

WildlifQ,^

to

three conditions to have standing:

must have suffered an "injury in fact"-an invasion of
a legally-protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and

First, the plaintiff

(b) "actual or

there

imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'" Second,

must be a casual connection between the injury and the conduct

complained of-the injury has

to be "fairly... traceable to the challenged

action of the defendant, and not... the result [of] the independent action

of some third party not before the court." Third,

opposed

50
^'

52
''

See Stone,

supm

to

it

must be

"likely," as

merely "speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a

note 6,

at 90.

See also GUNTHER. supra note

13. at

1591-1394.

392 U.S. 83(1968).
See Cappelleti, Judicial Review, supra note

1.

at

67-69, 84.

504 U.S. 555 (1992). Other important cases concerning standing, Frothin^hain v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447
(1923); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); United States v. Richardson, 418 LI.S. 166 (1974); Warth v. Seldin
422 U.S. 490, (1975); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State
Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). However, Frothingham contains a more precise
and modem standing criteria.
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favorable decision."

In other words, there are three requirements that legitimize the right of a litigant to

sue.

h must be demonstrated

that an

"injury in fact" exists; besides, the injury must be

one which was "caused" by the action being complained, and
significant probabihty that that injury will be "redressed"

he seeks. These conditions are used as

filters for

finally, there

by giving the

must be a

litigant the relief

screening out cases unsuited for judicial

determination.'''^

Above

all,

considers invalid.

the applicant

must demonstrate the invalidity of the law which he

Considering the presumable constitutionality of laws passed through

the examination of Congress to be in agreement with the Constitution,

a law should be "clearly demonstrated"

c)

by

the plaintiffs.''^

The Supreme Court and Its Autonomy
"Where independence

forceful

mechanisms

exists,

it

believed that the courts are able to be more

is

for the defense of constitutionalism

and

justice.

extraneous pressure and fear of removal, the judicial body has in

^^

See GUNTHER, supra note

" Ogden

V.

Fletcher

""^^

its

To

abolish

favor certain

13, at 1622.

Saunders, 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 213 (1827).
v.

Peck, 6 Cranch (10 U.S.) 87 (1810). In this case, coincidentaiiy. Chief Justice Marshall rendered

the opinion of the Court.
the

the invalidity of

Supreme Court;

law should be such

He noted

that the fact to resolve the constitutionality of a

therefore, the principle
that the

was

instituted

law was a "delicate" task for

when an "opposition between

the Constitution and the

judge feels a clear and strong conviction of their incompatibility with each other."

Moreover, the reasoning by which Marshall reached

that

conclusion was to adjust to the Separation of Powers

Principle.

Christopher M.
Analysis, 44

Am.

J.

Larkins,

Comp.

Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and Conceptual
606 (1996) [hereinafter Larkins]. Asserting the absence of autonomy, the

Judicial
L. 605,

judiciary can be "easily manipulated"
acts.

to

perform

its

duties of constitutional scrutiny of arbitrary governmental

See also Judge Learned Hand, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary

to Civilization.

Address on

14

"instruments to obtain

its

independence, dignity and effectiveness

These instruments are appointment,
remuneration.^'^

The U.S. Supreme Court

advice and consent of the

the

to

between

equilibrium

of his/her appointment,

tenure,

restricted

performance."

grounds for removal and

Justices are appointed by the President subject

The appointment process

Senate.'

and

executive

the

possibilities of favoritism of a

judicial

life

in its

legislative

creates

consequently,

branches;

an

the

judge towards the President because of the considerations

in a sense, are blocked.'''

The most important promotions of

independence, according to many,^" are appointment for

payment. Both are provided by the Constitution,^

life

with consistent

and both are enough

to isolate the

courts politically and to guarantee their independence.^^

The only way

remove judges from

to

impeachment process. "Judges
Otherwise, they

may

their judicial

offices

is

hold their Offices during good

shall

be "removed from Office on Impeachment

for,

through the

Behaviour."

"

and Conviction of

250"' Anniversary of the

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts at Mass. Bar Ass'n. Nov. 21, 1942). Stating
upon the success of our system is that the judges should be independent"
'"
Russell R. Wheeler and A. Leo Levin, Symposium, Judicial Discipline ami Removal in the United States,
available in Westlaw, LAT database, 1979 WL 24794 (F.J.C.)[hereinafter Russell & Levin]. See also H. Fix
Zamudio, Fiincion del Poder Judicial en los Sistemas Constitiicionales Latinoamericanos, Universidad
Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, 30 (1977 Mex.) [hereinafter Zamudio, Fiincion del Poder Judicial].
^^
See Zamudio, Funcion del Poder Judicial, supra note 58, at 30. Note that there are other circumstances that
that "a condition

may

influence the judges" independence, for instance, ideology, stability and responsibility etc.

U.S. Const,
Senate.

.

.

IL § 2,

art.

appoint.

.

.

cl. 2. ".

.

.

[The President] shall have power, by and with the Advice and consent of the

Judges of the Supreme Court.

The appointment process

."
.

indicates that judges are subject to political pressure to a very

minor degree. For a

Abraham, JUSTICES
Black, Jr., A Note on

broader discussion of appointments of Judges of the Supreme Court, see for example, H.

AND Presidents

(1985).

J.

Schmidhauser, Judges and Justices

(1979). Charles

Senatorial Considerations of Supreme Nominees, 79 Yale L.J. 657 (1970). Davis A. Strauss and Cass R.
Sunstein, The Senate, The Constitution

and

the Confirmation Process, 101 Yale L.J. 1491 (1992).

Europe, supra note 7, at 45. When comparing the American and
European models of judicial review. Professor Favoreu found judges of the United States "largely immune from
See Favoreu, Constitutional Review

political pressure

"

U.S. Const,

Owen M.
that in

Fiss,

its last

who enjoyed

art.

in, §

tenure for

in

life."

1.

The Limits of Judicial Independence, 25 U. Miami Inter- Am L. Rev 57, 60 (1993), emphasizing
1
(a Compensation, which shall no be diminished during their Continuance in

part. Article IIL §

Office) creates a strong fortification for filtration of political control.

"

U.S. Const,

art. Ill,

§

1.
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Treason, Bribery or Other High Crimes and Misdemeanors."" Moreover, this aeeusation

requires the concurrence of two-thirds of the

the

impeachment process

"for reaching

decisions

violation of their

less threatening.

which

are

most fundamental

Members

But above

unpopular,"

making

present ol the Senate,'

all.

Judges should not be prosecuted

since

such prosecution would be a

judicial obligations.

Last, but not least, all of these elements constitute the

freedom of judges

to decide

the cases with neither fear nor influence of external factors.^^

d) Effects of Constitutional Adjudication

Originally, the effect of judicial review in diffuse systems

That

is

beyond

to say, the

judgment made by

an inter partes one.

the court deciding the nullity of a

and the particular case.^

the parties

is

As

a result, with

its

law must not go

decision the court

indicates that the null law should be considered out of existence for the parties involved

in the case.

This principle, however, has been modified, particularly

because of the rule of stare decisis

''

"

U.S. Const,

art. II,

U.S. Const,

art. I,

^"

&

United States

the decision stand). ^" For example,

(let

when

a

§ 4.
§ 3, cl. 6.

See Larkins, supra note 57,
See Russell

in the

at

609.

Levin, supra note 58.

See Cappelleti, JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note
In other countries

constitutional issues

1,

at 86.

See also Brewer-Carias, supra note

1,

at 149.

such as Japan with a diffuse system of judicial review, the decisions of the courts concerning
still

have the original inter partes

effect.

was emerged as early as the development of English common law. The notion of stare
decisis et non quieta movere stands by the thing decided and not disturb the calm. Practically, this principle
"describes obedience to precedent" and embodies important values of the rule of law: fairness, stability,
predictability and efficiency. It "ensures that like cases will be treated alike, otherwise no equal justice would be
apply. " See James C. Rehnquist, The Power that Shall be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, the Constitution
and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L.Rev. 345, 347 (1986). See also. Constitutional Stare Decisis, 103 Harv. L.
"

The

stare decisis rule

Rev. 1344, 1345 (1990). For a broader discussion of the stare decisis doctrine and
cases see

Amy

L.

Padden, Overruling Decisions

in the

its

applicability in current

Supreme Court: The Role of a Decision's

Vote, Age,

and

16

decision

by

given

is

the

Supreme

interpretations of the Constitution

Coiirl

effect.

The

all

common

Court's

a

the

more

subject to the court's jurisdiction.

law

is

that judicial decisions

of the

74.

are of prevalent applicability.

principal motivation behind the United States' adoption of this system of

judicial review with a broader effect called erga

omnes has been due

judicial decisions that are adjusted to "present realities."

outdated to current times.

this

"the

nowadays, judicial decisions have

Decisions will be binding on

Moreover, the general acceptance under

Supreme Court

matters,

must be obeyed by everyone, rather than only by

parties to the case."^' Thus, in the United States

expansive

constitulional

in

to deliverance of

Otherwise, decisions would be

Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has followed

principle to maintain a uniform interpretation of the Constitution and to evade

contradictory decisions on constitutional matters.

Subject Matter
Freed,

Is

OhioSt.

in the

Application of Stare Decisis after Payne

Stare Decisis

L.J.

still

the Lighthouse

v.

Tennessee, 82 Geo. L.J. 1689 (1994).

Beacon of Supreme Court Jurisprudence?: A

Todd

Critical Analysis,

E.

57

1767(1996).

See Cooper

Aaron 358 U.S. 1, (1958). Justice Frankfurter rendered the opinion of the Court sugge.sting that
bound by decisions of superior courts. He reinstated the obligatory effects of earlier decisions
concerning desegregation issues. The reasoning of the court was on the basis of the Supremacy Clause (Article
VI) making of the Constitution the "fundamental and paramount law of the nation."
v.

inferior courts are

See Utter and Lundsgaard, supra note

3, at 589; noting that in the United States, people are most familiar with
and even the judges themselves feel comfortable adopting new ruling from higher courts.
" See Cappelleti, Judicial Review, supra note 1, at 85, 86, 87, 88; citing Alexander Bickel, The Least
Dangerous Branch 115, (1962).

erga omnes

''^

effect,

See Brewer-Cari'as, supra note 1, at 149, 150. See also, HUMBERTO J. La Roche, El CONTROL
JURISDICCIONAL DE LA CONSTITUCIONALIDAD EN VENEZUELA Y LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS, 129, 155 (1972
Venezuela).

Chapter

The European Model

a) Origin

II.

Review

of Judicial

judicial

review

centralized or concentrated form of judicial control due to

which confines the power of review
is

Germany

and Scope

The Austrian or European Model of

organ

in

its

recognized

is

own form

as

the

of organization,

one single judicial orgun J^ This single judicial

to

translated as a Constitutional Court, Tribunal or Council. Characteristically, the

Constitution of any country with this type of judicial review literally will create such a

constitutional court.

Under
to

the Austrian model, the "specialized" courts have been created particularly

review only constitutional issues. Therefore, ordinary courts are constrained from

hearing constitutional cases, and

when

a constitutional question arises before them, they

are obliged to submit the case to the constitutional court,

Another feature of the centralized system

See Favoreu, Constitutional Review

in

is

which pronounces a judgment.

the abstract form of review, under

Europe, supra note

40, 41.

7, at

Within the concentrated system, judicial review can be exercised only
included in the Constitution. Thus, the Federal Republic of

review through

its

Constitution of

Bonn of

1949,

The

Italian

if

Germany adopted

the expressis verbis condition

its

Mauro Cappelleti AND William Cohen,

;

Comparative Constitutional Law 73,
Constitutional Law]. More recently,

Central

see

is

the centralized system of judicial

Republic by the Constitution of 1948, Cyprus by

Constitution of 1960, and Turkey by the Constitution of the 1961
74, 75

which

(1979) [hereinafter Cappelleti

&

Cohen, Comparative

European states have
institutionalized the centralized form of judicial review: Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria; See Herman
Schwartz, The New East European Constitutional Courts, 13 Mich. J. Int'l. L. 741(1992).
in

1989,

several

17

and

Eastern

18

courts do not examine the factual circumstances of a particular casc/'^

final

judgment declaring

a law unconstitutional has a general

which should not enforce
Historically, the

structure

and

European form of judicial control was intended

legal effects as the

American model; however,
"

its

other courts

first

modern

to

have the same

implementation was

Nevertheless, Europeans

North American constitutionalism under which the

felt

inspired by the

written Constitution and

of Rights were born. The principle of Separation of Powers was also imported from

the United States to Europe. Constitutional review, in particular,

the

all

law any longer.

that null

followed by inconvenient circumstances.

Bill

effect over

Moreover, the

Old World. Eventually, Europeans found the technique

machinery

to their

Due

own

institutional

and sociological needs.

to its individuality, the concentrated

be analyzed briefly and the

German

centralized

was of

special interest to

to adjust this constitutional

'

system of judicial review

method

in

more depth.

in Austria will

^"^

Early in the twentieth century, the North American model was quite popular in

Germany, France and
their judicial

Namely,

campaigns

in

favor of adapting this novelty to

systems led important writers and politicians to reach an agreement.

late in

a conference

Italy so that strong

at

1925 the French Academie des Sciences Morales

which prominent public law

specialists

et Politiques

sponsored

concurred to influence ordinary

Review supra note 1. at 71, 72, suggesting that while in the United States judicial
performed as "an incidental issue," in Germany this has to be exercised as "a principal issue" by a
special organ and through special proceedings.
^"See Cappelletti, Judicial

review

is

This type of legal effect of judgments

See Favoreu, Constitutional Review

in

is

called erga omnes. See infra pp. 39-42.

Europe, supra note

7, at 41.

The American system did not prospered in Europe by virtue of the supremacy of the parliament, whose
idiosyncrasy was to create laws but not expose them to judicial scrutiny. Hence, European judges did not have
the capability of performing the active

Favoreu, Constitutional Review
''id.

in

and audacious role of those judges of the United

Europe, supra note

7, at

44, 45.

States.

See, e.g.,

19

judges to review the constitutionality of legislation.
basis of the Federal

Weimar German

German

court, called Tribunal of the

judge

examine

to

In a parallel

Constitution, in

November

development, on the

4,

1925, the highest

Empire, recognized the "power and the duty of the

the constitutionality of statutes of the Empire."*^

judges rarely admitted the unconstitutionality of legislation

'

Nonetheless, ordinary

so, practically,

judges avoided

the exercise of judicial review. In Italy, for instance, judicial review of legislation by

ordinary courts was practiced only once through a decision by the Court of Cassation on
July 28, 1947.*^^

The device did not
legal systems

was one of

find favor in

the

European countries. The incompatibility of

most remarkable disadvantages.

process of

common

whereas

most European countries the supremacy of

in

to supervision

law adjudication helped judicial review

by a judge.

to

In the

their

United States, the

germinate and to develop,

legislative

codes were not exposed

^'^

Another reason, which

in

terms of constitutionalism

is

crucial for the foundation

of judicial review, was the absence of the notion of the supremacy of the Constitution

over

all

existing legal orders. For instance, at that time, the position of the French

Parliament was a significant factor in the American model's failure.

If

faced with a

decision of unconstitutionality from the court. Parliament simply required the same

majority which originally proposed the unconstitutional law to reaffirm

its

position in

Alttiough the overall pattern has been the same, Germany, France, Italy and countries of Central and Eastern

Europe have adjusted
"

it

to their

own

Favoreu, Constitutional Review
Id.:

in

legal

and

see also Brewer-Cari'as, supra note

Empire, according

to Article

I,

102 of the Federal

Favoreu, Constitutional Review
Id. at

political practices.

Europe, supra note

in

at

7, at 43.

203, 204, quoting the decision delivered by the Tribunal of the

Weimar

Europe, supra note

Constitution.
7, at 43.

44, 45; distinguishing the supremacy of the Constitution in the United States and the preeminence of

legislation at that time in Europe.
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order to

make

its

desire

Moreover, contrary

prevail.''''

United States presided over by the Supreme Court,

in

Europe a

plural judicial system

interpretation

in

a given judicial

system can lead

and application of the Constitution. But,

to

was

Having more than

not suitable for the installation of a diffuse judicial control model.'^"

one higher court

system of the

to the single judiciary

the creation of inconsistent

essentially, the "organs"

were not

capable of performing that duty. The European body of judges lacked the creativity and
aggressiveness to deal with "quasi-political functions involved injudicial review."'^' The

pusillanimity of Continental judges

narrow judicial functions limited
and determine

was due

to their

to civil service.

'

having a "bureaucratic career" and

Only parliament could create

fidelity to the Constitution disqualifying the judiciary as a equivalent

its

branch with legitimate power to check legislative and executive
the failure of the

the law

American system, Europeans adopted

acts.'^"^

Ultimately, after

model designed

the Austrian

for

those countries with legal systems different from those of the United States.

The

original

formula of the Austrian model

Constitution of October

1,

creation of this Constitution

in the judicial revision

''

embodied

1920, proposed by the Austrian jurist

was

the construction of a

Hans

new democratic

the

in

Austrian

Kelsen.^''

state

The

concentrated

of legislation. Basically, the supremacy of the Constitution was the

Id. at

45, 46; referring to Carre de Malberg,

Id. at

45. In

Germany,

is

La

loi.

for instance, there is a court for each ordinary jurisdiction,

one high court for

civil

and

criminal questions, another for administrative matters, and a different one for tax disputes, labor problems and

controversies involving social legislation.
"'

Cappelletti, Judicial Review supra note

Constitutional
'''

Law supra note
Law Tradition

78

1,

at

62-64; See also Cappelleti

&

Cohen, Comparative

at 14.

See The Civil
supra note 2, at 38. Establishing that judges from judicial traditions different
from those of North American heritage have the influence of the early Roman Law in which judges (iude.x)
performed an exclusive role of arbitrator. "The settlement of disputes according to formulae supplied by another

official {praetor)"'

power was

was

the

main duty of the

iude.x.

Since judges had limited knowledge of law their judicial

also limited.

Favoreu, Constitutional Review

in

Europe, supra note

7, at 56.

.
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enlightenment of his project, and thus a Constitutional Court as guarantor of

that

supremacy was designed. This court specially created by

was

not to be part of the ordinary judicial hody,^'' yet

it

the constitutional provisions

was

to be the highest

organ of the

judicial system.

In contrast,

ordinary cases/^^'

would continue dealing with

the rest of the courts of the system

The

original concentrated

model of

judicial review

was designated

to

hear exclusively complaints of the federal executive, to review the constitutionality of

state legislation

and of the

state

governments, and to review the constitutionality of

by individuals was denied, and constitutional questions

federal laws. Therefore, access

could not be raised during a concrete case.^^

Hence, the question of the constitutionality of a law

is

brought before the court

in

an abstract and direct petition without referring a particular case and must be brought
within the period of three years after the official publication of the law in question.

After that phase, the oldest constitutional court in Europe extended

to electoral matters

and disputes between the federal government and

The Austrian Court began

See Cappelleti

&

Czechoslovakian Tribunal did not succeed and soon
all

§

state authorities.

it

in its

the

13,

at

most notable

73.

Note

that the

Constitution of February 29, 1920. However, the

vanished; see,

Brewer-CarIas, supra note

e.g..

1

at 195.

provisions regulating constitutional courts are isolated from the rest of ordinary courts'

regulations. See. e.g.. Fr.

Const.

And

Cohen, Comparative Constitutional Law, supra note 78

Czechoslovakian Tribunal was simultaneously created
Unequivocally

jurisdiction

function also as a Superior Court of Justice to hear

to

accusations of Parliament against the head of state or ministers.

'**

its

CONST,

arts.

56-62; F.R.G. CONST,

arts.

92-100; ITALY CONST,

arts.

134-137;

HuNG.

32-A.

"^^

See Brewer-Cari'as, supra note

''^

See Cappelleti

& Cohen,

1,

at

195,196.

Comparative Constitutional Law, supra

Judicial Review, supra note

at 71, 72, 73.

1

access to the Constitutional Court was permitted "under

Favoreu, Constitutional Review

in

Favoreu, Constitutional Review

Europe, supra note
in

note 78

at 13.

See also Cappelletti,

Note, however, that in a 1929 reform of the Constitution, the

some conditions

7, at 52.

Europe, supra note

7, at 5

1

to concrete

needs of individuals." See

22

move was

the

of review

consolidation

fundamental rights protected by the

Access
the state

Even

administrative

of

alleged

acts

violate

to

Constitution.'^'^

to the Constitutional

Court has been also extended so

governments can seek judicial review but the

the court itself can raise constitutional questions.

*"

that

now

not only

state legislature authority also.

The ways

to seek constitutional

review were expanded from direct petition to incidental form of judicial review. That

when
the

the higher Administrative Court, the

dilemma of applying

a

to

concrete

questionable, an incidental referral

Meanwhile, the main case

is

Supreme Court and

is

case

made by

suspended and

Court adopts a judgment on the point

it

a

statute

the Courts of

whose

is,

Appeals face

constitutionality

is

those courts to the Constitutional Court.

can proceed only after the Constitutional

at issue.

"^'

Therefore,

it

is

considered that even

though the Courts of Appeals, the Supreme Court and the Administrative Court cannot

make
to

use of judicial review power, these incidental

means

for judicial review allow

them

acknowledge the unconstitutionality of laws but without annulling them. Since

ordinary judges are banned from exercing any control over the constitutionality of

legislation, the Constitutional

When

Court has the "monopoly" of constitutional

reaching for resolution of a particular case,

if

litigation.'^"

the Constitutional Court finds

that the statute or executive regulation applied to that resolution is unconstitutional,

can, as mentioned earlier, raise the question of unconstitutionality.

is restricted.

convinced

^"^

The Constitution

art.

140.

Favoreu, Constitutional Review in Europe, supra note
'"'

See Brewer-Carias, supra note

1,

this

power

establishes that even though the "Constitutional Court

that a statute is unconstitutional, if the

Aus. Const,

However,

at

200.

7, at 52.

complete annulment of the

it

is

statute

23

would mean

a manifest prejudice against the juridical interest of the individual claimant

in a direct action,

brought before the court,

later

reforms

have access

made

to

him

law.

and

Second,

that

statute."'*''

This measure coincides with

to the Austrian Constitution to hear individual claims. Individuals

Court

in

two

instances. First, an individual can bring a

claim complaining that a statute or regulation can affect his rights

However,
"^

must not annul the

it

to the Constitutional

"direct action" or

directly.

it

is

necessary to demonstrate that the law in question applies directly

no administrative or judicial decisions have been made

by an "indirect claim" individuals can allege

fundamental rights against administrative
administrative act

was

or of the plaintiff in the proceeding in which an incidental question

was executed under

acts, but

only

when

is

is

regard to that

violation

demonstrable

of

their

that the

a presumably unconstitutional law or statute. Thus,

the court will limit itself to decide only the constitutional issue.

The Austrian Superior Court

it

a

in

composed of

"^^

the president

and the vice-president,

twelve members and six alternative members appointed by the President of the Republic

and with the approval of the legislative

renowned judges of

the

highest

authorities. All of

ordinary courts,

them

public

are

chosen from among

officers

and notable law

professors. In order to secure the impartiality of constitutional judges,

banned from participating

in or

members

being allied to political parties. Moreover, the president

and vice-president of the Constitutional Court should not have occupied a
position in the government for four years before their designation.'^^

"

Id., at

196. See also Favoreu, Constitutional

Aus. Const, art 140(3).
'""' Aus. Const, art. 140(1).
"" Aus. Const, art.
140(3).
"* See
Brewer-Carias, supra note
'"-'

1,

are

at 197.

Review

in

Europe, supra note

7, at

41.

political
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Thus, the Austrian niodel has had great influence

which exercise constitutional
to

adopt the American

more appropriate

control.

Germany,

its

in

and France,

alter the failed attempts

decided to adopt the concentrated model, which offered a

style,

structure for

European judicial review.'"^ Hence, since 1951 Germany

has nourished this judicial activity, making the

"most powerful

Italy

other European countries

in

Europe since

it

German

Federal Constitutional Court the
"*^

has the widest jurisdiction."

Additionally, soon after

establishment, through a remarkable case the court instituted

Case

Southwest

interpretation

(1951)'"'^

forth

set

the

fundamental

its

principles

and the court's most important constitutional policy.

The

authority.

of constitutional

In fact, four striking

conclusions were decided in this case:'"^

Although

it

is

considered that France practices a form of judicial control,

it

is

not applied to

French Constitutional Council (Counseil Constitiitionnel) exercises priori abstract review;

done before the promulgation of the
much more reluctant than most of the
its

this

legislation. Professor Cappelletti estimates that France, in fact, "has
rest

is

been

of Europe to participate in the 'constitutional revolution.'" Throughout

France has adopted parliamentary supremacy due to past events. During the ancien regime, higher

history,

courts of justice committed a large

number of abuses. Their duty was

to

review acts of government to be

accordance with the fundamental laws of the realm, however, the "judges were so deeply rooted

regime

The

its fullest.

form of review

that they

power

found any

liberal

in

in the feudal

innovation unacceptable." Therefore, a popular repugnant attitude against

Nowadays, prominent French jurists point out that in the last fifteen years France has
become as effective as other European countries exercising judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation.
Nonetheless, Professor Cappelletti still finds at least two serious limitations in the French system of judicial
review:
Individuals whose fundamental rights have been violated have no access to the Conseil
Constitutionnel. 2) Legislation can be reviewed only between its enactment and promulgation, and once it is
publicized, no judge can refuse to apply a law for unconstitutional reasons. See Mauro Cappelletti, Repudiating
Montesquieu? The Expansion and Legitimacy of Constitutional Justice, 35 Cath. U.L. Rev. 110-14, 17-18
(1985)[hereinafter Cappelletti, Repudiating Montesquieu?]. Due to the fact that the present work intends to
analyze the most effective forms of judicial review to be compared to the less effective one of Mexico, the

judicial

arose.

1 )

French system of judicial review

N.Y.U.

L.

Neubome,

will not

be included

in this study.

For a broader study of judicial review

in

and Separation of Powers in France and the United States, 57
Rev. 363 (1982); Mike Bothwell, Nicolo and the Push to 1992- The Evolution of Judicial Review in

France, see, Burt

Judicial Review

France, 1990 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1649 (1990).

See Favoreu, Constitutional Review
'"^

in

Europe supra note

1, at 52.

Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany

ed. 1997) [hereinafter

Constitutional Jurisprudence of

F.

R. G.]; citing the

BVerfGE

1:14 case,

23

(2"'*

(October

23, 1952) (Second Senate).

""

Donald

P.

Kommers, Judicial Politics

Court, 209 (Sage
Germany].

in

West Germany: A Study of the Federal Constitutional
West

Series on Politics and the Legal Order, vol. 5, 1976) [hereinafter Judicial Politics in

'
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The Constitutional Court

1.

(German

The

Law

in

Law

interpretation of the Basic

Constitution).

2. It is the

3.

absolutely supreme

is

function of the court to examine the legality or validity of public policy.

interpretation of constitutional provisions shall be

withm

the context of the Basic

as a whole.

Certain fundamental principles (democracy, rule of law and federalism) are inferred

4.

from

Law

the Basic

as a

whole."

In the United States, the practice of judicial review

Justice Marshall's interpretation of the text of the Constitution.

of the

upon

German

Constitutional Court, by contrast,

is

was announced
The

in

Chief

judicial review

power

confined by the Basic

Law

to pass

the validity of legislative or executive decisions. Hence, the jurisdiction of the

Federal Constitutional Court involves several important functions: protection of basic

rights,"" declaration of the unconstitutionality of political parties if they threaten to

damage

the democratic order or put at risk the existence of the Federal Republic of

Germany,

"

and protection of federalism by resolving the federal-state

between high

state

has "collateral

conflicts, disputes

organs and intrastate constitutional disputes.""^ Furthermore, the court

norm

control" jurisdiction through concrete judicial review initiated by a

reference of ordinary courts which find relevant federal or state laws that violate the Basic

Law.

Id.

due

In addition, the court should also

Comparing

the Southwest case to

American

determine the compatibility of federal and

cases, such

to their importance.

"- See F.R.G.

CONST, art. 1, in Federal Law Gazette
'"F.R.G.Const. art. 21(2).
114
F.R.G. Const, arts. 84, (4); 93 (1) I,J; 99.
115
F.R.G. Const, art. 100 (1 ), (3).

II at

885.

Marbun

v.

Madison and McCuIIocli

v.

state

Maryland

27

case has arisen

is in

conflict with the Constitution. This court has the ohUgation to refer

the case to the constitutional court and suspend the case until the constitutional question

is

resolved before proceeding with the ordinary lawsuit.'"^ That

is,

German

every

court

has the right to review the constitutionality of a law, yet the power to declare such a law

null

is

The procedure of concrete

Law
and

"

exclusive to the Constitutional Court.

stipulates that the

judicial review provided in Article 100 of the Basic

presumable unconstitutional law should be relevant

to the issue

be of importance" to the decision.'"^ Accordingly, between

that the statute "has to

ordinary courts and the Constitutional Court there exists an understanding

condition of relevance

is

concrete judicial review,

statute

were

to

absolute.

if

"A

statute is

when

the

only relevant, and hence qualified for

the subsequent decision of the court

would be

different if the

be ruled unconstitutional by the constitutional court and therefore not

applicable to the case in question."'"^ Notwithstanding, the unconstitutionality of the law

is

entirely clear, only the Constitutional Court

law.

The importance and

not, is dealing with a certain

great importance. Hence, in

Jom

Ipsen,

Contributions of
of Constitutional

from deciding exclusively

problem, and

Federal Republic of

Law 111-113

its

in

Germany

if

the law

is

at

to the Constitutional

is

of

Court for a

Main PRINCIPLES OF THE GERMAN BASIC LAW: The

to the First

215. Donald P.

fact

constitutional or

World Congress of

the International Association

(Christian Starck ed., 1983) [hereinafter Ipsen, Constitutional

See also Steinberger, supra note 121,

on the

carefully substantiated decision itself

most of the cases referred

Constitutional Review of Laws,
tlie

able to question the constitutionality of a

legal significance of concrete judicial review rests

the Constitutional Court, aside

'""'

is

Kommers, German

Constitutionalism:

Review of Laws].

A Prolegomenon.

40 Emory

L. J. 837, 841, (1991) [hereinafter German Constitutionalism].
See Steinberger, supra note 121, at 215, 223; noting that the only statutes subject

enacted after the entry into force of the Basic

Law

(1949).

See Ipsen, Constitutional Review of Laws, supra note 123,
'^'/rf. at

115.

at

1

14,

1

15.

to

review are those formally

28

concrete

with

examination,

court

the

ruling,

its

settles

almost

of

all

the

legal

controversies.'"

A

more

characteristic proceeding of the

abstract review of laws.

"

of federal

compatibility

German system of

judicial review

This review involves a resolution of uncertainties about the

or

state

laws

with

compatibility of state law with federal law.'"'

Basic

the

Law

or

The only applicants

differences

necessary for a real controversy, conflicting parties, nor injury

decide a constitutional question.'

arguments.

with the Basic Law,

'

norm

or statute.

'"*"

If the final

supplementary protection
there

is

when

The

judgment declares the law

to

is

is

not

court to

in question

incompatible

engages

in

an

determine the validity or invalidity of

significance of this proceeding consists of a provision of

to the Constitution

due to the lack of contentiousness, because

an applicant but not opponent on the petition.'

exercising abstract judicial review

principles

it

Applicants are required to submit written briefs and,

"objective" proceeding, since the court's duty

a legal

in fact for the

signifies the nullity of the law. Certainly, the court

it

on the

are the federal or state

government or one-third of the members of the federal Parliament.'^" Therefore,

less often, oral

is

of the Constitution,

is

The

criteria

adopted by the Court

consequently in accordance with the general

adopting constitutional rules of procedure.

Abstract

judicial review, as an objective procedure to safeguard the Constitution, is not restricted.

'-'/J. at 116, 117.

The range of

abstract judicial review

is

much

larger than that of concrete judicial review. Thus, matters

subject to abstract judicial review include subordinate legislation, for example, executive orders, ordinances, and
statutory instruments. Id. at 119.

Contrary to concrete judicial review, every enacted norm

is

formally enacted before the entry into force of the Basic
constitutional statutes. See
'^'

at

'"

subject to abstract judicial review. Thus, statutes

Law

(1949) are equally examined as the post-

id.

See Ipsen, Constitutional Review of Laws, supra note 123, at 118.
Constitutional Jurisprudence OF F. R. G., supra note 109, at

13, 14.

1026.

Constitutional Jurisprudence OF F. R.

G., supra note 109, at 13. 14.

See also Denninger ^wpra note 118,
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It

allows the Constitutional Court to review a law

characteristic of this proceeding lies in

of governmental parties

As

its

in

every imaginable aspect.

'^^

The chief

highly political nature due to the participation

in the cases.

noted, the court confines itself to declaring laws null and void or simply

incompatible with provisions of the Basic
requirements. However,

some

Law and

not subject to case and controversy

is

limitations apply to the Constitutional Court.

with moot questions, the court will refuse to decide the case. Also,
the court on concrete judicial review,

must prove

constitutional

court,

framework of

actual litigation.

it

Even

that a real conflict of opinion exists

when

that

in

If

faced

cases coming before

the ordinary court refers the case to the

a constitutional

question arises within the

review cases, the court must be certain

in abstract

between the norm and the governing

institution

exists.'^^

Likewise, the court

is

bound

to exercise concrete judicial

dates prior to promulgation of the ratification of the Basic

German

of self-restraint has had significant effect also in the
the court has

imposed on

itself certain limits

when

refusal to review trivial constitutional complaints

not clarify important constitutional questions.

'^^

all

"

See Ipsen, Constitutional Review of Laws, supra note 123,

'"

at

principle

its

functions such as the

court will not anticipate a question

it,

nor will

it

issue temporary

at 121.

121, 122.

Constitutional Jurisprudence OF F.
Id.,

The

those in which the result would

of constitutionality in advance of the necessity for deciding

''•*/</.

of 1949.'''^

Constitutional Court, and

exercising

and

The

Law

review of a law that

R. G., supra note 109, at 50, 51.

noting that Justiciability of constitutional complains depends of certain attributes of concreteness and

particularity.
Id.,

see Steinberger, supra notes 121

&

124 and accompanying

text; see

Laws, supra note 123.
"^ See

Constitutional Jurisprudence OF

F. R. G.,

supra note 109.

at 52.

also Ipsen, Constitutional Review of
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injunctions against government agencies. Preferably,

Court proceeds

emphasized by
political

b)

until

it

in

such cases the Constitutional

has time to consider the matter on

the court that

it

will not

merits.

It

has been

review or comment on issues which are "purely"

and already resolved by parliament as part of

Methods the Constitutional Court
The means on which

its

its

Utilizes to

duty.'^"

Decide Constitutionality

the Constitutional Court relies in deciding constitutional

questions ranges from textual interpretation to teleological explanation and from the

principle of proportionality to an objective order of values.

usually initiates

its

The Constitutional Court

constructive task by looking at the technical meaning of the words and

phrases in a given constitutional provision; in this context, the court also makes a

structural analysis of the Basic

the Basic

Law

based on

its

Law

Judges then examine the purpose of

as a whole.'"*'

language. Even though the principle of proportionality does

not emanate from the Basic Law, the Constitutional Court has adopted

of law to determine

if

legislation or other

it

based on the rule

governmental acts conform to the values and

principles of the Basic Law.'"*"

The

other form of interpretation developed by the Constitutional Court

the objective order of values,

and

is

included

in the

which derives from

Ipsen, Constitutional Review of Laws, supra note 123, at 133.

Judicial Politics in

West Germany,

supra note

1 1

Law

most fundamental of which

""Z^. at 50, 51.
'*'

0, at

called

the gloss of the Constitutional Court

Basic Law. According to this notion, the Basic

the basic value decisions of the founders, the

is

208-2

1

2.

is

incorporates

to achieve a

31

free

democratic order, such as a federal parliamentary democracy reinforced by basic

rights

and

'"^^

liberties.

These basic values are objective because they are said

independent reality under the Constitution, imposing on
affirmative duty to see that they are realized in

practice.'"^"*

For example, every basic right
also represents a value

it

imposes positive obligations on the

becomes an

it

general legal order, including not only rights of individuals but

In

recent years, the Constitutional

jurisprudence."'"^^ This position tends to favor

its

1951

It is

referred to as "moderate liberal

'^^

that the Federal Constitutional

Federal Constitutional Court Act as "an autonomous court of the Federation

all

other constitutional organs," the Constitutional Court did not enjoy that

Constitutional Jurisprudence of

roughly the equivalent of the doctrine of

West Germany

supra note

1

F.

R. G., supra note 109,

Due Process

of

Law

in the

at

45, 46.

The

principle of proportionality

United States. See,

e.g..

is

Judicial Politics in

10, at 210.

Constitutional Jurisprudence OF

'^V^y.,

Court has achieved has been a result

Although the Constitutional Court was described by the

tenacious performance.

independent of

'^"^

legal relationships.'^^

The Constitutional Court and Its Autonomy
The autonomy

'"*"

integral part of the

and support an individual's claims without

abandoning the equal treatment principle, however.

of

all

which

Court has adopted a new position when

deciding cases in which basic rights are implicated.

c)

have an

organs of government an

all

in the Constitution is a negative right against the state, but

states to ensure that

to

F. R. G.,

supra note 109,

quoting Peter E. Quint, Free Speech and Private

Law

in

at 47.

German

Constitutional Theory, 41 Maryland L.

R. 261(1989).
'""^

The Federal Constitutional Court, supra note 19, at 134.
The Court adopted this posture when deciding the abortion cases in 1975 and 1993. For
discussion about these cases, see infra Chapter IV § b), c) & d).
See Johnson,
Id.

1

a deeper
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independence early
Ministry

ol"

in its

establishment.

Justice. Despite this, in

'

its

it

was

very

subiLigaled to the control ol the Federal

months, justices started a battle

first

to

achieve their autonomy by claiming that the Federal Ministry was acting against the Basic

Law. They also argued

Court was a supreme constitutional organ

that the Constitutional

of equal rank of the federal president and the parliament, and that justices were not simple

civil servants

or ordinary federal judges but the supreme guardians of the Basic Law.'^*^

Moreover, they stressed

that

members of

the Constitutional Court had a greater

duty than those of the president and parliament: to ensure that other constitutional organs

observe the limits of the Basic Law.'^" Finally, the court achieved,

budgetary independence,'"' internal administrative
other correlative branches'^

control,'"^"

among

other things,

an equal position with the

and suggestions for removal of justices made exclusively by

the Federal Constitutional Court itself to the Federal President (but Parliament

Justices).

But above

all,

another victory was accomplished

crowned with the amendment of

The reform

'^^

not

S4.

1

impeach

may

reads:

Judicial Politics in

West Germany,

this

supra note 110,

their

independence was

code regulating the German judiciary.

the disciplinary

"The provisions of

when

law apply

at 83.

to

justices

Federal

of the

See also Constitutional Jurisprudence of

F.

R. G., supra note 109, at 15, 16.
'^"^

'^"

See Judicial Politics in

West Germany,

supra note

1

10, at 84.

Stating that the Federal Constitutional Court functions as a constitutional organ of the Federal Republic

Id.

and as a Court of Law.

The

"

"

salary of the President of the Constitutional Court

court's organization and procedure. See

With

its

as high as that of

Law

one of the members of the cabinet.

authorized parliament to regulate the

CONSTITUTIONAL Jurisprudence OF

F. R. G.,

supra note 109,

at 15, 23.

achievement, the Constitutional Court was able to control internal matters such as the hiring, firing and

supervision of

all

Germany, supra
'^^

is

Early, at the establishment of the Constitutional Court, the Basic

law clerks, administrative personnel and
note

The President of

1

staff library.

See also Judicial Politics in

West

10, at 84, 85.

the Federal Constitutional Court

now

enjoys the fifth-highest position

in

the Federal

Republic of Germany, after the federal president, the Chancellor, and the presidents of the two houses of
parliament (Bundesrat and Bundestag). The rest of the Justices follow in rank.
'''^

Judicial Politics in

West Germany,

supra note

judicial functions without political ties to parliament.

1

10, at 85;

allowing Justices to concentrate better on their

33

Constitutional Courl only to the extent thai they are compatible with their special status

under the Basic

Law and

with the Federal Constitutional Court Act" (fcca).'"^^

1969 the Basic

In

Germany's

Law was amended

to

conlirm the special status

political system, so that today, during a state of

Court

ol the

in

emergency and defense "the

constitutional status and the performance of the constitutional functions of the Federal

Constitutional Court and

states that "[t]he

provision,

all

its

judges shall not be impaired."'

^'

Law

Finally, the Basic

judges are independent and subject only to the law."'^^ According to

courts are independent of orders of other correlative branches, being

only by law and justice."

"

The

this

"bound

court has also insisted that judicial independence

is

achieved by a predetermined and stable remuneration which should be regulated by law
'^'^

and removed from the intervention of the executive branch.

A

Justice's tenure in court

is

a term of twelve years

general

A

constitutional judges.

'^^

Id.,

citing the

regarding

regulations

See F.R.G. CONST,

art.

1

process

''Deiitsches Richtergesetz, vol. 8

1

(1) in POLITICS

Schweitzer

et al. eds.

'" F.R.G. Const,

'^^^

AND GOVERNMENT

1995) [hereinafter

arts.

'^'^

"'"

IN

GERMANY

CAPPELLETI
See

FCCA

4(1),

FCCA

impeaching

and

states that constitutional

(FCCA)

I,

p.

1665), sec.

states that "the Federal

other constitutional bodies. See

DOCUMENTS 289

FCCA

(Carl- Christoph

Germany

1

18, at 1025.

MAIN PRINCIPLES OF THE GERMAN BASIC LAW: The

to the First

World Congress of

the International Association

(Christian Starck ed., 1983).

& COHEN,
art.

all

the

FCCA].

Ulrich Karpen, Application of the Basic Law, in

Law 76

not renewable nor

September 1961(BGBI.

1944-1994, BASIC

20(3), 97(1). See also Denninger, supra note

Contributions of the Federal Republic of

of Constitutional

FCCA

15g. Likewise, the Federal Constitutional Court Act

Constitutional Court shall be a federal court of justice independent of
art.

removing

of

singular provision contained in the

German judiciary code

92."
""

the

is

The Basic Law and

extendible beyond the retirement age of sixty-eight.'^"

provide

which

COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra

(2), (3), (4).

20, 21; indicating that justices

should leave office, regardless.

who

note 78,

at

330.

See also CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF

F. R. G.,

supra note 109,

at

reach the age of sixty-eight without completing twelve years in function

34

judges "may ask to be released from service

emphasizes

at

any time."

'

Moreover, the

fiasic

Law

that:

Judges appointed on a tenured, full-time basis to an established
post cannot, against their will, be dismissed, or permanently or

temporarily suspended from olTice, or translerred to another post,
or retired before the expiration of their term of office except by
virtue of a judicial decision and only

form provided by law ...
of the

courts

or

their

In the

areas

transferred to another court or

they retain their

full salary.

Both provisions are enacted
improper
the

influence.'^'

to

Bundesrat.^^''^

removed from

judges

their office,

may

be

provided

procure the right to an impartial judge, free from

The process of appointing
the

the

members of

members

Since the Constitutional Court

composed of eight

panels, both

of jurisdiction,

in the

in the structure

'"

two houses of parliament, with half of

by the

on the grounds and

event of changes

justices,

'^'^

the court

is

realized

by

elected by the Bimdestai> and half

is

integrated

by two independent

each house elects four members of each panel.

This process of appointing the members of the court permits that each house has
candidates of different political groups. Nonetheless, the

FCCA

indicates that "[tjhree

judges of each panel shall be elected from among the judges of the highest federal courts
of justice"

Law

""'

'"
"''*

"'^

who have

an historical service for

at least

three years.

"^'^^

However, the Basic

reserves that the elected judges should not belong to any house of parliament, the

FCCA

art.

12.

Sec F.R.G. CON.ST.
CAPPKLI.ETI

FCCA
FCCA

art.

97(2)

& COHF.N, COMPARATIVH CON.STITUTIONAI. LAW, supra

art.

94.

art.

2

The most important

tiotc 7X, at

321, 322.

division into

two

panels with mutually exclusive jurisdiction and personnel. The twin-panel idea was to achieve a lluid system

in a

fixed collcgial

(

1

),

body

(2);

like that

.structural Icature ot the

Constitutional Court

is its

of the U.S. Supreme Court. The First panel has jurisdiction over con.slitutional

issues or "non political" matters,

i.e.

concrete and abstract

norm

control and constitutional complaints.

By

Second panel is vested with jurisdiction over "political" cases, i.e. constitutional conllicts between
organs and levels of government, settlement of contested elections and ruling in the constitutionality of political
contra.st, the

parties. See, e.g..

IN

Constitutional Jurisprudence OFF.

West Germany

.supra note

1

10, at 86, 87.

R. G., .supra note 109, at 16-18; See Jui^iciai. Politics
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federal or state government."'''

chosen according

to their

It

has been considered that constitutional judges arc

views on tcderalisni and regardless of individual ideologies.

16X

d) Effects of Constitutional Adjudication

Originally, the effect of constitutional adjudication in this system

of general

is

applicability since the judges are not responsible for deciding a concrete case, but rather

for deciding the abstract question of the constitutionality of a law.'^*^

concentrated system of review, therefore,

and

is

judge declares an act unconstitutional, the ruling means
consequently has no further legal effect for anybody, as

subsequent legislative act so

form of review

it

the

that

if

act

system

is

is,

is

when

null

a

and

were abolished by a

it

Due

should disappear from the legal order.

in the concentrated

in a

should apply to everybody

that the decision

and thus the erga omnes principle operates.'^" That

to all state organs,

that the

The syllogism

to the fact

fundamentally of invalidity and

effectiveness of a law contrary to the Constitution, the

judgment of unconstitutionality

functions prospectively profiituro or ex nunc, without any retroactive effect.

"

Thus, remarkably, within the archetype of the Austrian model, an unconstitutional

law may have validity and efficacy up
Constitutional Court

is

art.

94(1); See also

""^

Philip Blair, Federalism

"""^

See Brewer-Cari'as, supra note

1

at

'^"

See

id.

all,

the court

art.

West Germany

Europe, supra note

22, 24 (1 98

7, at 41.

See also Cappelletti, JUDICIAL Review, supra note

Cappelletti, Judicial Review, supra note

1,

at

88-91.

1,

at 85, 86.

decision of the

may even

3(3)
in

193-194.

in

the

from a fixed date subsequent

and Judicial Review

See Favoreu, Constitutional Review
'^'

FCC A

moment when

the

published. But above

invalidation of the law shall operate only

'"'FCCAart. 2(3).
'"
See F.R.G. CONST,

to

1

).

order that the

to the publication

36

of the decision, but ncvcrlhcicss, the delay should not exceed a period

year.

ol

time ol one

173

However, modern

German

practical considerations have influenced the Federal

Constitutional Court to consider the judgment of unconstitutionality of retroactive effect

ex tunc rather than prospective significance ex mmc}^'^

It

was considered absurd and even

unfair to leave the injured plaintiff in a constitutional suit without a remedy.

words, the

strict applicability

of prospective effect of judgments permits the decision of

the court not to have any effect

upon

the very case pending before the court in the course

of which the question of constitutionality arose.
criminal sphere where

was provided

it

'^'^

That concern reached specially the

a set of regulations to permit

new

trials in

cases in which a court convicts a defendant under a subsequently voided statute.

Accordingly, the

retroactive-prospective

German

or

theories

effect

instead

I

totally

employ

its

demonstrated a
77

decisions.

diversified decisional modes. For example,

In

it

the

instantaneously ceases to operate; in the second case, by contrast,

"-

'^^

approach

realistic

Peculiarly, the court also has the

or simply incompatible with the Basic Law.

null

criminal

Constitutional Court in practice has either adopted

adjusting case by case the extent of

discretion to

In other

can declare a law
case the law

first

remains

it

in force

Id. at 89.
Id. at

91; identifying three as the most notable motivations which persuaded not only

United States and

judgments:

The

1.

Italy to

The need

reliance factor

abandon the

strict

adherence

to grant relief to the plaintiff

which direction

is

who

is

but also the

brings his constitutional complain before the court.

the "pragmatic and broad-minded

way of

3.

serving a penal sentence after being convicted of violating a law subsequently declared unconstitutional.

B rewer-C ARIAS 5t</7ra note 1, at 213, 214.
'" Cappelletti, Judicial Review, supra note
1, at 88-92.

Id. at

'^^

2.

The Criminal
decision upon a person

thinking."

defendant: a notion that strongly defends the retroactive application of a constitutional

who

Germany

to the theory of the constitutive non-retroactive effect of

91-96. See also

See Constitutional Jurisprudence of

'" Cappelletti,
Judicial

F. R. G.,

Review, supra note

1,

supra note 109,

at 94, 95.

at

54; citing article 79

(

1

)

of the

FCCA.
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because the law was held unconstitutional but not void.

1
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Among

the reasons

why

court declares a law unconstitutional but not null are to diminish political impact

the

in its

decisions and to avoid the burden as a result of a complete avoidance of a law.'

^

Interesting enough, in these circumstances the court advises the legislative branch to

make
all

the necessary corrections within a period of time also designated

court.

In

cases, the court's decision, including those that declare a legal provision compatible

with the Basic Law, have the force of binding law, and consequently,

organs of the federation,

legislature

is

the case

when

and

all

constrained

unconstitutional.

authorities, all courts

from

re-enacting

a

and

all

law

fundamental reasoning on which

it

has

it

Moreover, the binding effect principle applies,

to the

rulings.'*^''

While reluctant

to depart

constitutional

The

been

announced

in fact, to the ruling

was grounded.

those binding effects do not approach the Constitutional Court,

precedent

all

individuals are bound.

after

stare decisis principle as in the case of the United States

its

by the

it

"

is

Exceptionally,

not ruled by the

Supreme Court where

from principles

laid

down

it

obeys

in its

case
1

law, the court will readily

do so but only

if

convinced

that

it

of

X-1

erred in an earlier ruling.

Despite the fact that in Germany, as a code-based system, the judiciary performs a
passive role, the institutionalization of a Constitutional Court resulted in an achievement

of a democratic-libertarian form of government with the capability to check and limit

'"

Constitutional Jurisprudence OFF.

R. G., supra note 109, at 53.

See Ipsen, Constitutional Review of Laws supra note 123, at 132, 133; Referring to Constitutional Court's
decisions saying that consequences of invalidity would be too far-reaching.

"*"M; See also CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OFF. R. G., supra note 109, at 53.
"*'
Constitutional Jurisprudence OFF. R. G., supra note 109, at 54; See also Brewer-Carias, supra note
at

1,

213, 214.

"*"

Constitutional Jurisprudence OF F. R. G., supra note 109, at 54; indicating that basic standards of review
which the law is upheld or nullified, but not the various arguments arranged in support of a particular result
are which constitutes those fundamental reasoning.
in

See also supra note 72 and accompanying text.
Constitutional Jurisprudence OFF. R. G., supra note
Id.

'*'*

109, at 54.
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correlative branches and subsequently to avoid abuses to individuals.

Furthermore, the

court's moral authority and the willingness of the political arms of the

obey

its

rellects

mandates have resulted

its

continuity.

185

"complex

legal

in

an absolute legitimacy of court's performance

political

role

to

which

with great success and a high regard for

"'*^^

See generally, Cappelletti, Repudiating Montesquieu? supra note

107; emphasizing the importance of

"Constitutional Justice" as an instrument to attain Separation of Powers and to protect of
"*^

government

Constitutional Jurisprudence OFF. R. G., supra note 109, at 55.
See Johnson, The Federal Constitutional Court, supra note 19,
1

at 131.

human

rights.

Chapter

The Mexican Version

III.

Review (The Amparo Proceeding)

of Judicial

and Scope

a) Origin

Legal scholars have defined the constitutional control practiced

European one.

judicial review similar to the

model which Mexico has followed.
is

"mixed or composite," due

I

XQ
It

For others, however,

it

to the fact that the constitutional question

form during an ordinary case,

The power
together with the

as in the

Supreme Court of Justice of

Power of

Italy the

American

American system.

it

does not arise

emerge

in

an

'^*^

the Nation as the highest court,

the Nation

See Cappelletti, Judicial Review supra note

Germany and

the

to resolve constitutional controversies is conferred to federal courts

the exercise of the Judicial

'*"*

is

as a

has also been suggested that the Mexican system

exclusively as a direct action, as in the European model, nor does

incidental

Mexico

in

also deposited.''^"

76, 77. His deductions

at

l,

is

One may

come from

''^'

in

which

say that the

the idea that in

processes of control are brought as a direct action, purely to examine the constitutionality

of a given law before the court as

it

80, 81 (1961 Mex.)[hereinafter Fix

is

practiced in Mexico. See also

Zamudio, Juicio deAmparo]:

Hector

Fix Zamudio, El Juicio

stating that in

Germany

deAmparo

individuals

make

use

of constitutional complaint proceeding to reclaim their violated rights which are protected by the Basic Law,
while similarly in Mexico, particulars

make use of

Amparo proceeding

the

to protect their rights protected

by the

Constitution against acts of authorities.
"*"

See Brewer-Carias, supra note

legal

1

at

156, 163. Noting that alter the great influence of the United States'

system during the nineteenth century, Mexico conserves a peculiar system with the so-call

constitutional protection

which he considers a "unique and complex

Judicial Review in Mexico:
Juicio

deAmparo. supra note

A

study of the Amparo Suit (1971)

See Cappelletti, Judicial Review, supra note

'^'

See Constitucion Poli'tica DE LOS ESTADOS Unidos
is

'^"

Mex. Const,

art.

1,

made up of eleven justices and

and criminal
94 paragraph 1.

cases, the other for civil

trial

for

Richard D. Baker,
Baker]. See Fix Zamudio,

See also

[hereinafter

188, at 68-70, 170, 379.

'*"'

The Supreme Court

institution."

at 77.

Mexicanos

consists of

cases.

39

art. 105 (Mex) [hereinafter Mex. Const.].
two chambers, one for administrative and labor
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hierarchical position of the vSupreme Court of Justice

equivalent to that of the

is

Court of the United Stales and to the Constitutional Tribunal
court within

The

its

in

Germany

effect

produced by constitutional decisions

omnes

is

only inter partes and can never

effect. Peculiarly, the court's decisions

allowed to declare laws unconstitutional but rarely null or void.

unconstitutional laws remain in effect.

made by

the

conforms

to

as the highest

political legal system.'''^

consist of general declarations with eri^a

are

Supreme

Supreme Court of
historical

and

''^^

fact that declarations

Justice affect solely

ideological

unconstitutional with binding effect on

by the judiciary

The

all

factors.

of unconstitutionality

the parties of the case at bar

The

power

governmental bodies

in the legislative branch.

and those

is

to

declare

a

law

seen as an interference

Hence, the practice of allowing laws found

violative of the Constitution to remain in effect

is

a

way of preventing

the

Supreme Court

of Justice from assuming legislative functions which constitutionally belong to the people

and

their elected representatives.''^^

The
character.

To

first

''^^

vestiges

of constitutional control in Mexico were not of judicial

The Supremo Poder Conservador, a

political

agency of constitutional

two Supreme Courts, the words "of Justice" will be added to the Mexican Supreme Court.
December 1994, a Constitutional Judicial Reform was implemented to declare a law invalid as long as a
majority of eight members of the Supreme Court of Justice agree; see Mex. Const, art. 105, § IT. The 1994
reforms and Acciones de Inconstitucionalidad, as main part of these reforms, are described in Chapter V § b).
Id. art. 107 (II); see also Fix Zamudio, JUICIO D^Amparo, supra note 188, at 235, 285, 286, 379; noting that
it is the "relativity principle," a characteristic legal standard in the Mexican legal system. For further discussion
distinguish the

Late

''''*

see infra Chapter

III

§ c).

Mex. Const, art. 71 § 2"'' (I, II). See also Lucio Cabrera and William C. Headrick, Notes on Judicial review in
Mexico and The United States published in Revista Juridica Interamericana vol. V., in COMPARATIVE
Constitutional Law: Mexico, Uganda & United States, Cases, Articles, Comments and Questions 248.
254 (Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr. ed., 1974)[hereinafter Cabrera & Headrick].
'''^

See

Baker supra

note 189.
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defense,

was created by

the Constitution of 1836 and

also

is

known

as the Sicte Leyes.

This institution's main duties were to arbitrate and to constrain the three ordinary

branches of the government to follow the Constitution. Also

the

capability

to

declare

nullity

the

among

last for long,

since

carry out such great and arbitrary power.""'

Conservador were said

to

The

be responsible "only

members of

five

to

God and

decisions were declared to be immediately obligatory and
•

1

Its

functions

did not have a political structure strong enough to allow

it

had

it

of legislation, any executive act or even any

proceeding of the Supreme Court of Justice contrary to the Constitution."
did not

''^^

other tasks,

the

it

to

Supremo Poder

public opinion."

immune from

All

its

question or

''0''
"

•

objection."

After functioning for five years, an 1840 reform to the Siete Leyes suspended the

Supremo Poder Conservador. The new reform proposed
would be

better

Democracy
time.

in

that

some of

those functions

performed by a judicial organ. ""'' The study of Alexis de Tocqueville,

America, had a great influence on politicians and legal scholars

Through Tocqueville' s masterpiece, they found

Court was the organ to interpret

and

that the

Supreme Court went

far to

United States Supreme

to resolve constitutional questions.

congressional session a minority report was submitted"

at that

Also during a

alleging that the United States

account for the peace and tranquillity of

its

country by

'''**

See Fix Zamudio, Juicio QE Amparo, supra note 188, at 61, 62. See also BAKER supra note 189, at 8, 9;
Emilio Rabasa, El Arti'culo 14 y El Juicio Constitucional 231 (1969 Mex.)[hereinafter Emilio Rabasa];
See Felipe Tena Ramirez, Derecho Constitucional Mexicano 457, 458 (1968 Mex.)[hereinafter Tena

Ramirez].

It

was

a clear influence of the French culture

Conserxatour, institutionalized
Technically,
"""

See

it

in the

was granted with

Baker supra

note 189,

a great range of

at 8, 9;

They

scholars.

imitate the Senat

power over procedures, polices and personnel of government.

See also Fix Zamudio, Juicio

The Supremo Poder Conservador lacked
independence, integrity and a docile population.
""
See Baker supra note 189, at 9.
"""^

among Mexican

VIII French Constitution from ideas of Napoleon Bonaparte.

See Emilio Rabasa, supra note 198,

at

231.

the

command

DEAmparo supra

of the

armed

note 188, at 61, 62.

forces,

impartiality,

political

.
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holding "an iiiinicnsc power.""

Yet, this

power was

not that

of the "brute use of

violence" but a force based on judicial opinions in imparting "justice and equity."""^'

report also stated that the judiciary

public

for the

life,

and because of

"calm and

its

was

apart from

by a

trial

stresses

insolation possessed an impartiality that

and temptations of

was indispensable

just resolution of those great constitutional questions

preservation of public peace and good order

that

common

may

largely depend.""

utilizing the ordinary procedures of a lawsuit, the

The

The

upon which

the

report proposed

Supreme Court of

Justice

should decide the constitutionality of laws whenever the executive fourth part of the
deputies should challenge their validity.""*^

The same procedure was

for testing the constitutionality of executive acts

also

recommended

by Congress."

Despite the aims to imitate the United States model, the final result was far from

the original.

In practice, the proceedings consisted of a suit

direct contest

between two or more branches of government

At

that time the political conditions prevailing in

installation of

any "constitutional technique.""

between

official persons, a

in their official capacity."

Mexico were not

^

suitable for the

However, those considerations

are of

relevant importance as the foundations of judicial control of constitutionality which

gradually gained predominance in the country."'"

Years
(Yucatan)

2(.

'^he

205

See

report

later, as

a result of separatist acts, a state

commissioned one notable

was presumably elaborated by Jose Fernando Ramirez,

Tena Ramirez, supra

note 200,

at

459, 460.

206

Id.
207

See Baker, supra note 189,

at

10,

1 1

208

Id. at 11.
209

210

Tena Ramirez, supra note 198, at 459.
Baker, supra note 189, at 10, 1.
Tena Ramirez, supra note 198, at 459.
See

1

211

state-native

member

jurist

a

to

of the Mexican union

design

a

member of the Chambers

totally

new

of Deputies.
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Constitution sufficient to create an independent state. Having experienced an anarchic

system and
judicial

llie

Manuel Crescencio Rejon created

arbitrariness of despotic authorities,

procedure of constitutional defense

the

for

Yucatan State

Intluenced by the United States Constitution, he included a

protected by a

Supreme Court. This court was

defend individuals

in the

enjoyment of both

to

Supreme Court would

to act

'

political rights against the

actions."'"'^

It

was intended

that

and inclusive power of constitutional

defense, covering the organic sections as well as the

were

1840.

of rights, which was to be

bill

and

their civil

also exercise a general

in

be created with sufficient power to

application of unconstitutional laws and illegal executive

the

late

a

bill

of rights. In

all

cases, the courts

only upon the motion of the injured party and exclusively for the purpose of

making reparation

for the injury suffered."

America played an important

Once

again, Tocqueville's

Democracy

in

role in Rejon' s work. His understandings of the institution

of judicial review and his expectations about

its

legal effect

and practical

results

were

included in the exposition of motives"'^ of the proposed Constitution:

power which the Americans have entrusted to their
courts of justice is.
immense, but the evils of this power are

The

political

.

.

considerably diminished by the impossibility of attacking the laws

had been

except through the courts

of justice.

empowered

law on the ground of theoretical

to

contest

generalities, if he
legislator,

the

were able

he would play

champion or

If

the judge

to take the initiative

to

censure the

a prominent political part; and as the

the antagonist of a party, he

would have brought

hostile passions of the nation into the conflict.

contests a law in an obscure debate on

importance of his attack

and

is

some

the

But when a judge
particular case, the

concealed from public notice; his

decision bears upon the interest of an individual, and the law

is

~^.
'

See EmilioRabasa, supra note 198,

"

Baker, supra note

^

Id. at 15.

at

231.

189, at 12-14.

"Exposition of motives'"

is

a statement

appended to a proposed statute or other legal drafts explaining the
manner in which the proposal is to function.

necessity for such legislation and, normally, the
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slighted only incidentally. Moreover, althoutzh

not abolished;
is

its

moral force

not taken away; and

may

is

censured,

be diminished, but

final destruction

its

it

its

it

is

authority

can be accomplished

only by the reiterated attacks of judicial functionaries."^'^

Rejon's thoughts coincided with Tocqueville's
with the civil law system than with the

common

However,

would be introduced

it

into

was unavoidable

Mexican

view which

is

more consistent

law system, and therefore the adaptation

of the American model was restricted rather than

influence."'^

in a

total,

partly because of the French

that constitutional control

by judicial means

political thought.

Thereupon, Rejon added his owns ideas for the inception of a new constitutional
institution. In

one of the

articles,

procedure in Mexico.

He

protection (aniparo) to

all

illegal

was not

until

by another prominent

Baker, supra note
is

"It

who

is

ask

is

now

the duty of the

it

recognized as a constitutional

Supreme Tribunal

jurist,

at

provide

Today, the Mexican Constitution

117, 118 (1977 Mex.), referring

in force

Democracy

in

rights.""''^

a national level

Mariano Otero. Otero structured Rejon's ideas

Tkna RAMIREZ, supra

to

against unconstitutional laws or decrees and

1847 that Rejon's project was institutionalized

BURGOA. El JUICIO DE Amparo

Tocqueville. See also

it

those

in a federal Constitution."""

'" IGNACIO
""*

wrote:

it

executive acts, in order to repair the injury caused to their constitutional

It

them

he created what

to

implement

embodies the

America by Alexis de

note 198, at 460-463.

189, at 33; noting that from advocates' arguments of judicial control of

constitutionality,

evident the great influence of French scholars, such as Montesquieu, Rousseau, Sismondi de Sismondi,

Tocqueville and Villemain. Thus, the general ideas of constitutionalism, the purposes of government, and the
rights of
at
"'''

the heritage of the French Revolution; see Fix

Zamudio, Juicio deAmparo, supra note

188,

at 232; emphasizing that this was the first time that the term "amparar, " (to
was employed to consecrate constitutional limitations.
See Tena Ramirez, supra note 198, at 460-465, stating that Otero's will was placed at service of Rejon's

Emilio Rabasa supra note 198,

protect),
"^"

men were

371-374.

thought.
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principles and ideas of both Rejon and Otero,

who

are considered the Ibimtlers of judicial

control of legislation."'

The

principle of the supremacy of the Constitution

is

established in the

Mexican

111

However,

Constitution,

which

constitutional

supremacy has not been broadened

is

considered as

"rigid."""""

as

much

in

Mexico

the provision ol

as Chief Justice Marshall did

for the United States' counterpart. Marshall's reasoning allowed every court in the United

States to declare a statute unconstitutional whenever, in the course of any suit, a conflict

arises

between a

statute

Hans Kelsen did

in

specialized court.""

Nor did Mexicans proceed

and the Constitution.

Europe

institutionalizing judicial review to be exercised

in

The theory of judicial review

in

Mexico was,

instead, a

based on legislation and an original puipose of protecting individual

Mexico, what
to the

is

as Professor

by a

development

rights.

Thus, in

called "judicial review" in the United States and in Europe, corresponds

Amparo proceeding

which

or ""Juicio de Amparo,''

is

used to declare laws and

acts of authority unconstitutional.""

"'

FixZamudio, Juicio DEAmparo. supra note 188, at 371-374.
"" See Mex. Const, art. 133; it reads, "[tjhis Constitution, the
therefrom, and

all

Treaties that have been

made and

shall

Laws of Congress

be made

in

of The Union that emanate

accordance herewith by the President, with

Supreme Law of the whole Union. The Judges of each State shall comply
Laws and Treaties,
anything in the Constitution or Laws of the States
notwithstanding." Although Mexican magistrates classify their Constitution as rigid since it cannot be amended

the approval of the Senate, shall be the

with the said Constitution,

by ordinary legislation,

.

in practice,

it

.

.

has been quite easy to amend. Article 135 requires a two-third vote of each

state legislatures to amend the Constitution; however,
Mexico has amended its Constitution 359 times in less than half the time that the United States has exercised
twenty-six amendments. See Smith, Confronting Differences, supra note 4, at 94, 95. However, according to
Mexican scholars in the Roman Law tradition there was a need for certainty in laws, writing complete legal
codes. Therefore, the big number of reforms in the Constitution concurs with the idea of "perfection of law;" s,ee,
e.g., Sergio Elias Gutierrez & Roberto Rives, La Constitution Mexicana al Final del Siglo XX (1995
Mex.). See also Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition supra note 2.

legislative

house and an absolute majority vote of the

See Barker, Constitutionalism
"'
""

Cappelleti

in the

Americas, supra note

2, at

910.

& Cohen, Comparative Constitutional Law, supra

The primary purpose of

the

Amparo proceeding from

its

note 78

at 13.

inception to the present day has been the preservation

of freedom from unjustified imprisonment and of private property against arbitrary acts of government.
""''

Cabrera

& Headrick, supra

note 196,

at

248.
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who

principles and ideas of both Rejon and Otero,

are considered the founders of judicial

control of legislation.""'

The

principle of the

supremacy of the Constitution

is

However,

established in the

Mexico

Mexican

Constitution,

which

constitutional

supremacy has not been broadened as much as Chief Justice Marshall did

for the

is

considered as "rigid.

in

the provision ol

United States' counteipart. Marshall's reasoning allowed every court

in the

United

States to declare a statute unconstitutional whenever, in the course of any suit, a conflict

arises

between a

Hans Kelsen did

Europe

in

specialized court."""*

Nor did Mexicans proceed

and the Constitution.

statute

in institutionalizing judicial

The theory of judicial review

in

review

Mexico was,

to

be exercised by a

instead, a

based on legislation and an original purpose of protecting individual

Mexico, what
to the

is

as Professor

development
Thus, in

rights.

called "judicial review" in the United States and in Europe, corresponds

Amparo proceeding

or

"'Jiiicio

de Aniparo,'""" which

is

used to declare laws and

acts of authority unconstitutional.""

""'

FixZamudio,

Juic10DE/4a//'/1/?0, supra note 188, at 371-374.

"" See Mex. Const,
therefrom, and

all

art.

133;

it

reads, "'[tjhis Constitution, the

made and

Treaties that have been

the approval of the Senate, shall be the

with the said Constitution,

shall

Supreme Law of

Laws and

Treaties,

.

.

.

Laws of Congress of The Union

be made

the

in

whole Union. The Judges of each State

anything

in

the

legislative

in practice,

it

emanate

shall

Laws of

Constitution or

notwithstanding." Although Mexican magistrates classify their Constitution as rigid since

by ordinary legislation,

that

accordance herewith by the President, with

it

the

comply
States

cannot be amended

has been quite easy to amend. Article 135 requires a two-third vote of each

house and an absolute majority vote of the

state legislatures to

amend

the Constitution; however,

Mexico has amended its Constitution 359 times in less than half the time that the LInited States has exercised
twenty-six amendments. See Smith, Confronting Differences, supra note 4, at 94, 95. However, according to
Mexican scholars in the Roman Law tradition there was a need for certainty in laws, writing complete legal
codes. Therefore, the big number of reforms in the Constitution concurs with the idea of "perfection of law;" see,
e.g., Sergio Elias Gutierrez & Roberto Rives, La Constitution Mexicana al Final del Siglo XX (1995
Mex.). See also Merryman, The Civil Law TRADITION supra note 2.
See Barker, Constitutionalism in the Americas, supra note 2, at 910.
"" Cappelleti & Cohen, Comparative Constitutional Law, supra note 78
'"

The primary purpose of

the

Amparo proceeding from

its

at 13.

inception to the present day has been the preservation

of freedom from unjustified imprisonment and of private property against arbitrary acts of government.
^-^

Cabrera

& Headrick, supra

note 196,

at

248.
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The

constituti(Mial

Ibundations

Mexican

oi'

judicial

review are based almost

exclusively upon the explicit authorization contained in Articles 103 and

107 ol the

Constitution:

Article 103:

The Federal

courts shall decide

controversies

all

that arise:

From laws

I.

or

of the

acts

authorities

violate

that

individual guarantees;
II.

From laws

or acts of the federal authority restricting or

encroaching on the sovereignty of the

From laws

in.

states,

and

or acts of the state authorities that invade

the sphere of federal authority.

Article 107: All controversies

mentioned

in Article

103 shall

be subject to the legal forms and procedures prescribed by

law

in

accordance with the following

I.

The Amparo

suit

shall

rules:

always be prosecuted

the

at

instance of the injured party.

Under these provisions,

means of

a single

action.

the exercise of

The procedural

all

constitutional questions are decided by

are contained

rules

Regulating Articles 103 and 107 of the Constitution and

in the

the

in

Amparo Law,

Organic

Law

of the

Power of the Federation.

Judicial

Although the Mexican Amparo proceeding""

is

considered an "essential unity,"

it

has five facets:""

1.

The Amparo

as protection of liberty.

of the individuals established

(guarantees)

Amparo

It

in

was

built to protect

the

first

fundamental rights

twenty-eight articles of the

was exercised exclusively in Mexico. However, this Mexican invention
which have adopted this institution. In Argentina since 1957 the
Amparo was established not by provision or statute but by a decision of the Argentine Supreme Court. However,
note that the Argentine Supreme Court adopted a decentralized system of judicial review in 1887 without explicit
Before 1857 the

was of

institution

great influence in other countries

constitutional support. Today, Argentina's 1994 constitutional reform authorizes judicial review; See Barker,

Constitutionalism in the Americas, supra note
Constitution of 1931, Honduras in 1886,

Amparo supra

note 188,

at

2,

in

910.

Spain also adopted the

1900 and Nicaragua

in

Amparo model by

1948, see Fix

its

Zamudio, Juicio DE

70-72.

Zamudio designed this classification in order to facilitate the study of
see Fix ZAMUDIO, JuiCIO DV. AMPARO, supra note 188, at 376, 377.

Professor Fix
institution,"

at

Cuba

this

"complex procedural
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Constitution."'^

another person,

jurisdiction

is

The procedure can be
at

initiated

who

on behalf of someone

is

impeded by

any time of the day or night, and before any judicial authority whose

same

the

as the authority trying to execute the violation, but with the

obligation to refer the case to the corresponding federal court."

Administrative Amparo, brought by individuals, challenges acts of the public

2.

administration that violate the Constitution or federal laws."

Amparo

Judicial

3.

proceeds

(cassation)

against

judicial

or

quasi-judicial

decisions on the basis of error in selecting, applying, or interpreting secondary legislation;

that

is, all

Agrarian

4.

"

laws except articles of the Constitution."

Amparo

is

a variation of the administrative

an attempt to protect groups of organized peasants

system of communal agrarian propriety.
supposition that

it

who

serves people

It

in

Amparo.

Its

creation

was

accordance with the Mexican

consists of an exceptional procedure, under the

lack legal knowledge and the economic

means

to

obtain adequate counseling."

An Amparo

5.

Laws

Against

used to challenge laws which violate the

is

Constitution; therefore, such an action provides the judiciary with a

reviewing the constitutionality of legislation. This facet of the

In essence the rights protected in this

first

means of

Amparo

directly

considered as

is

section of the Constitution are those rights inherent to

human

beings, such as the right to hfe, to liberty, traditional civil liberties such as freedom of speech, press and

assembly, property and social rights, rights in
torture, exile
'"'

and deportation,

Fix Zamudio, JUICIO

X^E

civil

and criminal procedure and the

Amparo, supra note

188, at 378.

The

United States to protect individual freedom against arbitrary

Amparo.
-•"

"-

It

protects not only the right of liberty but also

Id. at

382, 383.

Id. at

381, 382. See also

right to

be protect from

etc.

BAKER supra

note 189, at

Pedro Pablo Camargo, The Claim of "Amparo"

all

Jr. ed.,

was

the archetype for this aspect of the

individuals guarantees contained in the Constitution.

174, 175.
in Me.xico:

Comparative Constitutional Law: Mexico, Uganda
Questions 412 (Fletcher N. Baldwin

writ of habeas corpus, instrument used in the

arrest,

&

Constitutional Protection of

United States, Cases,

Human

Articles,

1974). [hereinafter The Claim of "Amparo"].

Rights, in

Comments and
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the

most specific

work

it

being of special interest

in this

."^'*

BrieOy, the

proceeding,

is

first

when

of legislation

is, if

aspects of constitutional Justice,

in its

a

four facets of the

constitutional

Amparo

are used as a

having

question,

means

been

for judicial review

raised

in

particular

a

determined to be adverse to the interest of the party raising the

issue.

That

an individual alleges that a judicial decision was given under the basis of an invalid

statute

and

that

such decision has been affecting his constitutional rights, the individual

can exercise an

Amparo

against

the judicial

decision

and seek judicial review of

TIC

legislation.""

This allegation must be brought before one of the Collegiate Circuit

Courts, according to their respective jurisdictions, or to the

the case

is

Justice. If

brought before the former, a review by the Supreme Court of Justice would be

granted again only

of Justice

Supreme Court of

may

if

a constitutional issue

is

involved.""

However, the Supreme Court

refuse to review a decision of the Collegiate Circuit Court

on a precedent established by the Supreme Court of Justice as
law or the direct interpretation of a provision of the
In all of the first four aspects

if it

was based

to the constitutionality of a

Constitution.""'

of the Amparo, judicial review of legislation has an

incidental character within a concrete judicial proceeding. For these particularities, the

Mexican system of

judicial review

judicial review. Nevertheless, in

Amparo

-''
"•"

are

is

considered to exercise the American model of

Mexico only

have jurisdiction for the

federal courts

proceeding, and the parties involved in the suit are always individuals against a

378, 379. See also BAKER, supra note 189, at 164-174.
FixZamudio, i\MC\ODE Amparo, supra note 188, at 378.
Id. See also Mex. Const, art. 107 IX: Resolutions, in direct Amparo rendered by

Id. at

not

revisable

unless

the

decision

involves the unconstitutionality of a

interpretation of a provision of the Constitution. In that case

it

may be

limited exclusively to the decision of actual constitutional questions.

a Collegiate Circuit Court,

laws or establishes a direct

taken to the Supreme Court of Justice,
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public authority, so to speak: the legislator

who approved

dictated the decision or the administrative authority

According

Zamudio,

Professor Fix

to

A/nparo Against Laws

is

that

is

it

"a

the law, the judge

which has executed the

the

has

act."

fundamental characteristic of the
proceeding" because

constitutional

strict

who

it

safeguards the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution against "legislative acts that

Hence, the Supreme Court of Justice has ruled

infringe fundamental precepts.""

that the

constitutionality of a law can be attacked even in the absence of an administrative or

judicial

act.""*"

For instance,

the interpretation and

in the

other four facets of the Amparo, the subject matter

manner of application of

a law in a concrete case, but in

is

Amparo

Against Laws, the judicial examination turns upon the text of the law and the legislative

intent,

when confronted with

assume

that

the requirements established

Amparo Against Laws,

by the Constitution. Some

precisely for that particular

mechanism mentioned,

is

similar to abstract judicial review exercised by the Federal Constitutional Court in

Germany."

Nevertheless, by others, this side of the

Amparo

is

the closest expression of

judicial review like that exercised in the United States.""*"

^"

Id.

&

--''

Cabrera

"'"'

Fix Zamudio, JUICIO DE Amparo, supra note 188,

Headrick, supra note 196,

evolution of the classic Amparo. For

However,

this facet

of the

at

249. 252.

many

this

at 169,

378, The

transformation

Amparo grew overwhelmingly

in

is

Amparo

against laws

is

a product of an

a "degeneration" of the original

model.

order to establish a unitary system of interpretation

of the legal norm.
""'

""
"""

Baker, supra note
Cabrera

&

189, at 164.

Headrick, supra note 196,

at

249, 252.

at 169. See generally. Baker supra note 189, suggesting
between Amparo against laws and the jurisdictional possibilities afforded in the
enjoin the enforcement of allegedly unconstitutional laws and, in an even more

Fix Zamudio, Juicio DE Amparo, supra note 188,

that there are certain similarities

United States by actions

that

limited sense, actions that seek declaratory judgments on constitutional questions.
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Against Laws

Amparo

is

a

"direct"'*

constitutional

action" which

Then

brought in

first

Justice

Plenary Session can review the sentence (under what

in

appellation)."^"*

instance before the Federal District Courts.

This process constitutes an actual

should be

Supreme Court of

the

is,

reality,

in

which

suit (specific case) in

an

the organs

of the state are the adversaries of the plaintiff, such as the federal or state legislatures that

passed the law, the president or the governors of the states

Departments of State

that ordered

where the constitutional question
contrast,

it

is

The aforementioned
form of review

Against

is

to

it

and the

not the case

its

By

promulgation or

plaintiff."'*

Amparo Against Laws,

the

requires an injured party in a "particular case" to

who may

be responsible.

""*^

With

this observation.

Amparo

have more similarities to the United States system, where the case

and controversy requirements are

obligatory.""*^

a procedural formality, fixed rules govern the period in which the action

should be brought, and when the
self-executing law (that

positive act in order to

is,

Amparo Against Laws

against a law

Amparo

is

is

brought against a so-called

which obligates a person

to

perform some

comply therewith without a previous request by the government).

The proceedings should be brought within

Direct

is

it

arises incidentally during an ordinary litigation.

rebuts the suggestion that in the

suit against those

signed

Amparo Against Laws

of the law which has aggrieved the

abstract since

Laws seems

As

publication.

an action to combat an unconstitutional law right after

after the first act of application

promote the

its

who

thirty

working days from the day the law came

a suit tried on original jurisdiction and a single instance before the

Supreme Court of

Justice.

& Headrick, supra

'""

Cabrera

at

176,379.

-'^^

Fix Zamudio, JuiCIODEAyW/'/l^O, supra note 188, at 177, 378-380.

'''Id.

note 196,

at

249, 252. See also Fix

Zamudio, JuiCIO GE AMPARO, supra note

188,
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into force.

But

period of time elapses, the law can be attacked within fifteen days

if this

from the time the affected person

is

notified of the first act of application executed to his

detriment.""*^

The
all

situation

different for laws that are not self-executing.

is

those laws which do not impose the obligation to carry out a positive act until the

government actually applies the law, the
fifteen

§

VI of

first

the

Amparo Law,
is

It

The

contested be a law in the constitutional sense."''^

a general jurisdictional

jurisprudencia'

is

act of application."^'^

injury before the courts declare jurisdiction.

established as

Amparo

statute of limitations for bringing an

days from the date of notice of the

According to Article 73,

is

For instance, under

principle

there should be a personal

also essential

that

regulation

the

admissibility of the suit has been

based

in

Amparo Law and

the

in

with a clear notion that the mere existence of an unconstitutional statute

not sufficient, and that a legal injury should be demonstrated.

The
(strict law).

rules governing interpretation of the

Amparo

suit as a

whole are

This principle requires the courts to confine their attention

to,

stricti juris

and base their

decisions exclusively on, those conclusions of law wherein the plaintiff, in his formal

written complaint, tries to demonstrate that his constitutional rights have been violated

by

-"•^Mat 116.
Id. See Amparo Law, Regulating Articles 103 and 107 of the Constitution
Amparo Law]; See also. BAKER supra note 189, at 166-168.
"*'*
Amparo Law, arts. 21, 22; Fix Zamudio, Juicio DE Amparo. supra note

arts. 21,

unknowing about

its

was affecting interests of
determine when it was the proper time

sole promulgation,

the defined criterion to

it

was extremely

Status of law attaches only to statutory provisions enacted

difficult to

the applicant. Individuals were
to bring their actions.

they were exposed to having their petitions dismissed by different standards used by the courts. See

result of legitimate excersise

These terms

188, at 177, 378, 380.

caused insecurities not only for plaintiffs but also for judges themselves since
determine when a law, by

22[hereinafter

by the constituted

legislative bodies

Otherwise

id.

and those as

of the executive of extraordinary legislative functions. Therefore, Administrative

regulations are not considered laws and should not be attacked through

Amparo

Against

Laws proceeding.
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The courts

the challenged act."^

arc not allowed to add anythinsz to correct possible

defects in the complaint in civil cases, but this principle

types of

Amparo

which courts

in

Amparo

must be dismissed."

the suit

all

other

are permitted to instruct the applicant to supply any

The term granted

omitted formal element."

not applied strictly in

is

suits

is

of five days, but

if

the time has expired,

enable courts to enforce the Constitution by

protecting individual rights in particular cases, but they prevent the courts from using this

power

b)

to

make law

for the entire nation.

"'^^

The Supreme Court of Justice and Its Autonomy
The

authority of the

Supreme Court of

Justice has been limited for historical

reasons and by current political factors. In Mexico, with a civil law tradition, judges

habitually play a

it."^^

The

modest

role limited to interpreting

constitutional and political

and applying the law, but not making

powers granted

overshadowed and limited not only the judiciary but the

The appointment process

for seats in the

to

the executive branch have

legislature as well."

Supreme Court of

proposal by the President of three candidates to the Senate for

"^

Jiirisprudencia (Jurisprudence) in

courts

when

justices; see

Id.

are decisions of the

Supreme Court of

a question has been decided identically in five consecutive

Amparo Law

art.

"" Baker, supra note 189,
'^^

Mexico

All other types of

its

Justice consist of a

approval.

Once

the

Justice binding in lower

judgments by a high majority of the

192.

at 185.

Amparo include complaints in criminal matters, labor disputes on behalf of workers,
when the act complained is based on laws declared unconstitutional by jiirisprudencia

agrarian issues and finally

of the Supreme Court of Justice; See Mex. Const,

art.

107.

-'Ud.al 186.
See Barker, Constitutionalism
~^^

See

in the

Americas, supra note

Mhrryman, The Civil Law Tradition, supra

See. e.g., Mex. Const, chapter III describing
Presidencialismo Mexicano (1987), illustrating

executive.

the

note

2, at

2, at

907.

34-38.

powers of the President. See also JORGE Carpizo, El
and extraordinary political powers of the

the constitutional
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Senate examines the candidates, a two-thirds vote designates the

new mechanism

is

a result

ot"

a series of strong external

new

magistrate."''**

and internal criticisms made
-)

against the impartiality and subordination of the

Supreme Court of

to

C(\

Prior to the

Justice."

1994 Constitutional Judicial Reform, the President had the discretion

nominees and the Senate

This

to appoint the

approve them."

Article 17 of the Constitution provides that both federal and state laws should

needed means

establish the

to

guarantee the independence of the courts and their

resolutions. Likewise, the Constitution says that their salaries

that the

term of their function

is

may

not be decreased and

for fifteen years. "^' Nevertheless, "the

of the Supreme Court of Justice pales

in

comparison

power and

prestige

United

to the high court of the

States."-'"

c) Effects of Constitutional Adjudication

The

by the Supreme Court of Justice

legal effects of all decisions taken

action are strictly inter partes and always subject to the "principle of relativity".

known

principle also

as the "Otero Formula""''^ consigned in Article 107, §

The judgment
individuals,

-^^

Mex. Const,

art.

shall

being

be

such

limited

it

affects

them

affording

to

only

"'"*

any
This

II:

private

and

shelter

94.

See Smith, Confronting Differences, supra note
Liberalismo

that

in

contra

Democracia:

4,

103. See also Harvard

at

Recent Judicial Reform

in

Mexico,

108

Law Review

Harv.

L.

Rev.

Association,

1919;

1928

Supreme Court of
L. & Pol'y 295; 316

(1995)[hereinafter Liberalismo contra Democracia]; Jorge A. Vargas, The Rebirth of the

Mexico: An Appraisal of President Zedillo's Judicial Reform of 1995,
(1995)[hereinafter The Rebirth of the Supreme Court of Mexico].
See Liberalismo contra Democracia supra note 259,
-'"'

Mex. Const,

art.

at

1

1

1

Am.

U.

J.

Int'l

929.

94.

See Smith, Confronting Differences, supra note 4, at 103.
Liberalismo contra Democracia supra note 259, at 1929.

The Jurist Mariano Otero was the creator of
Act of Reforms of 1847.

this principle.

He

included this provision in a national level

in the
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protection

the special case to

in

which

the complaint refers,

without making any general declaration about the law or act on

which

the complaint

The emphasis on
an

institutionalizing

authority."

'

It

is

based.

the particular case corresponds to the original

instrument

also coincides

protect

to

the

governed

who

of the law, they are inanimate beings

contrast, the

lawmaking process

final

religiously adopted in the

is

Justice

mouth which pronounces

a law that

Mexican Amparo proceeding.

the

words

is

obligatory for

all;

by

may be

~^^

subject to precedent judgments

of the

and Collegial Circuit Courts. Lower courts"^^ are bound when

five consecutive decisions to the

conform

of

only the duty of the legislature. This concept was

Occasionally, inferior courts

Supreme Court of

acts

cannot moderate either the force or the rigor of

judgments do not create

Hence,

arbitrary

with history and more particularly with the French

influence, where once judges were "nothing but the

the law.""^^

against

purposes of

same

effect, uninterrupted

to jurisprudencia (jurisprudence)."^^

by any incompatible

Each decision contributing

to the

rulings,

formation

of jurisprudencia must be approved by a majority of eight votes out of eleven.

A

jurisprudential thesis contains a brief restatement of a single point of law, abstracted and

& Headrick, supra

^^^

Cabrera

^^^

Fix Zamudio, Juicio DE Amparo, supra note 188,

supra note 107,
See Cabrera

at 12, citing

&

note 196, at 254.

Montesquieu.

De

Headrick, supra note 196,

constituents of 1856 stated: "

at

174. See also Cappelletti, Repudiating

Montesquieu?

L' Esprit Des Lois.
at

254. At the beginning of the establishment of the Amparo. the

succumb partially by decisions of
them noisily and scandalously in a fight between the sovereignties of states and
federation." See Fix Zamudio, Juicio DE Amparo. supra note 188, at 189, citing Ponciano Arriaga.
District Courts, Military Courts, Administrative and Labor Courts, both federal and .state courts.
Jurisprudence binds on Unitary and Collegial Circuit Courts, District Courts, Military Courts, Administrative
and Labor Courts, both federal and state courts. Baker, supra note 189, at 551.
the tribunals than extinguish

It is

required that absurd and vicious laws rather

55

27(

the conclusions of law."

summarized from

However, adoption o{

jiirisprKclcnc'ui

not resemble the stare decisis doctrine solidly practiced in the United States.

docs

271

-'''Id.
^^'

Id.

The obligatory

effect of Jiirisprudencia

on lower courts excepting

all

is

limited for

to ignore jurisprudencia, the only resource available to

complaint.

two reasons:

1

.

Jurisprudencia

those governmental and administrative organs.

2.

persons affected by

When
this

is

binding exclusively

an obligated entity decides

omission

is

another Ainparo

Chapter
Judicial

a) Judicial

Review at Work

IV.

Review

at

Work

in the Field of Constitutional

Rights in the

United States
The use of judicial review
of relevant importance not only

in

to protect the rights of individuals

America but

also in Europe.

has become a matter

In fact, the protection of

individual rights by judicial review has been the second major justification for the use of

this legal

instrument in Germany. In the legal system of the United States, judicial review

has been a main instrument not only to secure the rights of the people but also to expand

the

the

meaning of

the rights granted

Due Process Clause

by the Constitution. For instance, judicial review and

of the Fourteenth

expanding the meaning and scope of the

Amendment have played key

roles

in

Bill of Rights.

Both the Supreme Court of the United States and the Federal Constitutional Court
of

Germany have

the authority to determine the proper application of the rights granted by

the constitutions of their countries."

States, this

power emerges from

"" Dieter Grimm,

Human

"

In the legal

the institution of judicial review,

Rights and Judicial Review

Comparative Perspective

systems of Germany and the United

267, 270 (David

in

M. Beatty

Germanw
ed.,

in

HUMAN

which has been termed

RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW, A

1994)[heremafter Grimm]. See also William Safran,

The Influence of American Constitutionalism in Postyvar Europe: The Bonn Republic Basic Law and the
Constitution of the French Republic, in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM ABROAD, SELECTED ESSAYS IN
Comparative Constitutional History 91, 103 (George Athan Billias ed., 1990). See also Norman Dorsen,
How American Judges Interpret the Bill of Rights,
Const. Comment, 379, (1994)[hereinafter Dorsen]. See
also David L. Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Government Interests, Madisonian Principles versus
Supreme Court Practice, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1521, 1522 (1992)[hereinafter Faigman].
1

1
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the greatest contribution that the United States has

made

to "pohtieal theory

and

civil

Hberty."-^''

Once

the Bill of Rights

which James

implementation,

"independent tribunals.
fellow

""^"^

members of Congress

was created

in the

United States the next step was

Madison declared should be accomplished through

Madison, the father of the

of Rights, expressed to his

Bill

the following view:

Independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves
peculiar
will

in

a

the guardians of those rights; they [the courts]

be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of

power
resist

manner

its

in the Legislative or Executive; they will naturally

be led to

every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in

the Constitution

by the declaration of

"^^

rights.

History, however, developed a course of events different from what

predicted because the

Supreme Court had

130 years of existence."

This

little

may

Madison had

opportunity to apply his premises during

be due to two

of Rights

itself

did not apply to state governments only the national government, and the Civil

War

its first

amendments

(XIII,

present century.'

XIV, and

XV)

facts: the Bill

did not acquire any substantial importance until the

Today most of

the

safeguards against national actions are also

available against state actions through the Fourteenth

Amendment and

gradual incorporation of the various protections listed in the Bill of Rights

'''^

Grimm, supra note 272,

at 59.

136; Steinberger, 5»pra note 121

at

See also Dorsen, supra note 272,

at

278

379; Brewer-Carias, supra note

1, at

214.

""elder Witt, Congressional Quarterly's Guide to the U.S.
1

the process of

Supreme Court, 374

(2nd.

ed.,

992 )[hereinarter Witt].

'-''Id.

'-''Id.

""m.
( 1

Glenn Abernathy & Barbara
Abernathy & Perry].

993)[hereinafter

'-''Id.

A.

Perry,

Civil

Liberties

under the Constitution,

16
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The Slaughter-House Cases."
Ilurtado

Cruikshank,'

the

limited

view

amendments."^"*

that

California,''

the

"

and Flessy

and

v.

v.

United States

Reese,'

Ferguson'

Supreme Court had with regard

the Slaughter-House

In

different citizenships,

Amendment

v.

United States

are clear

to

the

Cases the Court ruled

that

that the Privileges

v.

examples of

effect

there

of these

were two

and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth

applied only to the "citizens of the United States.""

Reese, according to the decision of the Court, the Thirteenth

In

United States

Amendment

v.

did no more

than abolish slavery."

In addition, the Court held in United States

v.

Cruikshank

that the

Due Process

clause could not be applied against a private individual charged in the killings of

60 freedmen, since the Fourteenth Amendment banned only
actors

from depriving any person of

life, liberty,

states

or property without

and governmental

Due Process of Law;
''X7

"but this adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another.""

-''^

at least

In

Hurtado

v.

Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872)

280^2

US

214 (1875).

elections inspectors

who

The case involved two Kentucky municipal
The offended alleged party that the inspectors had
1870 Enforcement Act. However, the Court held that because the

See also STONE, supra note 6
refused to allow a black

violated the voting right sections of the

man

at

509

to vote.

relevant sections of the act were not expressly limited to actions being racially motivated, they exceeded the

power of Congress under the Fifteenth Amendment, and that the prosecution could not proceed.
92 U.S. 542 (1875). See also STONE, supra note 6 at 510. The case arose from a dispute of an electoral
victory between Republicans and Democrats in Louisiana. 1872. The Republicans gained control of the parish
courthouse, where they were attacked by a factual army of "old time Ku Klux Klan," who killed at least 60
freedmen. Of the ninety-seven defendants indicted under the Enforcement Act of 1870, only nine were brought
to trial, and only three were convicted.
The Supreme Court reversed these convictions on the grounds that
punishment of the killings exceeded the power of Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment.
"**"
Hurtado v. California 10 U.S. 516 (1884). See also GUNTHER, supra note 13, at 413. This case sustained a
California statute which allowed criminal proceeding to be instituted by information rather than by grand jury
indictment. While using the phrase "principles of liberty and justice," the Court inclined to minimize federal
1

intervention in state criminal procedures.
283

Ferguson,

163 U.S. 537 (1897).

In Plessy, the Court found that "equal but separate-publicand black did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment since it was designed to
enforce absolute equality of the two races, but not intended to abolish distinctions based on color.
-'^
Witt, supra note 274, at 375.

Plessy

V.

accommodations"

J'-'

'"^

-^^

for white

Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
Witt, supra note 274, at 375. See also STONE, supra note 6
Stone, supra note 6 at 510. See also Witt, supra note 274,

at

509.

at

375.

59

Due Process clause

California the Court decided that the

guarantees of the Bill of Rights against slate actions.

found

that there

In

Plessy

Ferguson, the Court

v.

was no denial of equal protection by having "equal but separate public

accommodations"

for white

and black people."

Although the Court continued
nearly the end of the

until

"*^*^

did not expand the particular

19th century,

amendments.

interpretation of these

to restrict the effects

"'^°

of the Civil

War Amendments

eventually turned to a more extensive

it

This was to some extent

made

possible because

to hear a broader category of

Congress expanded the jurisdiction of the federal courts

cases arising under the Constitution or federal laws in 1875."

Later

Supreme Court went thorough

the

on,

a

characterized by having the Court applying the Bill of Rights

property than to protect individuals.

Weeks

States,""^^

"*"*

289

290
"*"

United

v.

Witt, supra note 274,
Witt, 5;//;ra note 274,
Witt, supra note 274,
Id.

States,"'^^

Cases

like Yick

Tniax v Raich,'

GUNTHER, supra note

Wo
'

v.

period

375. See also Gu^^lHER, supra noit 13, at 413.

at

377.

effectively to protect

Hopkins,"

v.

"

Boyd

v.

state officials to

violation of their constitutional rights.
jurisdiction, authorizing the
-"-

Wo

Yick

that the

Hopkins,

V.

1

Court

18 U. S.

concern by expanding

in the class

.

their release if they

who
new law

of persons

could show that their detention was

Several years later Congress further expanded the

in

Supreme Court

hear appeals in criminal cases."

356 (1886). See also WiTT. supra note 274.

Equal Protection clause guaranteed aliens the right

requirements by city officials.
( 1

to

.

win

United

United States"

could ask a federal judge to issue a writ of habeas corpus ordering their release from custody. This

allowed persons detained by

was

that

13, at 413.

375. See also

at

this shift in the federal judicial

more

and Guinn

at

"Congress made possible

polemic

See also C.

984)[HEREINAFrER CiVIL LIBERTIES].
116 U.S. 616 (1886). The Court declared

'"^^

Herman
that the

at

378. In 1886 the Court decided

to run laundries free

from discriminatory licensing

Pritchett, Constitutional Civil Liberties, 253, 254

Fourth and the Fifth amendments offered

against federal seizure for an individual's private papers.

total protection

See also Civil liberties, supra note 292,

at

198.

Ralph A. Rossum & G. Alan Tarr, American Constitutional Law, The Bill of Rights and Subsequent
Amendments, 556, (1995)[hereinafter The Bill of Rights]. Stressing that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
were described as safeguards against all government invasions of "the sanctity of a man's home and the privacy
of

life."

''''232

U.S. 383 (1914). In support of the ruling in Boyd, the Court held that evidence illegally obtained by

federal agents could be excluded

from use

OF RIGHTS

261. See also CiVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 292,

,

""'^

supra note 293,

at

in federal courts

through the "exclusionary rule." See also

THE BILL

at 189.

239 U.S. 33 (1915) By invoking the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court struck down state legislation
freedom of aliens to work.) See also Gunther, supra note 13, at 763. Discussing the Truax case
and how the Equal Protection clause gradually expanded its scope to all ethnic groups seeking protection against
restricting the

60

reanimated the hope

Supreme Court would

that the

finally

employ

its

power

to protect

individuals against the government."'^

It

was not

until

1925 that the Fourteenth

Amendment

acquired

its

current
TOW

importance and scope

Gitlow

V.

New

to protect individual rights against either state or federal actions."

York'"^*^

was

the path-breaking case for a

new

era of

The case involved

decisions expanding the reach of personal freedom and liberties.

left-wing socialist

who

published and distributed a Left

revolution and the organization of the proletarian

state.

Wing Manifesto
He was

violating a criminal anarchy law, which, he argued before the

rights guaranteed in the First

Amendment.

The "incorporation process" of
then began by assimilating the First

New York

Supreme Court

for

violated his

Although the Court upheld the law, "the

personal rights and liberties protected by the

the states.

a

calling lor class

arrested in

among

majority stated that freedom of speech and of the press are

Amendment from impairment by

Supreme Court

Due Process

the fundamental

clause of the Fourteenth

"'"^'

the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth

Amendment, and continued

Amendment

for approximately fifty

discrimination. William B. Lockhart et al. Constitutional Rights and Liberties, casescomments-questions. 1058 (7™ ed. 1991 )[hereinafter Lockhart].
238 U.S. 347 (1915) The case involved an Oklahoma "grandfather clause" requiring only black people to take
a literacy test before they could be qualified to vote. The court held that this clause violated the Fifteenth
Amendment. See also Civil liberties, supra note 292, at 340. See also LoCKHART, supra note 295 at 977.
official

-^'

Witt, supra note 274,

''*'

Id.
-""
'"*'

""

at

378.

See also CiviL LIBERTIES, supra note 292,

Gitlow

V.

New

York,

at

225.

268 U.S. 652 (1925)

Witt, supra note 274,
WlTT, supra note 274,

at

378. See also CiVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 292,

at

378.

at 20.

61

years niorc.^""

By

the mid-1970s, the

protection at least to the extent that

Supreme Court had expanded

Madison had proposed

The Substantive Due Process

1.

Substantive and Procedural

of the

the Bill of Rights

a century earlier.

Fourteenth

Amendment

Due Process emanate from both

the Fifth

Amendment

and the Fourteenth Amendment, respectively. This work examines only the Due Process

Amendment, which imposes

clause of the Fourteenth

the states.

"*""*

As

first

Process on

1873, in the Slaughter-House Cases, the Substantive

early as

Process concept was

Due

the obligations of

suggested by Justice Joseph P. Bradley. ^""^

Due

In his dissenting

opinion, Justice Bradley stressed that any law "which prohibits a large class of citizens

from adopting a lawful employment, or from following a lawful employment previously
adopted, does deprive them of liberty as well as property, without

Due

Process of

Law."-^«^

In 1877,

Munn

v.

Illinois

gave an opportunity

concept Justice Bradley had suggested four years earlier

Although the Court upheld the

""

Witt, supra note 274,

at

state regulation,

U.S. Const, amend.

without
-'"^

^'*

at

Court

Slaughter-Hoiise Cases.

this regulation

K04. Describing

eight

to get closer to the

how

on Substantive

Supreme Court has

the

amendments applicable

to the states

by the

Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

"" WITT, supra note 274,
"""^

first

in the

analyzed

378. See also STONE, supra note 6

gradually incorporated most of the rights guaranteed in the

Due

it

to the

Due Process

378.
§

1.

".

.

.

[N]or shall any state deprive any person of

life,

liberty,

or property,

of Law.'"

Witt, supra note 274.
Id.

at

XIV
at

518.

See also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36. 122 (1872).

See also ClVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 292.

at

293.

94 U.S. 13 (1877). The case involved a state law. which regulated the maximum charges for grain elevators.
The Court stressed that the critical point in deciding the case was whether private property was affected by public
interest. The Court held that the businesses regulated in Munn were public rather that private.
See also
GUNTHER. supra note 13, at 437.
1
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Due Process grounds and found
"affected with a

pubHc

1887, the Court

later, in

state legislation

interest"

showed

would be

that the

substance of the grain storage business was

and therefore subject to
a

new approach

in

Mugler

v.

Kansas.^^'^

power only

valid under the state police

if

it

It

secured by the fundamental law.^"

rights

Substantive

Due Process was completed:

law regulating economic matters

in

stressed that

unequivocally

concerned the protection of the public health, safety or morals, and only
violate

Ten years

state regulations.^"'^

if

it

did not

1890 the slow movement

In

the Court finally used

it

Chicago, Milwaukee and

to strike

St.

down

to

a slate

Paul R.R. Co.

v.

Minnesota.

Seven years

later, in

1897, for the

first

time the Court employed Substantive

Process to invalidate a Louisiana statute on the "liberty of contract" grounds.

was Allgeyer

v.

Due

The case

'

Louisiana;^^ and the Court decided that the statute violated the

Fourteenth Amendment's

Due Process

clause because

it

deprived the defendants of their

During subsequent years the Court continued

to decide

liberty to enter into contracts.'

'"

""*

THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 293, at 8L Stating that the narrow
Due Process clause in the Slaughter-House Cases was reaffirmed by the

Witt, supra note 274,

at

518. See also

procedural interpretation given to the

Court
''^

in

Munn.

Stone, supra note 6

at

815.

See also WiTT, supra note 274,

at

518.

See also ClvlL LIBERTIES, supra note

292, at 293. Indicating that although the Court refused to interfere with the state regulation,

it

appraised the

on Substantive Due Process grounds.
^'"l23 U.S. 623. "The Court upheld a state law prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages, but continued that not
every regulatory measure is to be accepted as a legitimate exertion of the police power of the states." See also
legislation

GUNTHER, supra note
""'

at

13, at 438.

Stone, supra note 6
293. See also

"134

816. See also Witt, supra note 274,

at

GUNTHER, supra note

13, at

at

518. See also CiviL LIBERTIES, supra note 292,

438.

U.S. 418 (1890). "The Court held unconstitutional a state statute authorizing a commission to set final

and unreviewable railroad rates." See also ROTUNDA, supra note 24,
'''
WITT, supra note 274, at 518.

at

365.

578 (1897). The case involved a Louisiana statute prohibiting anyone in the state from issuing
its territory with companies that had not been admitted to do business in the state.
^'^
GuNTHER, supra note 13, at 439. Indicating that Justice PeckJiam's broad articulation of the "liberty of
contract" gave the case its special significance in the development of Substantive Due Process, and considering
this case as the first one in which the Court invalidated a state law on Substantive Due Process basis. See also
THE BILL OF RIGHTS supra note 293, at 81. Considering also this case as the first one in which the Court
invalidated a state law on Substantive Due Process basis, and stressing Justice Peckham's principle that the right
165 U.S.

insurance on property in

,

63

Due

cases under the two doctrines developed by that time with regard to Substantive

Process:

1.

Business affected with a public interest could be regulated by the

Government should not

interfere with the

The Court upheld
however,

in the

'''

heading.

a

state

it

reduced the areas of economic

it

liberty

the

Court

is

declared

Holden

in

Lochner

liberty in

legislation

unconstitutional

v.

week

a classic illustration of the Substantive

the

New

make

note 295
-

contracts
at 76.

was a

part of the liberty guaranteed

(Sharing the same point of view of the

" Witt, supra note 274,

at

v.

Hardy:

maximum

Due Process approach

because

disagreed

it

in

which

York,

the

as

substantive reasonableness of the need for and terms of the enactment.

to

1898 the Court

in

Court had upheld a ten-hour regulation for miners

found an abridgment of contract

The case

"

this

of contract doctrine, the Court invalidated

involved a state law setting a ten-hour day, sixty-hour

bakers.

be embraced by

to

life

law regulating minimum working hours for miners

In spite of the fact that the

Holden,

2.

freedom of contract.""^

laws regulating wages and hours; nevertheless,

state

and

several stale regulations under the public interest approach;

Regarding protection of the

number of

upheld a

1920s,

state;

for

since

with

the

"

by the Due Process Clause. See also Lockhart, supra

last

two

authors.)

518.

169 U.S. 366 (1898). Stating that the Court justified

its

decision in light of the special health problems of

such workers and the unequal bargaining power of the parties.

New York statute as not valid labor law. and it declared that state
power extended only to protection of the public welfare. Moreover, the Court implied that there was not
enough public interest to justify the law's encroachment of the liberty of contract. The court also rejected the
198 U.S. 45 (1905). The Court regarded the

police

health and safety argument in support of the regulation.

'"

Civil liberties, supra note 292,

note

13, at

439.

Rotunda, supra note
^"'

at

293.

See also WlTT, supra note 274,

See also LocKHART, supra note 295
24, at 366. See also

Abernathy & Perry, supra

note 277,

at 77.

THE BILL OF RIGHTS
at 27.

at

518.

See also GUNTHER, supra

See also STONE, supra note 6
,

supra note 293,

at

83

&

at

84.

817.

See also

64

ii.

Disavowal

of Substantive

The period from 1905
legislation

abandon

to

Due Process

1930 was characterized by invalidation
""

on the basis of Substantive Due Process.

The Court, however, was ready

economic regulations

the close judicial scrutiny of

which coincided with the Great Depression and the
suggests that the Court

was compelled

cede

to

its

appropriateness of economic regulations to the

Nehhia involved a

state legislation regulating

the Court upheld

it;

legislatures

its

indeed, the Court

own view

economic

ol

in

New

Nchhia

Deal.

""^

v.

to

New York;"

The chronology

"super-legislative" role in matters of

wisdom of

the legislators.

'"

Although

an industry not affected by public interest,

was

clearly determined not to

impose upon

about correct economic policy, as the Lochner Court had earlier

done."^'^

After Nebbia, other cases such as West Coast Hotel

Darby Lumber Co.,"

and Olsen

v.

Nebraska"

"Subsequently, the Court has declared that

the

^'^

wisdom of

13, al

Parrish,'''^

ratified the Court's

does not

sit

United States

new

v.

position.

as a super-legislature to weight

whether the policy

it

expresses offends the public

444. See also LoCKHART, supra note 295

at

80. See also

legislation nor to decide

GUNTHER, supra note

it

v.

STONE, supra note 6

at

831.
^^^

291 U.S. 502 (1934) The Court upheld a

decision stated that

New York

Due Process demanded only

regulatory .scheme for fixing milk prices.

that states

adopted reasonable economic policy

The Court's
to

promote

public welfare, substantially related to object sought to be attained.
""^

Witt, supra note 274, at 518. See also LoCKHART, supra note 295 at 80. Indicating that from Lochner to
Nehhia the Court constantly "substituted its judgment for that of Congress and state legislatures on the wisdom
of economic regulations interfering with contract and property interests." See also Stone, supra note 6 at 831,
Civil LIBERTIES, supra note 292,
'^
WiTT, supra note 274, at 518.
^-^

Id.

at

306,

THE BILL OF RIGHTS

See also CiviL LIBERTIES, supra note 292,

at

,

supra note 293,

at 84.

306, 307.

300 U.S. 379 (1937). The case involved a Washington wage law stabilizing a minimum wage for women. See
also Stone, supra note 6 at 833, Gunther, supra note 13, at 455, Witt, supra note 274, at 519, LoCKHART,
supra note 295 at 85, THE BILL OF RIGHTS supra note 293, at 85.
"312 U.S. 100 (1941). The case involved minimum wages and maximum hours regulations, which the Court
upheld in 1941. See also Witt, supra note 274, at 519. STONE, supra note 6 at 834.
""
313 U.S. 236 (1941). The Court upheld state regulation dictating the maximum fee that an employment agency
could collect from employees. See also Witt, supra note 274, at 519, STONE, supra note 6 at 834.
,

65

welfare.

"''^'

The iTKxlem Court has pushed

Due Process complaints

aside

against

economic regulation and has not invalidated such laws on the grounds of Substantive Due
Process since 1937.

ill.

"

The Revival

of

Substantive

Due Process and Equal

At the time the Court was abandoning
approach

to supervising

economic regulations,

under the equal protection guarantee

that

it

Protection

Lochner Substantive Due Process

its

was already developing

allowed

it

way

another

to

a line of rulings

judge legislative

measures."^^^

In

Skinner

Oklahoma^^^

v.

the Court

Process to the concept of Equal Protection.

which provided

compulsory

for

TT

sterilization of persons convicted three times of felonies

The Court regarded

and the Court's decision rested on a view

-'-"

this

law as denial of equal protection,

allied to Substantive

Due

''''^

Process.

when

also developed in this case a "two-tier" review holding that

fundamental rights are impaired by a

tier"

Skinner involved an Oklahoma regulation

jC

showing "moral turpitude."

The Court

added the Substantive scrutiny of Due

statute, the court's scrutiny is stricter.

This "two-

review consists of a rational relation between the compelling objectives of the

Witt, supra note 274,

at

state

519.

13, at 462, Stone, supra note 6 at 834. Stating that since 1937, "the Court's
abandonment of Lochner-^XyXc Substantive Due Process review of economic regulations has been unequivocal."
"^ Witt, supra note 274, at 5 19.
""•316 0.5.535(1942).

'''GUNTHER, supra note

"' Witt, supra note 274,

at

same end.
"^ GUNTHER, supra note

See also CiviL LIBERTIES, supra note 292,

519.

Douglas invoked equal protection
13, at

in striking

the

Oklahoma

act. Justice

492. See also Witt, supra note 274,

Stone, supra note 6 at 843.
'" Witt, supra note
274, at 519.

LoCKHART, supra note 295

down

See also GuNTHER, supra note

at

519;

13, at

at

314. Stating that while Justice

Stone used Due Process for the

LOCKHART, supra note 295

at

147;

492; STONE, supra note 6

at

844;

at 148.

"" Civil LIBERTIES, supra note 292,

at

315. See also

GUNTHER,

.w</;ra

note 13, at 492, 493.

66

and the appropriateness of the means employed by the legishiturc

to

accomphsh those

ends.-^-^^

The Skinner
Connecticut,''^^^

which gave

decision,

Eisentand

personal choice in family

and Roe

Baird,

v.

life,

birth to cases such as

under

its

new

v.

Wade,

Substantive

"

Griswold

v.

also benelited matters of

Due Process approach.

Considerations About the Judicial Development of Rights
Jurisprudence.
Iv.

The Due Process clause of

the

Fourteenth

instrument used by the Supreme Court to strike

down

Amendment became

the

main

state actions that violate individual

This process of incorporation or nationalization that the Court has developed

rights.

concerning the applicability of the
of state and federal

Bill

of Rights has brought an essential homogenization

The case-by-case work of

rights.'''*"''

the

Supreme Court

has secured state compliance with federal requirements.''"*^ Moreover,

it

in this

regard

has successfully

counteracted the state-rights rallying cry of proponents of racial apartheid, as well as

^^'^

Civil liberties, supra note 292,

at 3 15.

"381 U.S. 479 (1965) Considered a landmark case, Griswold involved a Connecticut law forbidding the use of

The Court held in this case that the principle of privacy was a value protected by the Constitution
and struck down the Connecticut statute. See also STONE, supra note 6 at 941-955; WiTT, supra note 274, at 519;
contraceptives.

LOCKHART, supra note 295 at 148-152, 153, 154; Abernathy & PERRY, supra note 277,
at 649-558; GUNTHER, supra note 13, at 493-504 & 505.

at

427; ROTUNDA,

supra note 24,
^^"405 U.S.

438 (1972) Eisenstand involved a Massachusetts law forbidding

the distribution of contraceptives

only to unmarried persons. Looking to the different treatment given by the state legislation to married and

unmarried people, the Court held

Abernathy

that this

law constituted a violation of the equal protection clause. See also

&

Perry, supra note 277, at 429; Stone, supra note 6 at 954; Gunther, supra note 13, at 504;
LocKHART, supra note 295 at 154 & 155; Rotunda, supra note 24, at 556.
Roe V. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The case involved a Texas statute making it a crime to procure an
abortion, except to save the life of the mother. The Court struck down the statute arguing that it was in violation
of both the Due Process clause and the right of privacy of the Fourteenth Amendment. See also Witt, supra
note 274, at 519; Rotunda, supra note 24, at 558-664; STONE, supra note 6 at 955-960; ABERNATHY & PERRY,
supra note 277, at 429-432; LoCKHART, supra note 295 at 155-164.
'^'
Witt, supra note 274, at 5 19.
Keith S. Rossen, Federalism

in the

Americas

40 (1994). See also Louis Henkin. A
Henkin].
^'^

Henkin, supra note 344

at

484, 485.

Bill

in

Comparative Perspective, 26 U. Miami Iter-Am. L.R. 1, 39 &
L.J. 483, 484 (1997)[hereinafter

of Rights-and-a Half, 32 Tex. Infl
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opponents

to

reforming slate criminal justice systems

order to guarantee compliance

in

"^

with federal constitutional standards.
In addition, this process

in the Bill

implied

has enriched,

value and quantity, the rights enumerated

in

of Rights since the Court's decisions show protection of rights not written nor

in

the

Constitution;

instance,

for

the

presumption

of innocence

The

requirement of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for conviction of a crime.
of the Court while deciding

principle giving

life to

civil rights

cases has

universal suffrage, which

of democracy and representative government.

Court Reports the concept of
for such

liberty,

made

feasible to

it

many would

''^'^

It is

and

the

criterion

have equality as a

rather relate to the principle

also possible to find in the

Supreme

which includes individual autonomy and safeguards

autonomy against deprivation by government, "not only by Procedural Due

Process of

Law

(that is,

by

the requirement of the rule of law and fair procedures) but also

by Substantive Due Process

(a

requirement that

all liberty,

as well as life

and property, be

protected against arbitrary governmental action)."''^"

The protection of
improved some aspects of

rights

by

judicial

judicial review.

'''^'

development of jurisprudence has also

The Court has policed

adhering to the case or controversy requirements, which

from giving advisory opinions; from deciding

^^^

^'*^

Rossen, supra note 344

at 40.

Henkin, supra note 344

at

Id.

Henkin, supra note 344
Id.

at

political questions;

jurisdiction

by

prevent the Courts

from having before

485.

Stating that the criterion of the Court

was

equally." See also Witt, supra note 274, at 381.
'''

in general

its

485.

"if

one person votes,

all

must be

entitled to vote

and

to vote

"
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them someone without standing, or some kind of personal stake
from deciding issues

that arc either

in

the controversy; and

'

premature or moot.

In addition, the case or controversy requirement serves at least three important

objectives. First,

it

among

reduces the possible friction

the branches

review by limiting the occasions for judicial intervention.
possibilities of

produced by judicial

Second,

it

reduces the

having abstract, hypothetical, or speculative cases reaching Courts by

ensuring that constitutional issues will be resolved only in the context of concrete

Third,

disputes.

it

keeps

alive

the

autonomy and

of individual

principles

determination by ensuring that Courts will render decisions

at the

self-

behest of those actually

injured.''''^

b) Judicial

1.

Review at Worl<

Rights in

Germany

Concrete and Abstract Judicial Review and Individual Rights

On

the basis of abstract judicial review, the federal Constitutional Court

Germany can review any law
Basic

in thie Field of Constitutional

Law under

as to

its

in

congruity with the individual rights embodied in the

Article 93(1)2^''"^ of the Basic

The Constitutional Court

Law.'*''''

is

vested with this power, and can conduct such a review on petition of the federal

government, of the government of a Land, or of one third of the members of the

^^'

Id. See also STONE, supra note 6
^" Stone, supra note 6 at 88, 89.
''^

F.R.G.

CONST,

art.

at 88.

93(1)2 "The Federal Constitutional Court decides: ... in cases of differences of opinion

or doubts on the formal and material compatibility of Federal law or
compatibility of

Land law with other Federal

Land law with

this

Basic Law, or on the

law, at the request of the Federal government, of a

government or of one-third of the Bundestag members.. .'"
"^^^Grimm, supra note 272, at 271. See also JUDICIAL POLITICS

Land

.

Stating that abstract judicial review

is

IN

WEST GERMANY,

not "an adversary proceeding in a

strict legal

supra note 110,

sense.

decisions of the Court in such cases merely advisory opinions; for the question of a law's validity

before the Court, and a decision against

its

validity renders

it

null

and void."

at

106.

But neither are the
is

squarely

69

parliament.

In

extraordinary circumstances, the Constitutional Court can also analyze a

law on application

ol"

an individual whose fundamental rights are directly affected by a

given statute and not merely by

its

application.

^^^'

The Constitutional Court

is

meant

to

norm

or

"objective" judgment of the validity or invalidity of a legal

devote

itself to the

statute

when judging

3C-7

cases on abstract judicial review.

The Constitutional Court can review
rights protected in the Basic

employ

a

Law on

the request of any ordinary court

law whose constitutionality

exercises this

power under

Article

the compatibility of law with the individual

is

100''^'^

The

unclear.

of the Basic

and

to

Constitutional Court

federal

Law,'*''^

which has

it

executes this review

of laws on the basis of concrete judicial review.

The

petition of the ordinary court

must be signed by those judges who have a

voice in favor of referral and must be accompanied by a declaration of the legal provision

at issue, the

provision of the Basic

a constitutional decision

is

when

transgressed, and the extent to

fundamental to resolve the disagreement.

The Constitutional Court
referral

Law presumably

extremely

is

a court brings a statute before

strict

it

which

'*^'

checking the prerequisites of

in

on the grounds of unconstitutionality

because the Federal Constitutional Court does not have the obligation to engage

in

'^^

Grimm, supra note 272, at 27
See also F.R.G. CONST, art. 93( 1 )2, 4a.
^" Constitutional Jurisprudence of F. R. G.. sxpra note 109, at 1. Explaining that the proceeding
1

described as objective because

.

"it is

of the official entity petitioning for review;
'**

F.R.G.

CONST,

to its decision, the

art.

100(1).

is

intended to vindicate neither an individual's subjective right nor the claim

"Where

its

sole purpose

is

to declare

what the Constitution means."

a court considers a law unconstitutional, the validity of

which

is

relevant

proceedings shall be stayed, and a decision shall be obtained from the Land court competent

for constitutional disputes if the matter concerns the violation of the Constitution of a Land, or

Constitutional Court

if

the matter concerns the violation of the Basic

Grimm, supra note 272,

at

Law.

from the Federal

."
.

271.

''''Id.
Id.
'^'

Constitutional Jurisprudence
Jurisprudenc of

F. R. G.,

Court will discard the case "if the judges below

it

supra note 109,

at 13.

Adding

that the Federal Constitutional

manifest less than a genuine conviction that a law or provision

70

review every time

judicial

to require

the Basic

it

compliance with the Constitution only

Law.

is

compelled

cases foreseen in Article 100(

in the

Germany.

Statistically,

number of cases because most of
successful, instead

its

importance

model

a greatly important

is

it

individual constitutional complaints.

from a

The Court

I

)

ol

"

Concrete judicial review
practice of

'"

suggested by ordinaiy courts.

is

is

second

order

in the

Nevertheless,

its

ol

list

procedure

in the judicial

behind the procedure for

importance does not

rest in the

the cases submitted to the Constitutional Court are not

lies in the fact that

often what consequences can arise

specific statute are only realized in the day-to-day practice of law.^^"^

The consequence of both

and concrete judicial review has been a high

abstract

standard of exacting compliance with the Basic

Law and

its

rights.

Although

in

most

cases the complaint of unconstitutionality does not prosper in the Constitutional Court,

either for lack of substance or lack of importance to the evolution of Constitutional law,
'*''''

this

kind of complaint

is

extremely popular as a source of potential

In spite of the fact that

relief.

most complaints of unconstitutionality do not prosper

in

the Constitutional Court, the lower courts are ready to find constitutional aspects in their

dockets and to present such issues.

constitutional rights to the extent that

"So

far these structures

seems

it

have strengthened most

as if the Constitution

and the courts, and

not the people themselves, are the best guardians of individual rights."'"'^

of law

is

unconstitutional or

Judicial Politics in
"

if

the case can be decided without settling the constitutional question."

West Germany,

Ipsen, Constitutional

supra note

1

1

0, at

Review of Laws, supra note 123,

1

See also

05- 1 06.

at

1

14-

1

15.

'''Id.

2

Id.

Helmut Goerlich, Fundamental Constitutional Rights: Content. Meaning and General Doctrines
Constitution OF THE FEDERAL Republic OF Germany 51 (Ulrich Karpen ed. 1988).
'''Id.

in,

THE
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exceptional circumstances, under Article 100 of the Basic Law, the

In addition, in

Constitutional Court can

review a law on a petition of an individual whose

also

fundamental rights are directly threatened by a statute and not merely by

11.

its

application.

Complaints

Individual

The Constitutional Court can review any

act of a public authority to verify its

conformity with individual rights on the basis of Article 93(1 )4a'

of the Basic Law, and

^^"^
upon individual complaint.

all

The

individual must

relief in ordinary courts before submitting a

first

if

the applicant has not exhausted

if

The

by exhausting

all

constitutional complaint

means of

all

Court will accept a constitutional

legal remedies.

the complaint involves an issue of "general importance" or

suffer a grave injury

possible

complaint to the Constitutional Court.

In exceptional circumstances, the Constitutional

complaint even

exhaust

if

This

may

take place

the complainant will

his/her remedies.

must be put

stipulate the unsuited action or omission,

to use within a certain period of time;

and the bureau accountable for

particularize the constitutional right that has been violated.''''"

In

that;

and

agreement with Article

93(1) 4a of the Basic Law, any person, natural or legal, possessing rights under the Basic

'*"

'"*

Grimm,
F.R.G.

i;(/jra

note 272,

CONST,

art.

93(

at
1

271.

)4a.

^"^

Grimm, supra note 272, at 271. See also Ipsen, Constitutional Review of Laws, supra note 123. at 125;
Constitutional Jurisprudence OFF. R. G., supra note 109, at 14.
370
Grimm, supra note 272, at 271. See also CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OFF. R. G., supra note 109, at 14.
371

372

Judicial Politics

in

West Germany,

Constitutional Jurisprudence of

Germany, supra

note

1

10, at 107.

supra note

F. R. G.,

1

10, at 107.

supra note 109,

at 14.

See also Judicial Politics in

West

72

Law, may

complaint of unconstitutionality

initiate a

violated by public authority.

one of his or her rights has been

if

^^^

may

Constitutional complaints

also be

made

against any governmental action,

including judicial decision, administrative decrees, and legislative acts

With regard

the public authority clause of Article 93(1 )4a.

complainant must

file his

down. With regard

which no other

in

accordance to

to judicial decisions, the

complaint within a month after the decision has been handed

to a statute not the subject of a judicial proceeding,

legal redress is possible, a constitutional

and concerning

complaint can be brought against

^^"'*

it

within a year after

its

enactment.

However, jurisdiction over individual complaints
that individuals

may employ

To

against any act.

not a universal legal remedy

is

present a complaint before the Federal

Constitutional Court, a complainant must have his or her rights violated by an act of the

state.

''^^

of the

Jurisdiction over individual complaints

Constitution

but

rather

a

means

to

is

not intended to be a general protection

protect

the

individual

citizen

against

infringements of his or her essential rights."^

In addition, the injury endured

result of the transgression

on

by the complainant must be a current and

his or her rights

purpose for the "current" result prerequisite

is

by the governmental
to

keep out acts

"^ Constitutional Jurisprudence OFF. R. G.,
supra note 109,

"*

Constitutional Jurisprudence of

Germany, supra
"''

note

Judicial Politics

1

in

Ipsen, Constitutional
'''Id.

F. R. G.,

West Germany,

supra note

Review of Laws, supra note

1

have been disposed

at 15.

See also Judicial Politics in

Review of Laws, supra note 123,

10, at

107

123, at 125.

Certainly, the

of.

at 14.

supra note 109,

10, at 107; Ipsen, Constitutional

that

action.

direct

at 125.

West

73

or future acts; the second requirement

is

used as an obstacle to

against laws by individuals not adversely affected by a statute.

rein proceedings

///
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Judicial Review Achievements Concerning the Protection
Fundamental Rights
III.

The

of

significance of the articles relating to individual rights in the Basic

Law

been improved by the Constitutional Court's interpretation of these precepts.

new system

instance, the Constitutional Court allocated a totally

individual rights protection,

which guards individual

Basic Law, on the basis of Article

2."''

individual activity not referred to in

some

can review

The

it

under Article

2(

1

Any

sets

that

has

For

of judicial review and

activity not yet considered

by the

time the government interferes with an

constitutional article, the Constitutional Court

)."

principle of Proportionality

is

another important means introduced by the

This principle arises from Article

Constitutional Court to protect fundamental rights.

and

meant

fundamental rights as superior to the

law.'''^'

laws can restrain individual rights, but only

1

The Constitutional Court has ruled

in order to

make

conflicting rights

compatible or to protect the rights of other people or to protect important community

welfare.''^"

To make

certain that legislation

and other governmental actions are

in

congruity

with the values and principles of the Basic Law, the Constitutional Court developed a

'''Id.
'''Id.

""

Id.

""*'

Id.

'"

Citing

tJie

case

BVcrfGE

6.

32 (36

f.)

Elfes; 80.

137 (152

f.)

See also CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OFF. R. G., supra note 109,

Grimm, supra note 272,

at

275. Case

BVerfGE

19,

342 (348

ff.)

30,

at 46.

292 (315j.
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three-step

test.

any time parliament passes a law infringing on a basic

First,

means used must be necessary

to the

accomplishment

ol"

a lawful end. Second,

right, the

it

must be

indispensable to achieve this end.

Third, there must exist an appropriate relationship

between the individual

by the law and the purpose of the

right limited

burden on the right must not be extreme relative

to the benefits

restriction.

The

secured by the state's

objective."'^'^

Another important characteristic
fundamental rights

is its

of the

Constitutional

Court

protection

of

interpretation of these rights not only as subjective ones but also

On one

as objective principles.

rights require the state to refrain

hand, while understood as subjective rights, individual

from particular conduct.

On

the other hand, as objective

values, fundamental rights require the state to take special actions either to protect these

rights or to give true effect to them.^^^

The
fundamental

Constitutional Court has

rights

are

also

made

objective

various departures from the premise that

principles.

The

concerning individual rights has had an extraordinary impact

principle

in the area

of objectivity

of private law.

Conventionally, private law was considered as being outside the range of individual rights

which were regarded

as being a part of public law, regulating only the relationship

between the individual and the

state.

The new doctrine brings

the entire legal order under

50-7

the

^**^

power of fundamental

rights protection.

276. See a/50 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OFF. R. G., supra note 109, at 46.
Grimm, supra note 272, at 276. The Liirh case, a leading decision, BVerfGE 7, 198 (204ff.) See also
Christian Starck, Constitutional Definition and Protection of Rights and Freedoms, in 37 RIGHTS, INSTITUTIONS
AND Impact of International Law according to the German Basic Law 19, 33 (Christian Starck ed.,
1987)[hereinafter Starck]. See a/50 Constitutional Jurisprudence OFF. R. G., supra note 109, at 48.
Grimm, supra note 272, at 276. See also Starck, supra note 387, at 33.
^*"'
Grimm, supra note 272, at 277.
Id. at

"***

'"Id.

75

The Constitutional Court

stated that regarding the importance of this system of

axiom throughout

values, these objective rights "must apply as a constitutional

legal system," affecting private as well as public

law.^^

Under

this

new

the

whole

doctrine,

all

decisions of the ordinary courts are subject to constitutional review, supposing that the

law they apply touches an individual

right."

The objective system of values has given

birth to a parallel exploration for an

appropriate theory of fundamental rights, which faces an interpretative difficulty

is

when

it

confronted with open-ended words such as "democracy," "constitutional order," and

"free democratic basic

order."'*'^'^

constitutional theorists have

In regard to the objective

advanced

liberal, institutional, value-oriented,

Liberal

theory,

based

on

five

system of values, German

normative theories of fundamental

rights:

democratic, and social:

of economic

postulates

liberty

and

enlightened self-determination, emphasizes the negative rights of
the individual against the state.

Institutional theory focuses

on

guaranteed rights associated with organizations or communities

such as religious groups, the media, universities (research and
teaching),

and marriage and the family. Value oriented theory

places

emphasis on individual dignity as

its

it

relates to rights

flowing from the nature of the individual personality.

concerned with certain

is

rights

of speech and association and the role of elections and

political parties.

All

these

normative

constitutional theory or in

Id. at

'"^"

'''

political functions incident to the

Social theory, finally, highlights the importance of

social justice, cultural rights,

'*"*

and economic

explanations

find

security.'''^'

support

in

either

the

literature

judgments of the Constitutional Court, which seems

48, 49.

Grimm, supra note 272, at 277.
Constitutional Jurisprudence OF F. R. C, supra note
Id.

Democratic

theory

109, at 49.

to

of

be glad

76

to resolve

fundamental rights questions on a casc-by-casc basis, using what

considers as the most convincing theory suitable in a given circumstance.

Another corollary

that the Constitutional

individual rights are also objective principles

new concept introduced

a shift

^^^

Court has drawn from the concept

is that

that

governments may be compelled

furnish a person or a group of individuals with the essential

This

Court

this

means

to

make use of

from a purely formal tenet of freedom

to

a right.

to a real notion

'^'^^

of constitutionally protected freedom.

This substantial notion of constitutionally protected freedom consists of the
utilization of the right of

freedom by the individual

indispensable assistance to

make

the

valueless for a person.

to requisites

individual rights valuable.

without government help, a

condition that,

It is

to obtain

also true

human

when government

Numerus Clausus

Hamburg and Munich.

^'^"''

right

the

would be completely

furtherance."^^"*

the first step towards this

which involved

case,

This concept depends upon

constrains the exercise of a right

which could not normally be met without public

The Constitutional Court took

from government the

new

notion in 1972 in the

medical schools of the universities of

This case arose out of restrictive admission policies which

students, cast out because of these restraints but otherwise

seemingly qualified for

admission, sued challenging the regulations before the administrative courts in their

corresponding

^'^^

"^^^

Grimm, supra note 272,

'"^^

Id.

at

Skeptical about the

at

harmony of these admission

policies with the

278.

Numerus Clousus case BVerGE

supra note 109,
^''^

states.

33,

303 (330

ff.)

See also CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF

282.

Constitutional Jurisprudence OF F. R.

G.,

supra note 109,

at

282.

F. R. G.,
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right

Germans

ot" all

to freely select a trade or an

occupation under Article

12,

''

the

two

^'^*^

courts submitted the question to the Constitutional Court.

The Constitutional Court decided

that

education

profession; "both are integral parts of a coordinated

domain of education,

life

is

the

step in pursuing a

first

process.

"^'^'^

Moreover,

the Court stated, the constitutional protection of basic rights

in the

is

not

restricted to the function of defense against state intervention conventionally attributed to

the fundamental liberty rights.

According
objective

to the Constitutional Court,

norms also

decision in

all

up a value order

set

areas of

fundamental rights

The Constitutional Court declared

law.''*^'^

A

it

can demonstrate that
feature

significant

regarding

all

is

judgment

that

"any absolute

unconstitutional unless the

available space

the

capacity as

fundamental constitutional

that stands for a

numerical limit on admission into a course of study
institution applying

in their

of

is

completely

this

case

filled."

was

Constitutional Court refrained from obliging the government to expend a huge

money

and instead,

to fulfill its duty,

it

that

the

amount of

ruled that in the long run the government should

take steps to ameliorate the situation."^^"

A

third principle

the Constitutional Court has developed

quality of fundamental rights

is

the legislatures' obligation to protect individual rights

against threats from private individuals or

See F.R.G. CONST. Art.

12.

from the objective

Guarantees the right

to

groups."^*^"*

This principle arose in 1975 from

choose an occupation and forbids any compelled activity

except within the framework of a traditional compulsory public service which applies generally to
''^''Constitutional Jurisprudence OFF. R. G., supra note 109, at 282.
-^"'^

"""

Mat

283.

Id. at

284.

"" Id.
""

at

288.

Grimm, supra note 272,

'"'Id.

at

279.

all.
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the

First Abortion

unpunishable

Law Reform

if

which involved an

case,

performed within the

was adopted by

Bill

the

months of pregnancy.

three

first

of the legislature making abortions

act

Bundestag

"

The Abortion

1974, by 247 votes to 233, with the

in

opposition of the Christian Democrat and Christian Social Union parties. Immediately on

its

signature by the President, the

new law was challenged

before the Constitutional Court

by the Christian Democrat and Christian Social Union Opposition

parties

in

the

Bundestag, joined by the administrations of five state governments controlled by the same

party.'**^'^

The case arose before

the court as an abstract judicial review in

which party

feelings ran deeply reflecting religious-sectarian positions.

This

new Abortion Law had amended

the

German Criminal Code

aspects: First, the non-penalizing of abortions within the first twelve

second, the non-penalizing of abortions after the

first

in

important

weeks of pregnancy;

twelve weeks,

if

medical grounds

were present. The Federal Constitutional Court's majority decision was based upon two
principles, protection of

in its Articles 1(1)

and

human

dignity and the right of liberty, provided by the Basic

Law

2(2).

Article 1(1):

The

dignity of

respect and protect

it

man

shall

shall

be inviolable. To

be the duty of

all

state

authority.

Article 2(2):

Everyone

shall

have the right

to life

and

to

inviolability of his person.

The Court found a
developing

life,

positive obligation on the part of the state to protect

even against the mother, and

Id. BVerGE 39, 1(42). See
German and Its Basic Law

Jurisprudence OF F. R.

G.,

this

was

the reasoning for holding the

also Klaus Stem, General Assessment of the Basic
17,

51 (Paul Kirchhof

supra note 109,

at

53-54.

&

Donald

P.

life,

Kommers

Law-A German View in, 14
1993). Constitutional

eds.
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Abortion

Law

unconstitutional."*"^'

operate until the

In the

meantime

new law could be passed by

abortion should not carry a penalty

if

the court decreed provisional rules to

and

the Bundestag,

performed

any one of the following grounds existed: danger

after consultation

in

terms

ol

which

with a doctor and

if

to the health or life of the mother, not

avoidable by other mean; the existence of an irremediable defect on the unborn child that

would make continuation of

the pregnancy unreasonable(this within the

first

twenty-two

weeks); origins of the pregnancy in rape or another serious offense(this within the

first

twelve weeks)/^^

The

Law

Constitutional Court ruled that the right to

not only prohibits the government from exterminating

demands

guard individual

that the state

life

addressee of this constitutional obligation
securing protection of fundamental

In 1993, in a

sufficient

one

in

is

Article 2(2) of the Basic

life itself but, in

the legislature

which has

right at stake.

Where

from

its

ruling of the Constitutional Court stands in sharp contrast with the

more

traditional

Germanx, 43 Am.
Id. at

go too

far,

According

J.

Comp.

in the

L. 273,

to the

it

was asked

goal.

to decide a

Austrian Court no constitutional question was

Mirror: Abortion. Abuse and the Right to Protection

275 (1995). [hereinafter Casey

in the

United States and

in the Mirror].

21 5-219.

Discussing the form and effect of the Court's decisions, the author comments that while invalidating the

Abortion Statute, the Constitutional Court practically rewrote the law, which Parliament afterward
to pass.

See Grimm, supra note 272,
"""Id.

laws

a protection can fall short

^^ Gerald L. Neuman, Casey

Id.

to pass

case, the Court held that the protection has to be a

view of the rank and importance of the basic

very similar case.

^"

it

The

against transgressions by others.

approach undertaken, for example, by the Austrian Court when

"""^

addition,

rights.'*'^^

Second Abortion

limitations of a individual right can

The

life in

at

279.

felt

obligated

80

involved

since

the

state

did

not

reluses,

kill

but

abstained

only

from

punishing

abortion.

Despite the Second Abortion case which gave

to this

rise

new approach,

representative case for the protection of fundamental rights against threats

third

parties

is

a

case

involving

new

if

an individual right

gravely bothered by developments such as atomic energy, automatic data processing,

genetic engineering, or the like, the legislature

measures

c)

stemming from

economic, or social developments

technical,

endangering basic rights/'" According to the Constitutional Court,

is

the

to secure the right threatened.

Success of Judicial Review
As

v.

is

constitutionally responsible for taking

^

Danger

already seen, the United States and

of "Judicial

Activism"

Germany both have

a strong

to the protection of individual rights within their legal systems. This

rooted in different backgrounds; nevertheless, the results of this

commitment

commitment

is

commitment have been

widely and generally recognized.

The Supreme Court, when exercising

World War

11

of the Fourteenth

^"

"'"*

/J. at

power of

judicial review, has since

successfully focused on individual rights as the primary check on the abuse

of governmental authority."^ '"^

^"'

its

Amendment

In the

United States, the Substantive Due Process of

has played an important role

279-280.

Mat 280.
Grimm, supra note 272, at 281.
L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 776- 683
1

(2"''

ed.

1

978 ).

in

Law

securing the protection of

81

civil liberties against actions

reviewing

the

standardize

its

of state

constitutionality

Due Process

Substantive

While

of the states which violate funclainental rights.

acts,

the

Supreme Court has

clause to expand the scope of the Bill

application nationwide.

utilized

the

of Rights and to

This work of the Court has been

known

as the

"incorporation process" or "the incorporation controversy" of the Bill of Rights into the

Fourteenth

Amendment/'^

The German
distinctive feature,

legal system,

which has also played a major

rights included in the Basic

dignity

is

the

on the other hand, possesses a fundamental-rights-

Law.

In the context of Article 1(1) of the Basic

immovable base of

only to respect but also to

settles the character

role in the protection of individual

the constitutional order,

protect."^ '^

which

the state

obliged not

In addition to this important precept, Article 1(3)

of directly valid law that fundamental rights enjoy; and second, the

binding effect of these rights over the legislature, executive, and judiciary

In addition, the

rights has played a

is

Law, human

power given

key

role.

to the

.^'^

Courts responsible for the enforcement of such

These Courts have the authority

to

determine the proper

application of the rights bestowed in the constitutions of their countries."*'^ In both cases,

this authority

contribution

States

""
"'"'

emanates from the

made by

institution of judicial review,

the United States to political theory

Supreme Court and

and

of Rights ami the States

in,

at

is

perhaps the finest
"

civil liberty.

the Federal Constitutional Court of

Witt, supra note 274, at 378. See also STONE, supra note 6 at 804.
Stone, supra note 6 at 804. See also CiviL LIBERTIES, supra note 292,

Bill

which

The United

Germany have been

247; William

J.

Brennan,

Jr.;

THE EVOLVING CONSTITUTION, ESSAYS ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE

Supreme Court 254, 256-257 (Norman Dorsen ed., 1989).
Grimm, supra note 272, at 270.
^'**
Id. See also Gunter Dung, An Introduction to the Basic Law of the Federal
of THE Federal Republic of Germany, 11-16, (Uliich Karpen ed. 19880).

the

The
U.S.

""^

Id.

See also Safran, supra note 272

at 103;

Dorsen, supra note 272

at

Republic, in

The Constitltion

379; Faigman, supra note 272

at

1522.
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have shaped the constitutional protection

institutions that

national

the

in

United States, for instance, the extensive body of constitutional protection

been elaborated from the few textual provisions

for individuals has

Constitution."*"""

its

rundaniental rights

level."*"'

In the

of

ol"

As

deficiencies,

first

adopted, the Bill of Rights was greatly imperfect.

could be mentioned that

it

prescribe equality in rights for

all

it

this day, in the

forth in the

Among some

did not outlaw slavery; that

persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction; that

guarantee the equal protection of the laws; and that

By

set

Supreme Court

it

reports,

it

did not

it

did not

did not rule and restrict the

one can find rights

that

states."*^^

Americans

think are in their Constitution, but are not, or are there only invisibly, such as the

presumption of innocence and the requirement of

to

beyond a reasonable doubt

democracy and representative government but commitment

one person votes,

for

There one will find universal suffrage, though as a product not of

conviction of crime.

commitment

guilt

all

must be

to judicial review, the Civil

entitled to vote

and vote

equally."*""*

War Amendments changed

to equality: if

This does not

all

owe

the constitutional landscape

by

nationalizing the protection of individuals rights.

The individual enjoys

the protection of his/her

deprivation by arbitrary governmental action.

weight heavily

in

the

balance and are

compelling, public interests.

In

all,

^""

Grimm, supra note 272,

at

136; Steinberger, supra note 121 at 214.

*"'

Grimm, supra note 272

*"
^'^

at 59,

at 65.

Id. at 65.

Henkin, supra note 344

'''Id.

at

484.

the

life,

property or liberty against

Said rights are categorized so that they

defended against any but important, even

Supreme Court renders

271. See also Dorsen, supra note 272,

at

precise levels of judicial

379; Brewer-Carias, supra note

1

83

review-some supernuoiis, some
rights

careful,

and of the competing pubUc

level of scrutiny

In

some

The comparative weight of

interest in the constitutional

and restrains government from encroaching

Germany,

the

It

*"

civil rights.

notion that there

is

In addition, the Constitutional

German

Constitution."*"^

Court has employed judicial review and

where personal or

political

review.'*"''

to a reduction of parliamentary

that

So

that, the

scrutiny

upon or

Court brings a

and juridical decisions under the control of the Constitution and,

hence submits them to judicial

freedom

its

political liberties are infringed

where fundamental requirements of equality are neglected.

good deal of

judicial review.

a protective duty implicit in the concept of fundamental

rights has given great importance to the

to strictly control state acts

terms of

in

has elaborated a theory of fundamental

which surpasses the jurisprudence of most other countries with

First, the

predominates

in

In the end, there

name of fundamental

power, yet

in

the

system

is

more

this

can be no doubt that

the

sort

this leads

the

United

States

and

internationally recognized for possessing

Each system's success
percentage of

its

in

the

German

of right guaranteed by

models

constitutional

one of the most reliable judiciaries

protection of fundamental

The

rights.

fundamental rights than the sort of freedom guaranteed by democratic participation.

Both

the

balance determines the

Constitutional Court has certainly been active

unfolding and developing the Constitution too.

rights

strict.-

rights

have

""

been

in the world.

has enabled a high

citizens to feel confident about to their judiciary's performance.'*"^

See Grimm, supra note 272

at 65.

'''Id.

^"''

William Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts-Comparative Remarks,

in

GERMANY AND

Present and Future-A German American Symposium 411, 412 (Paul Kirchhof

&

ITS BASIC Law: Past,
Donald P. Kommers eds..
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Despite the foregoing achievements, judicial review has also been blamed as the

instrument that allows the

Supreme Court

judges should not decide/^"

to

make

decisions on "social policy issues" that

Judge Learned Hand contended

that there

was "nothing

in

the United States Constitution that gave courts any authority to review acts of Congress."

Judges must keep

in

mind

criticism like this

when considering overturning

statutes or

executive actions, particularly because of the arguments about the propriety of judicial

review

in a

democratic system.

Other argument aimed

each branch of government should decide for

act

itself

what

at limiting judicial

is

review

is

that

constitutional and then should

on the basis of its own conclusions.^^'
Others find judicial review disparaged because of

Justices,

who

are appointed for life

its

undemocratic character.

and remain on the Supreme Court long

after they are

out of tune with the nation's view, can invalidate acts of periodically elected government.

A

response to this argument

is

that

when

the

Supreme Court

strikes

"void for vagueness," Congress can rewrite the statute clearer.

invalidates

as

statutes

constitutional

unconstitutional,

amendment. "^^^

down

Even when

statutes as

the Court

such rulings can be overturned directly by

Another response

to the

claim that judicial review

is

1989). David Ponte, "PNUD: La Confianza en la Justicia Me.xicana. de las Mas Bajas" La JORNADA
Newspaper, (Ciudad de Mexico) Octubre, 9, 1997 at 1.
Stephen L. Wasby, The Supreme Court in the Federal Judicial System, 3-5 (2"'' ed. 1984)[hereinafter
Wasby].
Id. President Andrew Jackson made his own judgment by vetoing legislation for a national bank even though
Marshall, in McCulloch v. Maryland, had early sustained the validity of such bank. Likewise, President Jefferson
though Supreme Court determinations about statutes' validity were entitled to respect but were not binding on
him as president.
- BiCKEL, supra note 18 at 16, 17. "[W]hen the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the
action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and now; it
"''"'

exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing majority, but against
actually happens..., and

it

is

the reason the charge can be

See Wasby, supra note 430,

made

it.

That without mystic overtones

that judicial

review

is

is

what

undemocratic."

at 220. Formally, Congress has overturned Supreme Court decisions in several
The Eleventh Amendment (no suits against states by citizens of another state) overturned Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793); the Sixteenth Amendment (income tax) reversed Pollock v. Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1894); the Twenty-sixth (18-year-old vote) overturned Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.

occasions:
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undemocratic
because of
"the

is

Alexander BickePs,

ways of

political pressure.

the scholar," in finding the

make

judicial review will also

legislators

from

their insulation

that judges are better at judicial

and

it

That insulation permits them

meaning of the

text."*

"*

for action,

and

will

to follow

Frequent exercise of

less likely that those seeking policy

political executives

review precisely

changes will press

put a restraint on legislators'

willingness to meet their responsibilities to deal with social problems.'^'^"

Chief Justice Burger

what

it

Plyler

in

v.

Doe^^^

said,

"[wjhen

this

perceives to be the failings of the political process,

an opportunity to function."

On

it

Court rushes

in to

remedy

deprives those processes of

the contrary, others say, the court's action can help

establish an agenda of issues given active consideration

by the other branches and can

stimulate activity to deal with otherwise ignored problems."^"*^

At the core of the contention about the undemocratic character of judicial review
the argument that courts

must protect the minority

rights that are part of

is

democracy by

enforcing rights of free speech, assembly, petition and press. John Ely argues that judicial

review

is

excesses.

necessary to protect politically powerless minorities against majoritarian

For him, judges,

in the exercise of judicial review,

should not search for

fundamental values to be enforced, or substantive results to be imposed, but should focus

on

restrictions

on the "opportunity

to participate either in the political processes

by which

values are appropriately identified and accommodated, or in the accommodations those

1

12 (1970); and the post-Civil

War Amendments

eliminating slavery, redefining citizenship, and protecting civil

rights.

^" See BiCKEL supra note 18
^^"^

at 25, 26.

See Wasby, supra note 430,

^^ 102 S.Ct.
2382
See

at

at

221.

2414 (1982).

Wasby, supra

note 430,

at

221. Stating that after the Court's reapportionment rulings, state legislatures

learned to deal with redistricting and those rulings opened up the political process.
"'-'*'

Ely, supra note 36

at

73-179.
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processes have reached.""^

The Constitution

'

the point of substantive decision

and

virtually "represents everyone's interests at

that application of substantive policy will not be

manipulated to reintroduce discrimination." The document "has sought to assure
effective majority not systematically treats others less well than

Even some who recognize
contend

review

that judicial

may be

that judicial

it

that an

treats itself."

review allows courts to make policy

exercised as long as the decisions are "principled."

Legislators and political executives stand for pragmatism; courts, on the other hand, must

stand for principle, deliberateness, the use of rationality and logic, and detachment from

the turmoil and passion of political conflict.

[T]he root idea

is that

As Alexander Bickel would

the process

is

justified only if

representative government something that
that

is

is

it

say:^"^'

injects into

not already there; and

worth from a

principle, standards of action that derive their

long view of society's spiritual as well as material needs and that

command

adherence whether or not the immediate outcome

is

expedient or agreeable.

Professor Wechsler adds "the duty [of the judiciary]

is

not that of policing or

advising legislatures or executives, but rather simply to decide the litigated case and to

decide

it

in

accordance with the

The Supreme Court

way

is

law.""^"^"

no more than a coordinate

superior to executive and legislative institutions with which

of mutual respect.

The

346 (1936),

tried to

v.

Idal 100.101.
See Bickel supra note 18

is

at 58.

in

no

linked in obligation

by Justice

Tennesse Valley Authority 297 U.S.

minimize the opportunities for unnecessary

'''Id.

"'

it

government,

so-called rules of "judicial auto-limitations," noted

Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Ashwander

^''

institution of

political conflict

between

87

the

Supreme Court and

Supreme Court had

the executive and legislative branches.

called attention to the great gravity and delicacy of

passing upon the validity of an act of

its

political

based

The

and constitutional terms,

ratification of their

own governance

its

obligations of self-restraint

court's

if

its

function

in

correlative branches, Brandeis set out certain

disciplines that the court has developed for

pressures."^^

After the United Sates

to

avoid unnecessary

may became

the

stronger,

in

the judges are not elected or submitted to legislature-

appointments

to the court: for their claims to constitutional

legitimacy and to a mandate to control the popularly-elected institutions of government

are then at their lowest.^^

In the

United States what

exists, is the historical contextual

evidence that provides significant, but not definitive, support for the claim that judicial

review

is

not an illegitimate usurpation oi power.

Conversely. Germans accept the Constitutional Court as a legitimate participant

large

Most

community decision-making process.^^

in the

scholars and legal professionals

applaud the Constitutional Court's decisive influence upon the development of German
Constitutional Law.

Germans

interpreter of the Basic

judicial review

is

Law

are comfortable with the court as the final authoritative

for several reasons.

clearly stipulated in the Basic

The

Law.

authority of the Court to exercise

A

democratic legislature elects the
lie

members

**'

^^

of the Constitutional Court and dissenting opinions were permitted in

GUNTHER. supra

note 13.

at

197L

3-20

Edward McWhinney. Supreme Courts and

Judicial Law-Making: Constitutional Tribunals and
Constitutional Review 99-101 (1986). [hereinafter McWhinney].
^^ Id. The Brandeis rules of judicial auto-limiiation have been rigorously applied in the almost ritualistic
insistence of an actual case-controversy as the necessary base of constitutional jurisdiction,

continuing rejection of anv notion of rendering Advisory Opinions. See supra Chapter

I

and on the

§ b).

""'Id.

Johnny C. Burns. Some Preliminary Thoughts on a Contextual Historical Theory for
Judicial Review. 12 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 585. 654, 655 (1987).
**^

CoNSTTTunoNAL Jurisprudence OF F.

R. G.. supra note 109.

at 55.

the Legitimacy

of

88

Despite

democratic legitimacy the Constitutional Court

its

"pohticizing justice.

legislative

""^^'^

procedural and substantive law.

in

the judicial self-restraint prmciple

proposals

is

whenever

political issues are at stake.

established by the Constitutional Court

Despite the fact that

itself,

By

because

it

is

this

these

the court

principle has been

the court does not have the option to refuse

only as a method of the review;

this, the

Among

which should be exercised by

The

a decision because of the political issue involved.

the case.

has been criticized for

Proposals to reduce the tension between the Court and the

bodies include changes

restraint serves

still

it

principle of judicial self-

does not block the court from deciding

Constitutional Court takes part in the legislative procedure, not

authorized by the Basic

Law

but rather because the government and the

opposition take the view that an enacted statute

is

been reviewed and confirmed by the Constitutional

only incontestably valid after

is

the

has

Court.'*^'

Another stream of commentaries identified with neo-Marxist
serves as a brake on social change and

it

critics

main force responsible

say that the court

for the imposition of

a constitutional ideology that sanctifies consolidation and stability, defends the status

quo, and promotes consensus politics. These critics manifest far less sympathy for the

Court's institutional role in

German

politics.

The grounds

for this

criticism

invalidation of reforms regarded as progressive and liberalizing by large parts of

is

the

German

society.

In cases like

Id.

The Party Finance

IV,

the First Abortion

and

Admissions the Constitutional Court has been criticized for exceeding the

in

Census Act and Higher Education

limits of judicial

power since

it

"'took a

quasi-legislative position."

Ipsen, Constitutional

Review of Laws, supra note 123,

at

128-135.

'''

Z The
'

1949.

nation's shocking experience with a totalitarian regime

Germans became aware of

the fact that

it

was

was

the

main reason

to draft the

the Staat, the government and

all

its

Basic

staff,

Law

that

in

had

89

Therefore,

have

The United

developed

States

"special

Supreme Court and

the

German

categories"

constitutional-legal

Constitutional Court

immunizing

legally

lor

themselves against the necessity to make pronouncements, on demand, as to the alleged

power or

constitutionality or unconstitutionality of particular exercises in constituent

Such categories become instruments of

assertions of executive or legislative authority.

judicial self-restraint as of the political question doctrine in the United States.

d) Distinctions

of

Between the American System of Judicial Review and

that

Germany
Germans have

commitment

a strong

against oppression; therefore, the Basic

all

"

of the Constitutional Court's

Law

to the

Rule of

Germany

and therefore the chief duty of constitutional theory

American

constitutionalism,

enumerates

is

there

is

are practically undisputed.

its

own power

to find

Although judicial review
ironically,

it

Perhaps, for this reason, the source and

jurisdiction."^"^^

United State Supreme Court, by contrast, established

review.'^^''

as the best protection

leaves nothing to inference, as

authority of the Federal Constitutional Court in

sources of judicial

Law

no

is

The

of judicial review,

and establish the limits and

one of the landmarks of North
persuasive

totally

theoretical

explanation of where the Supreme Court's power to invalidate the acts of elected officials

comes from nor

committed the most atrocious crimes. They witnessed
Law, had allowed brutal inhumanity and immorality.
*" See
"'^"'

^'^

McWhinney
Id. at

842.

that their legal

struggle for the

order before the enactment of the Basic

supra note 438.

Constitutional Jurisprudence OFF. R.
See

The

the occasions for the use of such a power.

G.,

supra note 109,

at 30.

MARY ANN GLENDON Et AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS

1

1

7

(2"''

ed. 1994).
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explanation for judicial review continues within the scope of American constitutional

theory/'''

In contrast, the

German Basic Law

judicial review, but there are

grants to the Constitutional Court the

some controversies over

still

much

of majoritarian policy (legislative acts) causes as

The

difference

is

Germany

that in

or political parties

who

the criticism

use.

its

debate as

Judicial nullification

in the

in

Germany

use constitutional litigation for political aims.^''^ After

since the Basic

The countermajoritarian
Constitutional

Court

considerations.

The Court has

mentioned

cases

on

occurs in

Abortion case.

order of values.

Some

"

Germany

basis

the

number of important

is

all,

the

not a serious

the exercise of judicial power.

resorted to theories of

earlier, is the objective

in the First

Law justifies

difficulty

resolves

declared unconstitutional a

Act

United States.

directed against governmental agencies

is

countermajoritarian problem, a major difficulty in the United States,

problem

power of

By

its

of

to

the extent

and

historical

own

that

the

functional

creation; one of them, as

using this standard, the Court has

statutes, including the

Abortion Reform

of the judgments have provoked criticisms

regarding the fact that judges are imposing their

own

personal values on the nation as a

whole.

For several reasons the exercise of judicial review

Germany than
legislative

*'^

in the

United

States.'*"'^

First, in

Germany, not

less difficult in

the executive branch but the

ROBERT BoRK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 1990); JOHN ELY, DEMOCRACY AND Distrust
andRAOULBERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).

^" Constitutional Jurisprudence OFF. R. G., supra note
109, at 55.
Id. at 336-348. See generally Casey in the Mirror, supra note 405.
*^'^

somehow

branch elects the members of the Court by a two-thirds vote for a single

See generally.

(1980);

is

Constitutional Jurisprudence OF F. R.

G.,

supra note 109,

at 58.
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nonrenewable term of twelve years.

makes somewhat

intervention here o{ liundcsldi;, and fiiindcsral

less tense the relationship

Supreme Court

Court. Moreover, the U.S.

this often

The

'

prevents the

between legislatures and the Constitutional

justices,

on the contrary, serve a

Supreme Court from growing and

life

term, and

changing."^^'

Second, the Federal Constitutional Court practices certain techniques to interpret
the Basic

Law. These techniques might be brought together under the general heading of

constitutional textualism."^^"

leads to legal positivism

as if

it

is

strictly

The

when

civil

law

tradition, with specific

structures,

adjudicating, so the Constitutional Court frequently judges

adhering to the constitutional

text.

are to ascertain the

But the Court also employs

The focus

systematic and teleological models of investigation.

whole from which judges

norms and

aims and objects, or

often on the text as a

is

telos,

of the Basic Law,

a style of reasoning that allows judges to incorporate broad value judgments into their

decisions.

Such a

style has

been employed on the Supreme Court's Substantive Due

Process judgments.'*^"^ The Constitutional Court uses history to assert judgments decided

on the basis of teleological reasoning, although, on the other hand, original
significant role in

German

constitutional interpretation.

the subjective understanding of the

constitutional adjudication

uncertainty

when reaching

is

much

Meanwhile,

Framers and the importance

debated."^^^

text.

''\ Id.

^" Constitutional Jurisprudence OFF. R. G.. supra note 109,

'"Id
'''Id.

'"Id.

no

United States,

should be given

in

This kind of thinking contributes to more

decisions."^^^

See supra note 160 and accompanying

it

in the

intent plays

at

40-57.
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example,

1954, the

in

Supreme Court decided Brown

which abolished separate schools
and

other

Amendment/^""
Court ruled

on

schools

In Ahini^ton

Also

students/^"*

in the search

in

Roe

in the

schools of Kansas

violated

Sclienipp and En^el

v.

the

Wade, 410 U.S.

Mapp

illegally seized

For example,

abortion

statute,

Fourteenth

Supreme

Vitalc, the

13 (1973), the right to abortion; and finally,

1

Ohio applied

v.

to the states the exclusionary rule,

by the police could not be used against a defendant

At the same time, the Constitutional Court has been

in a state courts.^^^

political storm."

v.

separation

lulncdtion of Topeka,

could not hold prayer and Bible-reading exercises for their

and seizure cases,

under which evidence

permissive

v.

such

that

School District

that public schools

Bourd of

and while students

for black

grounds

the

v.

in

in "the

eye of

1975, the First Abortion case, which invalidated a

was severely

recriminalization of abortion during the

first

criticized

on

the

grounds

that

trimester of pregnancy exceeded the

judicial

bounds

of judicial power. Critics argued that the implementation of Basic Law's objective values

in

the

case was a legislative

In

task."^^''

Constitutional Court, crossed boundaries

would have

to

the

when

it

famous Party Finance IV case

told parliament that federal funding

be provided to minor political parties securing 0.5 percent of

in a federal election instead

the

all

of the 1.5 percent limit previously established by

Neal Tate, Comparative Judicial Review and Public Policy: Concepts and Overxiew,
Judicial Review and Public Policy, 7 (Donald Jackson and Neal Tate
^" 347 U.S. 483, 486-88 (1953).

eds.,

in

votes cast

law."^''^

COMPARATIVE

1992) [hereinafter Tate].

^" 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963), and 370 U.S. 421, 422-25
(1962).
*^^
367 U.S. 643, 658-60 ( 1 96 ).
1

See generally, Casey
*^'*

in the

See Party Finance case 24

109, at 210.

Mirror, supra note 405.

BVerfGE 260 (1968)

in

CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF

F.

R. G., supra note
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But once the Courts have ruled
the social controversy does not

come

that specific rights arc constitutionally protected,

However,

to an end.

the Courts are not able to
^'^''

continue a persuasive process within local legislatures and

Another distinction

is

among

citizens

the extensiveness of the practice of judicial review.

United States employs the all-courts model.

Any

court

may

The

exercise judicial review, and a

declaration of unconstitutionality on the part of a lower court judge need not be approved

by any higher authority

to

be effective.

Although cases can be appealed

Court, the policy influence of the judiciary

maximized

is

J.7X

by

Supreme

United States because

Germany, on

the

the "special" Constitutional Court.

To

courts can review constitutional questions.

judicial review exclusively

in the

to the

all

contrary, exercises

restrict the

power of

judicial review only to a constitutional court might increase the breadth of the typical

constitutional question posed to the courts, but

it

also reduces the

number of occasions

and range of policy issues on which the courts can exercise judicial review.
Finally, the

competence of the Constitutional Court

Supreme Court. The Constitutional Court has many
Court does not assume
judicial review.

in that

'''Id.atl.
''"Id.

political questions

upon

constitutional questions.

and engage

,

at 4.

Supreme

in abstract

the Constitutional Court

is

Unlike the United States

the specialized court is not a general court of final appeal."^^^

See Tate, supra note 47 1
'''Id.

can resolve

wider than that of the

duties that the United States

However, from the jurisdictional perspective

limited to adjudicate only

Supreme Court,

it

is

J.7Q

Chapter

V.

Establishing a Constitutional Court

a)

Mexico

in

The Ineffectiveness of the Mexican Judiciary
The weak

state

of the Federal Judiciary in Mexico was demonstrated in the most

recent 1994 Constitutional

Mexico,

of

Ernesto

Amendment concerning

Zedillo,

resembling

the

predecessors, has limited, even more, the

Some

Justice.

the judiciary.

current president

example of some

historical

power of

The

of

his

Supreme Court of

the existing

of the principal features of these reforms, which touched twenty-seven

constitutional articles, are the decrease in the

number of

eleven, and the removal of the "floating" ministers of the

The number of specialized Salas was

also reduced

ministers from twenty-one to

Supreme Court of

from four

to two,

one for

Justice.

civil

"

and

penal cases, the other for administrative and labor cases.^*^^

In addition, these

reducing

it

amendments

from a lifetime appointment
i

o

also altered the ministers' tenure in office

by

to a fifteen-year term, without the possibility of

1

re-designation.

The President

still

holds the power to nominate candidates

for

Why Do Rule of Law In Mexico? Explaining the Weakness of Mexico's Judicial Branch,
Rev. 141, 149 [hereinafter Taylor]. See also The Rebirth of the Supreme Court of Mexico, supra note

Michael C. Taylor,
27 N.M.
259,

at

L.

297.

Id., at

149. See also

The Rebirth of the Supreme Court of Mexico, supra note 259,

BURGOA, Derecho CONSTITUCIONAL Mexicano, 882 (1997)

[hereinafter

Contra Democracia. supra note 259, at 1929.
*" Taylor, supra note 481, at 149. See also BuRGOA, ed. 1997, supra note 482,
Taylor, supra note 481,

at

149. See also

BURGOA,

ed. 1997,

Q'?

at

BURGOA,

supra note 482,

at

882.

at

886.

302.
ed.

See also IGNACIO

1997]; Liberalismo
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Supreme Court ministers
suggest to the Senate a
"^*^^'

Justice.

candidates. ^^^

another

at

this

by

Then,

list

If

list

a

The

to the Senate.

variation

now

of three candidates to occupy a seal

super majority

the Senate eliminates

of three different nominees.

the

vote,

all

If

stage has the authority to select

Senate

is

that the President will

Supreme Court of

in the

has

to

one of the

select

three candidates, the President

the Senate again rejects the

which candidate

will

list,

must offer

the President

take over each open

ministerial seat.

The Acciones de Inconstitucionalidad (Unconstitutional Actions) Procedure
of the innovations added by the 1994 Reforms.

the public scrutiny

new and
work

for at least

First, the

effect into the

Mexican Constitution

is

J.RO

This

important for this

two reasons.
establishment of the Acciones to the Constitution carried the erga

Mexican

system for the

legal

accomplishment has been surrendered by
inconsistent."''^"

one

This procedure has particularly attracted

and has been regarded as the most original reform of 1994.

"original" procedure implanted in the

is

Second, the

Amparo

trial

first

strict

time.

omnes

Nevertheless, this remarkable

procedures that have rendered

was not enhanced

at all

it

largely

by the implementation

of the Unconstitutional Actions Procedure but condemned to exist under the Mariano

Otero

**''

^

*"

Formula."^'^'

BURGOA,
Id.

ed. 1997,

supra note 482,

See also Taylor, supra note 48 1

at
,

882-883.

at 149.

Taylor, supra note 481, at 149.

'''Id.
'"'/J. at
"''"'

150

BuRGOA.

ed. 1997,

supra note 482,

at

888; Taylor, supra note 481, at 151.

See The Rebirth of the Supreme Court of Me.xico, supra note 259,

at

314.

:
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The objective of Accioncs de

Incon.stitiicioiuiliddd procedure

disagreement between constitutional requirements and federal or state

is

to

determine a

legislation.'*''"

This

procedure permits the Supreme Court of Justice to declare unconstitutional legislation

invalid.

Since the Supreme Court of Justice never before had been given

Mexican

represents an unparalleled event in the

The Mexican Supreme Court's new

omnes

effect certainly constitutes a

it

legal system.

capability to

paramount development

make judgments with er^a
in the

Mexican

constitutional

Nonetheless, the conditions for using the Acciones de Inconstitucionalidad

history.

make

power,

this

this

procedure useless

in at least

two circumstances.

First,

must be

the claim

brought by the General Attorney or by thirty-three percent of either House of Congress."*
Since the General Attorney

is

and legislation

the president's will,

nominee who can be removed from

a presidential

is

office at

not sanctioned without presidential support,

it

is

improbable that a General Attorney would ever promote a constitutional challenge against

legislation.'*'^

Congress may be more

likely to bring a constitutional complaint;

the constitutionality of a statute should not

given constitutional challenge

generates."**^^

depend upon

Furthermore,

the legislative support that a

it is

hard to obtain a thirty-three

percent vote in opposition to a majority-upheld statute in a scheme where the

ruling-party federal legislators
r^

Congress.

"'-

BURGOA,

Taylor, supra note 48

"''"'

^''^

greater than the

at

888.

number of all

ed. 1997,

supra note 482,
1

,

at 151.

See The Rebirth of the Supreme Court of Mexico, supra note 259, at 322.
Id. See Mex. Const., art. 105. sec. 11(c). See also BuRGOA, ed. 1997, supra note 482,

BURGOA,

ed. 1997,

supra note 482,

Taylor, supra note 48

^'"*

Id.

See also

1

BURGOA,

,

at

1

at

888. See also Taylor, supra note 481, at 163.

63.

ed. 1997, supra note 482, at 888.

number of

other parties' legislators in

498

^"^

"''^'

is

however,

at

98

Second, the requirement

procedure within

to raise this

pubHcation has provoked criticism for several reasons.
period of time that

it

may make

the

Supreme Court of

thirty

days of the hiw's

Thirty days

may

this

take

months or even years before

requirement has been considered as

in the

clear,

'^

Supreme Court

Acciones de Inconstitucionalidad procedure represents another
'^"^

The requirement compels

Justice to declare a law unconstitutional only

ministers out of eleven so decides.

if

the

a majority of eight

'^^'^

requirement means that

In short, the

become

irrational.

obstacle for those seeking relief through this procedure.

Supreme Court of

enough

Moreover, since

a statute's constitutional breaches

Finally, the "super qualified majority" requirement involving the

of Justice decision

such a short

Justice unhkeiy to acquire

evidence on the practical ramifications of the challenged legislation.^'"

it

is

in spite

of the opinion of the challenging

governmental body (either the General Attorney or Congress), and despite the Supreme
Court's simple majority vote (six or seven votes out of eleven) against that law,

remain effective and legally enforceable
concur.

if

a

it

will

"super qualified majority" does not

504

In sum, the

1994 Reforms are not a great leap forward

in the

autonomy and power

of the judiciary. This overview of the Acciones de Inconstitucionalidad procedure

is

by

no means exhaustive. The incorporation of the recent amendments under the current

Mexican

^'^'^

See

Me X.

legal

system was accompanied by obstacles and tricks that render them useless.

Const.,

art.

105, sec.

See a/50 Taylor, 5»/7ra note 48

II.

i ,

at

151

&

163.

''''Id.
^'"
"

151

&

105, sec.

II.

Taylor, supra note 481,

See Mex. Const.,
See Mex. Const.,

315.

art.
art.

at

105, sec.

163.

11.

See also The Rebirth of the Supreme Court of Mexico, supra note 259,

at

99

cmphasi/c only

Trivial procedures, such as the Accioncs de IiiconstititcioiialidiuL

urgency

for

more

serious thoughts concerning the implementation of

safeguards of constitutional values

b)

in

new

institutions

the

and

Mexico.

Acciones de Inconstitucionalidad Procedure

v.

the

The Acciones de Inconstitucionalidad procedure does

Amparo
not

seem

Trial

to

have brought

about any factual or palpable betterment to the eroded power of the federal judiciary

Obviously,

Mexico.''"^

the

object

be

to

Inconstitucionalidad procedure was only to

attained

for real utilization of the

has been extremely limited/

As mentioned above,
entitled to bring

in

Mexico

Usually,

to bring a

a

new

new kind

federal

^'"

of federalism

^

either

structure,

there

is

Congress or the General Attorney are the only ones

a

congressmen stand

the people.

interested in positive changes for

congressmen

members of Congress. Thus,

Justice.

for the interests of the citizenry."

immense abyss between them and

Mexican congressmen

to the fact that

in

Acciones de Inconstitucionalidad procedure

Mexican

The

society

situation

is

in the ruling party constitute the vast majority of

it

is

inconceivable that a complaint about the

unconstitutionality of a law will obtain a thirty-three percent vote in a

'"'

Acciones de

era of constitutionalism in

barely ever succeed in defending a just public claim in the Congress.

mainly due

the

Accion de Inconstitucionalidad before the Supreme Court of

Within the government

However,

introducing

make apparent

Mexico. "^"^ Although, the 1994 Reforms seem

Mexico, the chance

by

in

See The Rebirth of the Supreme Court of Mexico, supra note 259,
BURGOA, ed. 1997, supra note 482, at 888.

at

scheme where

315.

See The Rebirth of the Supreme Court of Mexico, supra note 259, at 318
See Taylor, supra note 481, at 149. See also BuRGOA, ed. 1997, supra note 482,

at

882-886.

the

number of

ruling-party federal legislators

is

larger than the

number of

all

other parties'

legislators in Congress.

Additionally, asking the General Attorney to raise a challenge under the Acciones

de biconstituciofialidad procedure makes

who

is

a presidential appointee,

may

little

The General Attorney,

be discharged by the President

employ such

this official is totally unlikely to

practical sense.

a procedure against a

at will.

law

that

Therefore,

was approved

^"'^

with presidential support.

The Amparo

trial,

already reviewed in this paper,

to offer practical safeguards for the constitutional order in

also possesses certain features that limit both

its

is

the only available institution

Mexico. However, the Amparo

own scope and

the

power of

the

Mexican

'*'°

judiciary.

The decisions

resulting

from Amparo

suits

do not bear the erga omnes effect but

rather are restricted to ruling only that the law challenged not be used against the person

submitting the application."^" The law impugned will continue to be applicable since the
Federal Judicial branch does not possess powers to "abrogate or derogate a law.""

sole fact

makes

the

Since the

work of the Mexican judiciary twice

Amparo does

the

^"''

^"^
'"

Court.

arts.

as complicated.

its

inappropriate legal character.

the single act of the authority in the specific case presented to

For instance,

See Mex. Const.,

This

not invalidate the law judged incompatible with the

constitutional order, the law continues in force despite

The Amparo simply annuls

'"

if

the

law challenged consists of a tax violation of the

51, 52.

Taylor, 5»;7ra note 481.

at

151

&

163.

Rafael Estrada-Samano. Administration of Justice in Mexico: What does the Future Hold?, 3 U.S. -Mex. L.J.

35, 43.

See also The Claim of "Amparo" supra note 233.
See The Claim of "Amparo" supra note 233, at 421.
Id.

at

417.

constitutional right not to be deprived of a living, the favorable judgment absolves the

applicant from paying the

However,

levy."^'

the rest of the population

from the same unconstitutional tax law unless they too

file

an

Mexican Supreme Court's scope of action

In addition, the

Amparo. The Court

due

to the nature of the

the

Amparo was conceived

in the

finds itself

Roman Law

bound by

tradition,

legislative or executive acts in order to avoid

these branches."

'".

to the restrictions,

power

the

to

any

fulfilled in

To

Mexico.

satisfy this

need

in the

instrument because

friction

the judiciary

between any of

omnes

nullify with erga

unconstitutional laws that threaten the constitutional precepts

Mexican

is

immune

severely restricted

is

this

not

suit.

which excludes

from nullifying

With regard

Amparo

is

still

effect

a necessity to be

legal order,

I

propose the

establishment of a Constitutional Court in Mexico, which would have the power to

on the grounds of

nullify legislative or executive acts

their unsuitable character with

regard to the Constitution.

c)

The Need

for a Constitutional

The necessity of creating

this

Court

Court

is

Mexico

in

based mainly on two

factors: First, the lack

of reliable instnjments to protect the constitutional order in Mexico, and second, the

current

Mexican judiciary
low

judiciary has fallen as

'" Brewer-Carias, supra note
^'^

Cabrera

& Headrick, supra

"^ Taylor, supra note 48

DE Amparo, 16(1967).

1

,

at

1

is

largely discredited.

this time, the people's faith in the

as a twenty-two percent approval rate, according to the United

at 167.

note 196,
1

By

at

258.

53. See also

Eduardo Pallares, DiCCIONARlO Teorico Y PrActico DEL JUICIO
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Nations Program for Development.^'^'
symbiotic character of

this

branch

This situation

in relation to the

Court there.

Constitutional

a

Inconstitucionalidad procedure and the

Mexico

Besides the

Amparo

extremely worsened by the

executive branch.

Therefore, the current role of the judiciary in

creating

is

justifies an urgent

inefficacy

trial,

the

of the Acciones de

Mexican Judiciary

incapable of successfully carrying out the duty of applying judicial review.

must be isolated form the current judiciary because of

this task

which views the judiciary

society,

as an inefficient

need for

its

In

itself is

Mexico,

discredit before the

governmental agency, deeply tied to

the corrupt executive branch.

As

a result,

the

if

power of

judiciary, the public will distrust

Mexico
is

its

is

deposited in the current Mexican

legitimacy for exercising such an important power.

requires the adoption of an institution to guard the Constitution,

essential for society

checks

judicial review

will,

sooner or

To avoid such

and

latter,

for a healthy

whose

governmental structure. Otherwise, the lack of

be conducive to anarchy or to a

dictatorship.'^'^

ends. Professor Cappeletti suggests the adoption of "a

constitutional norms, institutions and processes

control the political power."'' '^

To

integrity

...

new kind

in an attempt to thereby limit

achieve that end, he asserts,

it

is

of

and

necessary to adopt

judicial review of the constitutionality of state action. This development, he says, has

changed the governmental structure of much of Continental Europe over the
years or so.^'^

Mexico should

"" David Ponte,

"PNUD: La Confianza en
(Ciudad de Mexico) Octubre, 9. 1997, at
judiciary

is

one of the lowest

also be

'''Id.

to

"constitutional justice," in

la

Justkia Mexicana, de las

1.

Commenting

that

in the world.

'" Fix Zamudio, Juicio de Amparo, supra note 188,
Cappelletti,

open

at 51.

Repudiating Montesquieu? supra note 107,

at 5.

last forty

Mas

Bajas"

which

La JORNADA NEWSPAPER,

Mexican public's confidence

in the

Mexican

governmental power

is

limited by a constitutional

been designed and institutions created

to enforce

Hence, being a country with a

civil

norm and

such

in

which procedures have

"

limits.

law tradition, Mexico

may

well adopt the

proper system. The implementation of the European model could be suitable for several

reasons.

the centralized system

First,

jurisdiction.^"' Civil

law judges are unfamiliar with

on the constitutionality of

to decide

lacks the stare decisis doctrine

statutes

this principle, so

could result

in a

civil

in

law

allowing each judge

law being disregarded as

by some judges, while being held constitutional and applied by others.""

unconstitutional

Hence, a single judicial body could be made capable of giving decisions of general
binding effect

when

dealing with the constitutionality of legislation, and the conflicts and

chaotic uncertainties can be avoided.'"

Second, in the European model, the concept of Separation of Powers

from

that of the

American system. """^

the judiciary as a third

power

legislative branches of

government.

authority of the

interpret

United States, for example, the recognition of

a progressive achievement to limit the executive and
"'

In

the concentrated system,

American judges could be interpreted

a single court entrusted with constitutional review constitutes not a third

power but one above

the others that

"' Cappelletti, Judicial Review,
supra note

is

charged with monitoring the three essential

1. at

55-60.

'"Id.
''-'Id.
Id., at

Id.

by contrast, the

as a political one, since they

'yd.

'-^

different

and make law encroaching on the legislative power. Therefore, according to

Hans Kelsen,
parallel

is

In the

is

54.

See also, Favoreu, Constitutional Review

in

Europe, supra note

7, at 55.

'

104

functions of the state (executive, legislative and Judicial branches).

affirms that the impetus for constitutional courts in Europe

concentration of political power.

"
'

Professor Favoreu

owes much

to the increased

"

Third, the centralized system reflects the unsuitability of ordinary civil law courts

for judicial review.

The United

~

States

Supreme Court has ordinary

of the courts, and even for constitutional questions a special procedure

like the rest

required. Therefore, the

Supreme Court

is

is

not

equivalent to the highest court of appeals, but

However,

not compatible with the specialized constitutional courts." "

civil

jurisdiction just

the traditional

law courts lack the structure, procedures and mentality required for an effective

control over the constitutionality of legislation."

Therefore, as Professor Cappelletti concludes, these are

reasons

why

a civil law country,

judicial organs.

It is

when adopting

healthier to create a totally

problems of coordination.

Favoreu, Constitutional Review

^-^
"**

""^

its

main function

is to

judicial review, should not use existing

new

judicial corpus despite the inherent

in

Europe, supra note

7, at 56,

ensure that the Constitution

It

is

noting that the Constitutional Court

Cappeli.etti, Judicial Review, supra note
Id.

Although
review.

a civil

respected in

neither
state

all areas.

According

Id. at

to

this

62. Civil law countries lack

Characteristically, in

1,

at 60.

law country, the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice has tried unsuccessfully

constitutional litigation and leave the

Mexico

notion

in

Mexico a

specialized

court

to excersise

could be institutionalized

for

Supreme Court of Justice with its ordinary jurisdiction.
the "compact and manageable structure of the United States Supreme Court.

there are several specialized courts, such as the Federal Fiscal Court, Court of the

Federal District for Administrative Conflicts and Federal Electoral Conflicts Court." See Mex. Const,
^'"

is

remains outside the traditional categories of

Id. at 56.

judicial
^""

most important

"^

part of the judicial order nor part of the judicial organization.

power, and

the

Cappelletti, Judicial Review, supra note

1,

at

65, 66.

art.

94.

Conclusion
The American system of

No

countries.

whatever

review has been very attractive

judicial

special procedure for constitutional questions

their nature, are

to

required;

many

disputes,

all

decided by the same courts, and extraordinarily the principle of

stare decisis rules the legal effects of cases decided.

machinery has

is

to

be implemented

in a

common

The only requirement

law system with a

liberal

is

that this

democratic

system. Hence, countries wishing a similar system, but impeded by their civil law

tradition, sought an alternative instrument to

review inferior laws to assure conformity

with a higher, more fundamental law. The European model

is

the result of this desire.

This model concentrates judicial review power in one single judicial organ, whose
foundation

is

manifested in the Constitution and whose decisions have a general effect.

This model has been adopted for an important number of western, central and eastern

European countries.
Despite

decades

of constitutional

transformation,

institutional

arrangements

prevent the Mexican judicial system from achieving effective instruments to enforce basic

constitutional principles and maintain an equilibrium of powers.

an obstacle for major changes and until

it

is

The Aniparo

represents

reformed, constitutional guarantees remain

threatened in Mexico.

Mexico

aspires for a democratic

branches. Therefore,

it

government and needs a judicial check

in its

co-equal

needs to join the constitutional movement. Constitutionalism has

105

106

made

groat progress in countries that have established constitutional courts.

their

decisions,

fundamental

constitutional

rights.

Modern

courts

have engendered respect

lor

Because of

constitutions

constitutions necessarily include constitutional

and

supremacy

and constitutional review both of which are missing from the Mexican System.
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